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Chapter One 
Introduction  
 
1.1. Statement of Problem 
The impact of societal instability on fertility remains one of the least understood 
issues in population studies. There are three major types of societal instabilities. First, the 
instability resulting from natural and man-made disasters like famines, earthquakes, wars, 
floods and terrorist attacks. The second type of instability is related mostly to economic 
problems, particularly unstable unemployment and other types of market insecurities 
such as term-limited working contracts. Finally, the third type of societal instability, of 
concern in this thesis, is the sociopolitical one. The latter is conceptualized as the wide 
range of types of domestic unrest in civil and political society: on one end of the spectrum there 
are mild dislocations and internal strife that do not require police action, and, on the other end, 
such highly disruptive events as strikes, civil disobedience, riots, coups, power struggles and the 
like (Sofranko and Bealer, 1972). Another conceptualization of sociopolitical instability, 
proposed by Alesina and Perotti (1993), emphasizes, at the one extreme, an executive instability 
that is the “propensity to observe governmental changes,” constitutional and, especially, non-
constitutional ones (like the coup d’état) that are typical for authoritarian and totalitarian 
regimes. At the other extreme, scholars place social unrest and broad political violence. 
Although these types of societal instability are related with each other and even could partially 
overlap, there is still a distinctive conceptualization of each based on the predominant 
component in any given kind of instability.                                                         
Previous works addressing the impact of instability in political society on fertility 
are relatively rare. The majority of works have focused either on the impact on fertility 
caused by instability resulting from natural or man-made disasters, including wars and 
famines (Palloni, 1990; Palloni, 2006), or by economic instability, particularly unstable 
employment and other types of market insecurities such as term-limited working 
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contracts (Kreyenfeld, 2010; Perelli-Harris, 2008). In contrast, the impact of 
sociopolitical instabilities, especially its milder variants caused by the cycles of 
empowered political elites in authoritarian states, or the effect of sociopolitical instability 
in civil society (not directly or fully related to economic uncertainty) on fertility has 
received little attention. In the current dissertation research I attempt to fill this gap by 
studying the impact on fertility of relatively moderate sociopolitical instabilities related to 
the cycling of the ruling elite in the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 
(Roeder 1993) and the erosion and deterioration of the social contract in the same country 
(Cook 1994). 
Russia and the former USSR provide a unique opportunity to study the 
relationship between sociopolitical instability and fertility rates. The USSR and its 
successor, Russia, had both minor political instabilities and major ones, including, in case 
of the former, the breakdown of the state and a social system collapse. Some periods 
were typified by only one type of instability, while other periods had several. The variety 
of types of instability in the country’s recent history allows for a thorough examination of 
their impact on fertility. (Further in the dissertation I provide a list of the sociopolitical 
instability types along with their definition (p. 50). The period of research interest, from 
1959 to 1998, was marked with several variants of sociopolitical instabilities that are 
broken down and ranked in intensity and strength. Various types of instabilities’ impact 
on fertility (which underwent extreme variations, from sudden increase in fertility in the 
mid -1980s to steep decline in the late 1980s and early 1990s), are examined. 
Sociopolitical instabilities of various types usually cause short-term fluctuations 
of fertility. Though rarely defined precisely, short-term fluctuations in fertility are 
referred to as ones with periods lasting up to two decades (Ben-Porath 1973; Hammel 
1985; Adsera and Menendez, 2009). Despite the short duration of such fluctuations, they 
are consequential for many reasons. First, they can have a huge impact on the social and 
economic dimensions of society, and in particular on education, labor market and social 
security. Second, short-term fertility fluctuations' impact is not limited to the timing of 
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the fluctuations themselves: short-term fluctuations in fertility create an “echo effect’ that 
affects society for long periods, often several generations. The “echo-effect” is a 
demographic phenomenon of the long-term and has repetitive consequences of fertility 
rates for the future sex and age structure of population and, in turn, its further impact on 
fertility rates. Third, short-term fluctuations in fertility often create new social and 
economic environments for the corresponding generations that lead to new demographic 
patterns, social strategies and specific lifestyles. (For example, the Baby Boom 
generation in the U.S.). These, in turn, heavily impact the social, cultural and political 
elements of society. A more detailed analysis of short-term fluctuations in fertility of 
various origins is provided in the corresponding section (pp. 52 - 63). 
 
1.2. Research Objectives and Questions 
The first objective of this project is to investigate the extent and direction of 
fertility change caused by different types of sociopolitical instability in Soviet and post-
Soviet Russia. Specifically, this research identifies time periods characterized by stability 
and those characterized by various types of sociopolitical instability, and examine their 
impact on fertility rates. 
The second objective of this research project is to propose a mechanism 
explaining how various types of macro-level sociopolitical instabilities influence micro-
level decision-making on fertility that, in turn, leads to a corresponding outcome. A 
model allowing for testing hypotheses linking macro-level instability and crisis with 
micro-level (or individual) fertility decision-making is proposed.  
In doing so, two fundamental questions are addressed: 
1. Are fertility rates affected by sociopolitical instability? 
2. Are fertility rates affected differently, both in magnitude and direction, by 
various types of sociopolitical instability?  
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1.3. Limitations of Previous Studies 
 Previous works addressing short-term fertility change, including studies of 
societal instability, are relatively rare. As mentioned before, the majority of the existing 
studies have focused on either the impact of instability resulting from natural disasters, 
wars and famines (Palloni, 1990; Palloni, 2006), or on the effect of economic instability, 
particularly unstable employment and other types of market insecurities such as term-
limited working contracts (Kreyenfeld, 2010; Perelli-Harris, 2008). The impact of 
sociopolitical instabilities, especially relatively moderate ones such as cycles of 
empowered political elites or the deterioration of social contract on fertility has received 
little attention. 
In addition, existing demographic theories fall short of bridging macro-micro 
links. Traditional demographic theories emphasize the macro level and generally fail to 
represent human agency (Davis, 1986; Caldwell, 1978; Knodel & Van De Walle, 1979; 
Lesthaeghe, 1977; Watkins, 1986; Hammel, 1990; McNicoll, 1994). Other theories, such 
as the microeconomic, present a model of decision-making at the household (micro) level 
but reduce the macro level to the changing constraints and opportunities that influence 
this decision-making equation (Becker 1991; Becker and Lewis, 1973; Becker and 
Tomes, 1976). This theory also considers decision-making in a state of equilibrium. Thus, 
the model is not applicable in times of rapid and unexpected change.   
To address these theoretical and empirical limitations, this dissertation explores 
the impact of several types of sociopolitical instability on fertility rates utilizing a model 
that encompasses both micro- and macro levels. The proposed model links large-scale 
social and political conditions, individual perception of these situations as uncertainties, 
and individual decision-making on fertility and aggregate fertility behavior. 
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1.4. Theoretical Directions and Contributions 
To understand sociopolitical instabilities in the recent history of the USSR/Russia 
(1959-1998), I draw upon two political theories. The first is reciprocal accountability, 
which is used to define cycles of instability of political leadership in the former USSR 
after 1953, the year when Soviet dictator Stalin has passed away and the new forms of 
relationship within the political elite were established (Roeder, 1993). Altogether, four 
consequential cycles are defined and ordered. These cycles are specified by time period. 
In reciprocal accountability theory, time periods are seen as varying on two planes of 
society: policy and civil. Instability in the first plane is characterized by inconsistency 
and the reversal of previously introduced policy reforms. Policy reforms refer to efforts to 
redistribute privileges and wealth by changing the policy outputs of government. This 
kind of instability is relatively moderate. Reciprocal accountability theory postulates that 
greater instability occurs within civil society. This kind of instability corresponds to 
cycles of leadership and coincides with the introduction and reversal of procedural and 
constitutional reforms. Procedural reforms are efforts to redistribute power and wealth by 
changing policy making procedures (transfers of decision making among previously 
existing organs (that are the Soviet/Russian governmental bodies) or changes in the 
configuration of formal organs themselves). Constitutional reform is a type of procedural 
reform in which the most fundamental rules of policymaking and accountability are 
changed. The bigger the scope of the proposed change, the greater is the instability. This 
instability is further exacerbated when there is inconsistency and reversal of 
implementation in the reforms. Thus, periods associated with implementation and 
reversal of procedural reforms have higher levels of instability than those associated with 
policy reforms. For the same reason, instability related to constitutional reforms is greater 
than the instability followed by procedural reforms. 
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Periods of instability can also be caused by longer-term changes in social 
institutions. Other political theory employed in the dissertation research, social contract 
theory (Cook, 1984), describes the core institutional setting that provides stability within 
a social system in the USSR. According to this theory, societal stability is based on an 
implicit agreement between the government and populace that dictates loyalty and 
compliance of the latter in exchange for the provision of a social contract package. In the 
USSR, this package included secure employment, delivery of free medical and social 
services, and stable wages and prices. The initial deterioration of the social contract and 
then its further erosion and failure have marked the corresponding periods with greater 
levels of instability in civil society. What is important is that though the social contract, 
according to the scholar, contains economic components, its major impact touches upon 
the social and political dimensions. Cook illustrates this point by demonstrating the 
increase of politically motivated strikes with the erosion and, especially, the deterioration 
of the social contract. The reason for the strikes is that people started to view the solution 
of the problem not in addressing local economic conditions but rather in changing the 
components of the social system and existing political regime. 
To link instability to fertility rates, my research draws mostly from uncertainty 
reduction theory (Friedman, Hechter & Kanazawa, 1994) and to some extent from the 
theory of decision-making in a state of uncertainty (Arrow, 1983; Machina, 1987; 
Goszynska, 1991). These theories and methodological approaches emphasize individual 
perceptions of risk and uncertainty, and how they affect behavior in the corresponding 
situations that produce different outcomes. 
This dissertation research advances demographic theory by explaining fertility 
behavior in particular conditions. It links macro-level sociopolitical instabilities of 
various kinds with individual decision-making on fertility based on the uncertainty 
reduction theory. The research could also be regarded as a test of uncertainty reduction 
theory that is applied here in new ways. This research also contributes to the 
interpretation of demographic history in the USSR/Russia. Methodologically, this 
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research incorporates political, sociological and demographic theories, employs statistical 
method, and applies demographic analysis to Soviet and Russian social history.   
 
1.5. Hypotheses 
As a basis for the first set of hypothesis for the research presented here, I use and 
reformulate core assumptions of uncertainty reduction theory (Friedman et. al, 1994, 375-
400). Uncertainty reduction theory assumes the existence of both immanent and 
instrumental values. Reduction of uncertainty is considered to be a nonstandard universal 
immanent value. In opposite to the instrumental values that “…provide means to a wide 
variety of ends, immanent values are the ends that are desired purely for their own sake” 
(Friedman, 1994, 377). According to the theory, actors prefer decision-making under risk 
(where probabilities are known) to decision-making under uncertainty (where 
probabilities are unknown). Thus, actors try to reduce uncertainty by converting it instead 
to a situation under risk. Actors can do this in two ways. First, they can gather 
information that transforms uncertainty to risk. Second, they can adopt global strategies 
designed to reduce uncertainty about a set of future courses of action (Friedman et al., 
1994, p. 382).  
Proponents of uncertainty reduction theory (Friedman et. al, 1994, 375-400) have 
used this approach to explain fertility variation. According to this theory, having a child 
means reducing uncertainty because that means being embedded in the decades long 
interaction with a child and investment in his health, upbringing and education. In other 
words, the decision to have at least one child vs. having no children could stem during 
times of uncertainties from such sociopolitical instabilities that affect level of 
certainty/uncertainty of a spouse. Several assumptions and hypotheses have been derived 
from this perspective, including that the decision to have at least one child could function 
to reduce uncertainty related to constrained career opportunity and as a reaction to 
uncertainty related to duration of marriage. 
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 The following assumptions may be extrapolated from uncertainty reduction 
theory to explain the effects of instability on short-term fluctuations in fertility:  
 (1) Sociopolitical instability at the macro-societal level translates into 
uncertainty at the micro-level of a fertility decision-maker (individual level or at the level 
of a family unit); 
 (2) The greater the extent of societal instability, the greater the level of 
associated uncertainty that micro-level decision-maker on fertility outcome (an individual 
or a family unit) would like to reduce.   
 (3) The greater the level of uncertainty at a micro level, the greater the 
number of births per individual or a family (according to the uncertainty reduction theory 
premise that fertility implies reducing uncertainty). 
These assumptions further suggest the formulation of several general hypotheses: 
H1. Periods of sociopolitical instability not coupled with economic instability and 
crisis are typified by increased fertility. 
H2. The greater the extent of sociopolitical instability on a societal level, the 
greater the fertility rate for a given period (other factors controlled). 
This basic hypothesis is further elaborated upon by taking into account specific 
scope and type of period-specific instabilities that allow for ranking by intensity and 
magnitude. It is tested in regard to each pair of the established hierarchy of instabilities in 
regard to their magnitude and intensity. 
H3. Stable periods are typified by lower fertility rates than the ones marked by 
sociopolitical instabilities. 
H4. Stable periods are typified by greater homogeneity (or less variance) of 
fertility rates than those marked by increasing levels of sociopolitical instability. (That is 
because during the unstable periods, marked with increased uncertainties, fertility should 
go up, according to the uncertainty reduction theory). 
Finally, the last general hypothesis concerns periods that are marked by both 
sociopolitical and severe economic instabilities and crises. 
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H5. During periods characterized by both a profound economic and sociopolitical 
instability, fertility rates will be most affected by the former and, according to the 
premises of microeconomic theory, will go down. (The detailed argument for the 
formulation of this hypothesis is provided below (see pp. 111-114).      
 
           1.6. Data and Research Methods.  
The data used in this research were obtained from Roskomstat (State Committee 
on Statistics), an official Russian governmental body. This organization also incorporates 
data from its predecessor in the Soviet Union, Tse Se U (Central Statistical Bureau). The 
data are based on censuses that took place in the years 1959, 1970, 1979, and 1989. The 
information about births is mainly derived from current registration in ZAGSes, the 
Register of the Acts of Marriages and Births. Thus, the role of censuses in obtaining 
fertility data is mostly indirect—for instance, they provide an age structure for calculation 
of the ratios in fertility tables. Also, retrospective data about number of children born are 
sometimes collected. Between the censuses, age structure is estimated on the basis of last 
census and the current registration of demographic events. Census data have been used in 
many Russian, European and American publications (e.g. Coale & Anderson, 1978). 
The statistical methods used in this research project are variations on APC (age-
period-cohort) models. With these models, it is possible to estimate the effects of periods 
with different levels and scopes of societal instability and crisis on fertility rates while 
controlling for age and cohort effects. Variations of this model were required because 
available data contained uneven period and age intervals: Fertility rates were available for 
every year in a period of research interest—1952-2000—but they were grouped in five-
year age intervals (15-19, 20-24…45-49).  There are three major variations of APC 
models: generalized linear model, intrinsic estimator and hierarchical models. I have 
chosen the first one since it is less flawed in the case of having strong theoretical 
assumptions for setting equality constraints. That means equating just two coefficients in 
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one of the three dimensions (age, cohort and period) basing it on the existing knowledge 
of informed assumptions. 
 
1.7. Organization of Thesis 
 Chapter 1 introduces the overall project, describes the limitations of 
previous studies, formulates research questions and hypotheses, describes theoretical 
directions and contributions, and provides an outline of the structure of the dissertation. 
 Chapter 2 provides an overview of sociological approaches to the 
conceptualization of instability, analyzes political theories of instability, and creates a 
typology of societal instabilities. Based on this typology, the periodization of social 
history of USSR/Russia is established. 
 Chapter 3 addresses theoretical and methodological issues in identifying 
a mechanism that links societal instabilities and crisis to fertility decision-making and 
behavior. Specifically, demographic theories are analyzed to find ways to this 
mechanism. The rationale for using uncertainty reduction theory is provided. The model 
and procedure for an application to research questions based on that theory is worked out. 
 Chapter 4 describes data and methods used to test the hypotheses and 
outline the results of testing. The analytic method that is used in this research is a 
variation of an age-period-cohort (APC) model; the application of the model to the data is 
described and justified. The results of the analysis are presented.   
 Chapter 5 discusses the research results in relation to 
theoretical/empirical issues and articulates directions for future research. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Instability of Institutional Structures and Society in the USSR/Russia: 
Conceptualizations, Theories and Periodization 
This chapter describes the different kinds of sociopolitical instabilities as well as 
instabilities related to economic crises in the USSR/Russia from 1953 to 1998. This 
periodization is the foundation for examining the impact of different types of instability 
on fertility rates. First, I analyze the concept of instability in relation to different theories. 
Second, I define different periods in recent Russian history in terms of particular types 
and levels of instability. 
 
2.1. Critical Overview of the Theories of Sociopolitical Instability  
To develop an understanding of social and political instability, two theories of 
institutional and political order are examined. The first is the theory of reciprocal 
accountability and the second is social contract theory. By elaborating on the premises of 
these theories, a general analysis of the concepts and dimensions of instability is 
undertaken. 
 
2.1.1. Instability as a Sociological Concept 
To analyze the effects of instability on fertility, it is important to investigate the 
possibility of this concept’s operationalization. Functionalist scholars (Alexander, 1982, 
vol. 1, 174) attempted to link instability with system equilibrium, including static and 
dynamic, moving and stationary kinds of this phenomenon. 
“Moderate” or “mild” functionalism is used as a tool for conceptualizing sociopolitical 
instabilities by Sofranko and Bealer (1972). They view instabilities largely as growing 
imbalances between several segments of societies such as the economy, education, welfare and 
the political system. For instance, they cite the examples of some African countries that were not 
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able to match job opportunities within the continent with the growing number of highly educated 
professionals, usually attributable to improving quality of education and increase of educational 
settings in these countries. 
Sonfranko and Bealer acknowledge the wide range of types of domestic instability and 
their relative seriousness. On one end of the spectrum are mild dislocations that do not require 
police action. On the other end, Sofranko and Bealer locate such events as strikes, civil 
disobedience, riots, coups, power struggles and the like. They also make a very important and 
promising attempt to conceptualize domestic instabilities. They offer a construction of an index 
of the level of domestic instability that allows for scaling. This level is based on intensity of the 
most unstable domestic event, number of domestic unstable events, and magnitude of civil 
violence. 
Safranko and Bealer suggest that the first measure be constructed based on a seven-point 
rating system ranging from complete stability (0) to extreme instability (6).  The countries are 
assigned to each of these categories based on the most unstable events recorded in a given 
period. For instance, in one such allocation, the following events were rated in terms of intensity 
of instability: 0 - general election held and without repercussion; 1 - resignation or dismissal of a 
cabinet official or dissolution of a legislature; 2 - peaceful demonstrations, strikes of article law; 
3 - riots or assassination of political leaders, but not the head of state; 4 - large-scale arrests, plots 
or terrorism; 5 - revolts or coup d’état; and 6 - revolution or civil war (Sofranko and Bealer, 
1972, 35). The second measure, the number of unstable events, is pretty straightforward. In the 
third measure, related to civil violence, the summary instability score is created from a set of five 
basic measures: 1 - number of participants; 2 - area encompassed by the most widespread strife; 
3 - number of casualties; 4 - extent of property damage; and 5 - duration of civil violence. 
A very useful conceptualization of instability is also proposed by Alesina and Perotti 
(1993). The authors introduce the concept of sociopolitical instability that could be viewed in 
two ways. The first one emphasizes executive instability. The second relates to social unrest and 
political violence. The first approach defines political instability as the “propensity to observe 
governmental changes.” These changes could be either constitutional or non-constitutional. The 
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first ones take place within the law, and the second could mean having a coup d’état. Authors 
stress that a high propensity to executive changes is associated with policy uncertainty and, in 
some cases, with threats to property rights. Also, propensity for executive changes is distinct 
from the actual frequency of changes.  
The second approach for measuring sociopolitical instability proposed by Alesina and 
Perotti is aimed at capturing phenomena related to social unrest. The index of sociopolitical 
instability includes the following variables: ASSASS, the number of politically motivated 
assassinations; DEATH, the number of people killed in conjunction with phenomena of 
domestic mass violence; SCOUP, the number of successful coups; UCOUP, the number of 
attempted but unsuccessful coups; DICT, a dummy variable that takes the value of zero in 
democracies; 0.5 in semi-democracies and 1 in dictatorships.  In this model, democracy is 
defined as a country with free competitive elections, while semi-democracy is a country with 
some form of elections but with some severe restrictions on political rights; a dictatorship is a 
country without competitive elections. 
One of the important implications of this approach is the inclusion and conceptualization 
of the milder forms of sociopolitical instabilities that could be limited to the power struggle in 
ruling elites. These kinds of instabilities could also create uncertainties and affect demographic 
behavior; however, they are rarely mentioned and researched. The examples of a few works 
explicating such kinds of relatively moderate types of instabilities are Roeder’s (1993) work on 
power struggle in the USSR elite and Cook’s (1994) on the deterioration of the social contract in 
the USSR. The concepts employed by these authors are elaborated upon in the following 
sections. 
Based on these analyses, I argue that it is possible to operationalize different 
levels of instability and disequilibrium at the ratio level of quantification, providing a 
ranking of the instabilities of various degrees of magnitude and intensity. The above-
mentioned unstable equilibrium, for instance, is definitely lower in the level of instability 
than the state of disequilibrium. Different types of change (evolutionary, discontinuous, 
etc.) create different levels of instability that can be ranked as well.   
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Also, instability can be ranked not only in scope but also in strength (intensity). 
Instability in civil society, for instance, will be ranked higher than instability in the power 
elite. By the same token, instability in the political system of an authoritarian state ranks 
higher than it would in industrial democracies, because the latter does not depend so 
much on the polity of a state. It is appropriate to mention here that, as many scholars 
point out, using the concept of equilibrium does not necessarily imply a functionalist 
logic and approach.  
The typology of instability is important for locating periods of instability across 
the social history of the USSR/Russia in order to test the hypotheses regarding 
instability’s impact on fertility rates. I will elaborate on the typology of instability in 
relation to different historical periods of the country of interest and apply it for testing 
hypotheses in subsequent sections.   
 
 2.1.2. Instability as viewed by reciprocal accountability theory  
In this subsection I show the relevance of the reciprocal accountability theory 
based on new institutionalism. By elaborating on this theory, basic and structural models 
of “reciprocal accountability” and cycles of leadership are demonstrated.  
 
The Theory of Reciprocal Accountability 
The theory of reciprocal accountability is rooted in the premises of new 
institutionalism. It breaks with two dominating traditional views on policy-making: 
individual- and society-centered. Some branches of new institutionalism offer a state-
centered theory. It views the polity as a largely autonomous system with its own internal 
interests and logic of development. It defines institutions as rules that prescribe 
behavioral roles (North 1990, 3; Keohane 1988, 383-94; Young 1986, 107). These rules 
encompass human behavior and social interactions. Individual choice can challenge a 
prevailing rule and thus change the expectations that define the institution. This new 
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institutionalism view of the interplay between elements of social interaction is essential 
for building a model of power relations. 
The theoretical model of reciprocal accountability developed by Roeder provides 
an explanation of power relations in the authoritarian state, namely the USSR from the 
1953 (the year of Stalin’s death) and up to the moment of its breakdown. It allows for 
determination of periods of socio-political instability related to power imbalance and 
ranks them in scope and intensity. I will discuss that model using the formulation of the 
principles of new institutionalism that are the foundation of the reciprocal accountability 
theory. I will then turn to the basic elements of the model and follow up with an analysis 
of its structure and functioning. I will apply that model to real policymaking in the 
authoritarian state and will link cycling of reciprocal accountability with changes in 
levels of stability/instability. 
 
The Basic Model of Reciprocal Accountability 
 A model of reciprocal accountability starts with the definition and recognition of 
the Bolsheviks’ constitution. A constitution is defined as polity’s most fundamental rules 
defining political roles and relationships, whether written or unwritten. 
 Roeder (1993) begins his analysis of the constitution of Bolshevism with a static 
relationship where the constitution shapes coalition processes and through these 
influences defines political outcomes. The constitution is linked to reform in a two-step 
relationship. The first step is the interaction between political actors that is guided and 
governed by constitutional rules and results in shaping coalitions. Because the latter 
consists of actors with certain preferences, these constituencies tend to favor some policy 
outcomes over others. That leads to the second step, coalition-building processes creating 
a chance for innovation (reform) because they could redistribute shares of certain 
political preferences. This, in turn, could change the distribution of policy benefits and 
costs (Brzezinski & Huntington, 1965, 191-232; Schilling, Hammond & Snyder, 1962). 
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The dynamic version of these relationships includes the possibility of changing 
rules in the course of political development. According to the principles of new 
institutionalism, political behavior also affects existing rules. However, there are limits in 
the range of these changes because of the constraints of basic constitutional rules. So, 
although certain changes are possible and even likely, the design of the constitution 
constrains its own development, creating the so-called path-dependent trajectory (North, 
1990, 92-104). 
The constitution of Bolshevism was founded on a conscious plan to deprive the 
vast majority of the adult population of political participation and to eliminate 
accountability of those exercising policymaking. The early decisions created a 
constitutional order of reciprocal accountability—not between a large unenfranchised 
populace and policymakers, but between policymakers and their bureaucratic 
constituencies, i.e., within the state structure. The constitution determined a reciprocal 
accountability in which policymakers needed the support of their bureaucratic 
constituencies, but bureaucrats in turn needed support from policymakers to remain in 
office. 
The political game in the Soviet Union from 1953, the year of Stalin’s death and 
the new arrangement of the power structure, to the breakdown of the state, revolved 
around the formation and change of coalitions between two tiers of political power: 
policymakers (first tier) and bureaucrats (second tier). From 1953 to 1985, the 
constitutional order was institutionalized. The first tier (Politburo) and second tier that 
represented bureaucratic constituencies (Central Committee) were reciprocally 
accountable to each other. However, they were involved in a tug of war to shift the 
balance of power. In the first tier, the struggle for leadership through coalition formation 
resulted in cycling between directive and collective leadership. However, with the 
advancement of institutionalization, the amplitude of alternated cycles of power shifts 
diminished, both for shifts between first and second tiers and within the first tier (i.e., 
between directive and collective leadership). 
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Institutionalization of the constitution thus established political equilibrium 
among empowered political actors. This equilibrium created a paradoxical effect: it 
contributed to the stability of the political system while at the same time creating 
vulnerability due to inability to adapt to social change. The more institutionalized the 
constitution became, the more stable the system became, with less likelihood that reforms 
would succeed. This notion is used later in the ranking of periods in regard to the degree 
of political instability. The latter is further tested for the impact on fertility: according to 
the uncertainty reduction theory explicated later, the more unstable the period is, the 
greater is fertility. 
 
 Structural Model of Reciprocal Accountability 
 The model of reciprocal accountability needs to be examined in a more detailed 
way. In a previous subsection, the relationship between constitutional structures of the 
authoritarian state and normal politics was sketched. Normal politics is the state in which 
political actors use existing rules to attain their goals. At a certain point, however, rules 
lose their efficiency and become an obstacle to the goals instead of means to their 
achievement. At this point, political actors turn to constitutional politics, in which they 
try to advance their causes by changing the rules themselves. 
 The shifts between directive (one-person) and collective or collegial 
(multiperson) rule in the first tier reflect the oldest distinction between assigning 
policymaking in the authoritarian state to a single individual, a small committee, or a 
large assembly. Examples of directive rule are assigning policymaking to a president or a 
general secretary. Examples of rule by committee are junta, revolutionary command 
council, or Politburo. There are basic differences between individual and collective 
political choices traced in game theory and collective action logic. The importance of the 
distinction between individual and collective decision-making is underscored by 
researchers (Olson, 1965, ch.1-2).  
  
18 
 
 The body that holds the power to select and remove policymakers constitutes the 
selectorate, a term used by Roeder to specify the body of “voters’ in the totalitarian and 
authoritarian societies. In democratic societies, the electorate encompasses the vast 
majority of the participant population (although a small chunk of it is unenfranchised and 
is not a part of the electorate; this group includes felons, resident aliens, the 
institutionalized and minors). In an authoritarian state, policymakers are accountable only 
to a small part of the entire potentially participant population. Using Dahl’s term for the 
continuum of a selectorate, inclusiveness is significantly lower in an authoritarian state.  
The new institutionalism suggests that accountability arises in the context of a 
delegated relationship, incorporating a principal-agent model. The policymakers (agents) 
are accountable to the selectorate (principal); agents are punished by cancellation of their 
principal relationship, or rewarded by a continuation of the relationship. 
 Roeder identifies three ideal types of policymakers’ accountability: 1) leaders are 
despotic and so not accountable to others' control; 2) leaders are accountable to a 
restrictive group of social interests; or 3) leaders are accountable to a selectorate drawn 
from the governing apparatus itself. The example of the first type is hereditary monarchy; 
junta exemplifies the second type represented in authoritarianism; and democratic society 
is an example of selectorate accountability, according to the scholar. 
Power relationships differ significantly between democratic and authoritarian 
societies. Democratic societies hold a pattern of hierarchical relationship characterized by 
unilateral delegation in which the rights of the agents are conditional but the rights of the 
principal are ultimate. Agents (policymakers) could be deprived of their rights by 
removal from their posts by the selectorate, but the principal (the selectorate) cannot be 
deprived of its rights by the agent. Reciprocal accountability in authoritarian societies 
assumes that selectors such as bureaucratic constituencies can be appointed and removed 
by the very leaders (policymakers) whom they themselves appoint and remove. 
 In both types of accountability, a role may be simultaneously a principal and an 
agent. However, within the hierarchy a principal is an agent of a higher principal; in a 
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reciprocal relationship the principal is at the same time is the agent of its own agent. In 
other words, the second-tier bureaucratic constituencies appointed by policymakers are 
their agents. At the same time, they are policymakers’ principals because being appointed 
by them, they also elect them. And vice versa, first-tier policymakers are agents of the 
second-tier bureaucrats and face the possibility of being removed from their posts by the 
latter. At the same time, the first-tier leaders are the bureaucrats’ principals because they 
appoint second-tier bureaucrats and delegate to them some of their rights. 
 Again, it is worth emphasizing that according to the state-centered orientation of 
the new institutionalism, the analyzed type of reciprocal accountability is applicable 
within the polity. As for the relationship between state and society and, in particular, 
between leaders and the majority of population, it is strictly hierarchical.  
 This model of accountability in an authoritarian polity could be represented in a 
following way (see Fig.1.1):  
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  Figure 1.1. Model of Reciprocal Accountability 
 
 
 
 
 
                            Figure 1. Model of reciprocal accountability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 represents two-tier polity outlined by Roeder (1993). In the first tier, 
policymaking could be collective or directive. The second-tier selectors, drawn from 
nongovernmental interests or the governing apparatus, are accountable to the 
policymakers. The selectors also select the leaders, which, in turn, make the leaders 
accountable to the selectorate. Accountability is not continuous—it is rather sporadic. 
Reciprocal accountability is not simultaneous—it is rather nonsynchronous, with 
alternating periods of accountability of leaders to selectors and selectors to leaders. The 
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tug of war between two tiers could cause oscillation between the poles of reciprocal 
accountability and hierarchical despotism. The oscillation in the first tier is between 
directive and collective leadership. The presented model reflects what has been called 
above the normal polities, the ones exercised largely under existing rules. There are three 
important dynamics in authoritarian polities.  
 The first is a cycle of alternating directive and collective leadership. At the 
creation of a new regime or during the time that follows succession, authoritarian leaders 
push for collective leadership. Their rationale is a fear that their own autocratic power 
could turn against them, and they view collective leadership as a check. However, 
collectivities are characterized by two ambiguities: the relationship of a collectivity's 
chair to its other members and the relationship of a collectivity to other decision-making 
centers like the cabinet (Woodward, 1990, 137-64). These ambiguities create an arena for 
a tug of war between the collectivity and its leader that often results in the consolidation 
of directive rule. Then the rest of the collective leadership begins to break off and either 
contest directive leadership or, after the leader's removal or death, reestablish a new full-
scale collegial rule (with the approval of a new leader). 
 The second dynamic of authoritarian polities is the balance of power shifts 
between tiers. Because reciprocal accountability is exercised non-synchronically, there 
are incentives and opportunities for each tier to limit the opportunities and power of the 
other one. This process is closely tied to the balancing of directive and collective 
leadership in the first tier. The greatest level of control of the first tier by the second is at 
the time of establishing collective leadership in the former. In contrast, the consolidation 
of directive rule in the first tier upgrades its power and control over the second. 
 The third important dynamic of authoritarian polities is the link between building 
coalitions within and across tiers and the policy process and its outcomes. The policy 
process and its outcomes are affected by: 1) the configuration of power in the first tier; 2) 
the structure of the suffrage within the second tier; and 3) the balance of power between 
tiers. The first link is explained by the fact that while during the first collective rule 
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political preferences must be balanced, a strong leader can impose his own preferences on 
his colleagues. 
 The second link (between the policy process and the structure of the franchise in 
the second tier) is determined by the desire to build coalitions with the second tier’s 
bureaucratic constituencies. Policy conducted by the leaders (whether under a directive or 
collective rule) aims to please the most influential and powerful second tier 
constituencies. As an example, Ames points out the use of public expenditures as a 
weapon of survival by Latin American executives (1987, vol.1, 44-45, 47-73). In another 
example that compares Argentina and Chile, Remmer (1984, 218-19) concludes that 
because higher percentages of Argentinean adults were permitted to vote, “authorities had 
more incentive to search for lower, and middle class, support in Argentina than in 
Chile…”. 
 Finally, in the third link, policy outcomes are affected by the shifts in power 
balances between the first and second tiers. Reciprocal accountability creates mutual 
expectations that Friedrich has called anticipated reactions (1940, vol.1, 3-24). Skidmore 
(1973, 17) illustrates this mutual influence and the shifts in expectations and obedience in 
his analysis of polity dynamics in the Brazilian military regime. He observes that despite 
strict hierarchy and discipline within the military corps, “…this structure allows room for 
an intricate process of participatory decision-making. The higher levels retain the final 
word, but they cannot diverge too far from the views of their junior officers”. The 
differences in policy preferences between the second and first tiers (especially when the 
latter is under directive rule) will reveal themselves in policy with every major shift in 
power between those tiers. 
 The model of normal authoritarian politics has a predictive capacity. There is, for 
instance, a slim chance for reform under stable reciprocal accountability, with these 
chances increasing with the shift to directive leadership in the first tier. This leadership 
change is usually accompanied by a shift of the power balance between tiers in favor of 
the first tier. The greater possibility for reform in these conditions is explained by the 
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greater ability of a leader to impose his policy preferences on his colleagues in the first 
tier and to overcome the resistance of the bureaucrats in the second tier due to relative 
weakening of their power. 
In contrast to normal politics, constitutional politics aim to revise the very rules of 
the authoritarian game. As Roeder notes, there are two constitutional issues that are 
central to the survival of bureaucratic reciprocal accountability: the composition of the 
selectorate and its relationship to policymakers (1993, 33). There is also a process of 
institutionalization that diminishes chances of constitutional changes. 
The first issue deals with the expansion of the franchise. Leaders often bring in 
unenfranchised participants to strengthen their positions while building coalitions. This 
may be accomplished through an appeal to popular support or by creating new structures 
outside of bureaucratic constituencies, as did Gorbachev in the late 1980s. However, it 
could be also accomplished by bringing in unenfranchised bureaucratic constituencies. 
 Changing the rules in the power balance between two tiers is aimed at changing 
reciprocal accountability into some approximation of the hierarchical one. The selectorate 
tries to promote collective leadership in the first tier to strengthen its own power. Leaders 
in the first tier may try to expand the number of bureaucrats in the second tier to 
complicate possible unified collective action against first tier leaders. 
 The process of institutionalization reinforces the mutual expectations of political 
actors. At first, the rules of the authoritarian constitution are characterized by 
indeterminacy. For instance, the power and responsibilities of the General Secretary of 
the Communist Party were not well determined. The coordination of mutual expectations 
and the reduction in indeterminacy in relationships between political actors and structures 
brought by institutionalization increased the stability of the political order. Reduction of 
the indeterminacy of power in the course of institutionalization reduced vacillation 
between collective and directive leadership, the shifting power between the first and 
second tiers, and the corresponding cycles of policy. That reduced chances for reform, 
which both increased the stability of the political system and at the same time doomed it 
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by rendering it incapable of adapting to the changing social environments. One of the 
examples of such inability to implement reforms as a result of the institutionalization of 
the vacillation of power between the first and second tiers was the failure of the 
implementation of the so-called Kosygin reform that implied giving more power, 
autonomy and incentives to the primary organizations like plants and factories. 
 
Cycles of Leadership and Changes in Policy and the Levels of Its Stability 
In its mature form, the institutionalization of the Soviet political system assigned 
reciprocal accountability between the first tier, the Politburo, and the second tier, the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party. The strategic positions in this selectorate 
were held by the primary bureaucracies of the Soviet society, including the party 
apparatus, the state economic administration, the military, and the police (Azrael, 1970, 
211; Brown, 1971, 140).  
 Two of these constituencies, namely, the part of military and economic 
administration, are often brought together by analysts who label them as a military-
industrial complex. In this form, the selectorate is largely represented by: 1) the party 
apparatus, linked with ideology; 2) the military-industrial complex; and 3) the secret 
police (KGB). These three constituencies are usually referred to as an “iron triangle.” 
 The enormous complexity of the rules of authoritarian politics and their 
implementation in the form of coalition building makes it impractical to concentrate on 
each individually. I will analyze only those that are directly related to actual and potential 
socio-political instability. Several points should be made before turning to this analysis. 
 First, the cycling between directive and collective leadership (and accompanying 
shifts in power balance between two tiers) designates different models of policymaking. 
These models oscillate between high and low levels of policy contestation. These shifts 
can be related to the levels of consolidation. 
 Second, it is worth elaborating on the major issues that were contested in the 
normal polity. Priorities in budget spending were one of the most important issues of 
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contestation, with the main rivalry existing between the civil and military sectors of the 
economy. That implies contestation between different budget priorities, such as 
expenditures on producer- and consumer goods, and also between heavy industry and the 
so-called social sphere. The shifting cycles of leadership had a significant impact on these 
policy processes and issues. The cycling of leadership goes through four stages, each one 
represented by a certain political regime. The four distinctive types of political regime 
based on changing cycles of leadership, are: first, stable directive leadership (that is 
singular, unilateral rule); second, stable collective leadership; third, contested (or limited) 
directorship; and, fourth, the period characterized by the breakout of the leader. 
 The third type is nested within the broad category of directive leadership. The 
fourth type is nested within the category of collective leadership. Hence, according to the 
logic of leadership cycling, there are four consequent phases of cycling.  After each 
succession, there is a period of stable collective rule. Then the leader breaks out (that is 
attempts to shift the balance of power toward a directive rule), creating instability within 
still existing collective leadership. If he wins (gains control), a new stable period of 
directive rule is established.  
After that, the leader begins to be challenged by his colleagues, with the support 
of bureaucratic constituencies. This usually leads to the limited (contested) directorship. 
The latter often lasts up to the next succession that brings new collective leadership. The 
level of policy contestation increases in the phases of leaders’ breakout and limited 
directorship. Policy contestation at these periods is both a product and a cause of 
instability. The dynamics of instability related to policy contestation caused by cycling of 
leadership could be represented as follows (see Fig. 1.2: Instability Related to Levels of 
Consolidation and Contestation at Different Leadership Cycles at page 26): 
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 Figure 2.  Instability related to levels of consolidation and contestation at 
                 different leadership cycles 
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The diagram presented by Roeder (1993) shows not just the static relationship 
between power consolidation and policy contestation (i.e. instability), but also the 
declining amplitude of both the oscillation between collective and directive leadership 
and of the level of contestation with each new cycle. This trend is caused by the 
institutionalization of reciprocal accountability.   
 The instability related to the reciprocal accountability mode of change can be 
rank-ordered in degree and intensity (from low to high): 1) asynchronic accountability 
between the first and second tiers; 2) breakout of the leader and corresponding policy 
shifts and reforms; 3) contestation of consolidated leadership and corresponding 
incoherence in policy, including reversals of the policy reforms; 4) procedural reforms; 
and, 5) constitutional reforms. Points two and three can be internally rank-ordered across 
cycles given the fact of diminishing consolidation and policy contestation with each new 
cycle. 
This rank-ordering and periodization of various types of instabilities are important 
for future testing of the hypotheses about these instabilities’ impact on fertility. 
 
2.1.3. Social Contract Theory 
Another theory that deals with the issues of instability and crisis in the 
USSR/Russia is that of the social contract. Cook, the main proponent of this theory, 
proposes that stability in the USSR after Stalin’s death was based on an unwritten 
agreement between the political elite and the population: the political elite provided 
economic security, including employment and wage stability plus social welfare, and in 
return expected political compliance and quiescence (Cook, 1993). 
 The key element of Cook’s model is that the population is viewed not as 
unenfranchised consent (the case with Roeder’s model), but as a potential actor. This 
population can present a threat to stability should the political elite violate the social 
contract. To be precise, the actual party in a social contract is not the whole population. 
In the case of the USSR/Russia, the intelligentsia, including dissidents, did not participate 
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in the deal with the political elite, and thus was not willing to comply. Also, non-Slavic 
segments of the population of the Soviet Union had strong motivation for secession and 
were not easy partners in the social contract. The contract was actually maintained 
between the political elite and the Slavic, blue-collar workers.  
 Among competing explanations for long periods of apparent political stability is 
an attribution of full employment and social security, ideological principles, and built-in 
properties of the planned economy (Kornai, 1992; Kostakov, 1987). On the other hand, 
alternative explanations for the workers’ compliance attribute it to the atomization and 
depolitization of the working class and personal dependencies of workers (Zaslavsky, 
1982; Walder, 1986).  
 To prove that it is the social contract that accounts for both phenomena, Cook 
proposes two approaches. First, to demonstrate that it is fear of unrest that motivates the 
political elite to stick to the contract, Cook introduces so-called “pressure points.” At 
certain periods of time, the ideological and economic constraints provide strong 
motivation, or pressure points, for the political elite to reverse some parts of the contract, 
either by increasing prices, or by cutting social welfare. If during these pressure point 
periods the government keeps up with the social contract ingredients, it proves the 
existence and importance of the social contract. One example of such pressure points is 
when Gorbachev proclaimed a new emphasis on the self-efficiency of factories and 
plants. Despite that, the government subsidized and bailed out potential and actual 
bankruptcies when faced the threat of unemployment. 
 Disproving alternative explanations of workers’ political quiescence, Cook also 
demonstrates a strong correlation between failure in social contract delivery and worker 
unrest. The beginning of the deterioration of the social contract in the eve of 1980s and 
its acceleration in the early 1990s not only increased the number of strikes but also 
changed the very nature of workers’ demands. Workers shifted from making locally 
focused demands (such as improving working conditions) to making broad political ones 
(as in reducing the role of the Communist Party committees at the factories). 
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 Cook singles out several periods in the delivery of the social contract in the 
USSR: first, the period of stable delivery of the social contract (1953-1979); second, 
certain failures in the delivery or the beginning of the deterioration of the social contract 
(1980-1985); third, further deterioration of the social contract (1986-1991); and fourth, 
complete breakdown of the social contract (with the breakdown of the socialist state 
USSR in 1991). 
Rank ordering of political instability may be performed along the lines of this 
periodization. The two reviewed theoretical models, reciprocal accountability and the 
social contract, have elements of incompatibility. The major one is different assumptions 
about population. While the reciprocal accountability model views the population as an 
unenfranchised participant, the social contract one ascribes it an important role that is 
taken into account in governmental decision-making. The first model defines periods of 
instability for the period from 1953 to 1990, while the second one views most of this 
period as stable, characterized with social contract-based political order. 
Still, these two theories could be complementary in defining and rank ordering 
periods of instability. Because these theories emphasize largely different periods (the first 
one elaborates primarily on the Soviet period up to Gorbachev, while the second 
emphasizes the deterioration of the contract in the early 1980s and the period of the 
breakdown of the state in the 1990s) and because they analyze different types of 
instability, both can be applied to testing hypothesis about the impact of different types of 
instability on fertility. In the next section, I will provide full-scale rank ordering and 
periodization of different types of instability that will be based on both reciprocal 
accountability and social contract. 
 
2.2. Social History of the USSR/Russia. Periodization of Different Types of 
Instability 
In this section, the theories of reciprocal accountability and social contract are 
applied to the periodization of sociopolitical instability across Soviet/Russian history. 
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Along with that, instability related to the economy is applied to the reviewed historical 
period. Instability is viewed across the planes of policy, civil society and economy. 
Relying mostly on the theories of Roeder, Cook and Aslund, Soviet/Russian history is 
described with an emphasis on events that brought instability of a given type for certain 
years within the period of research interest.       
 
           Periodization of instability-related policies 
From small to large scope, socio-political instability related to the theories of 
reciprocal accountability and social contract could be classified along the following lines: 
 Policy reforms: efforts to redistribute privileges and wealth by changing 
the policy outputs of government (for instance, shifting governmental spending between 
defense and social programs, heavy and light industries, producer and consumer goods). 
 Procedural reforms: efforts to redistribute power and wealth by changing 
the processes of policy making (transfers of decision-making among previously existing 
organs or changes in the configuration of formal organs themselves.) 
 Constitutional reform: a type of procedural reform where the most 
fundamental rules of policymaking and accountability are changed.   
 Social contract: the institutional setting providing stability of social 
system. 
Procedural reforms, constitutional reform, and social contract dynamics, although 
of different scope, could arguably all be referred to civil society instability. Policy reform 
and procedural reform are viewed within the theory of reciprocal accountability and 
cycling of leadership. According to this theory, there are four such successive cycles: 1) 
collective leadership; 2) breakout of a leader under collective leadership; 3) directive 
uncontested leadership; and 4) directive contested leadership. 
The instability of policy could be conceptualized as incoherent (among its 
elements) and inconsistent (over time) and viewed in a context of four instability types 
for the cycling of leadership: 1) the relatively minor instability within the most stable 
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cycle (uncontested directive leadership); 2) the relative instability of the cycles: from the 
most stable, directive uncontested leadership, to the least stable, contested leadership; and 
3) the relative stability of each successive cycle with its corresponding one (for instance, 
Brezhnev's directive leadership vs. Khrushchev's directive leadership); 4) instability 
caused by reversal of reform. Correspondingly, the following periodization of stable and 
unstable periods could be defined: 
 
 
Stable political periods 
1953- June 1954- stable collective leadership (without contestation) 
June 1957-1959- directive uncontested leadership by Khrushchev 
            Oct. 1964 - summer 1965- stable collective leadership (without contestation) 
Early 1970-1981- Brezhnev's directorship 
Nov. 1982-Dec. 1986- stable collective leadership (without contestation) 
 
Unstable political periods 
Latter half of 1954(53)-1957- Khrushchev's breakout (an attempt to shift the 
balance of power toward a directive rule) 
1960-1964 Khrushchev contested directorship 
1965-1969- Brezhnev's breakout (an attempt to shift the balance of power toward 
a directive rule) 
1982- Brezhnev's contested (limited) directorship 
The policy that stems from the cycling of leadership looks as follows: 
 
    Policy reforms 
1. Collective Leadership after Stalin’s Ouster 
According to Roeder’s “reciprocal accountability” theory, after Stalin’s death in 
March 1953, the collective leadership’s attempts at balance among themselves led to a 
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stalemate due to incompatible commitments. The new leadership was committed 
simultaneously to the comprehensive and expectation-raising process of expanding 
consumer goods output (the New Course), increasing investment in agriculture (the 
Virgin Lands Program), maintaining high investment in heavy industry, and keeping 
defense strong. In 1954, both the heavy industry and the consumer goods industry 
received a higher level of investment than in Stalin’s Fifth Five-Year Plan. Trying to 
please all constituencies, the collective leadership settled on paper reforms. Four 
measures increased the purchasing power of the population: 1) price reductions in 
consumer goods; 2) a reduction in turnover tax so that the effective price of goods fell 
still further; 3) a reduction in mandatory annual deductions from each worker’s wages to 
purchase bonds from the state from the equivalent of four weeks to two weeks of income; 
and 4) a reduction in taxes on the private plots of collective farmers, increasing money 
volume for peasants.   
However, there was no increase in the output of consumer goods commensurate 
with the increase in disposable incomes, and that led to greater disequilibrium between 
supply and demand.  Price-fixing due to new demand on the governmental stores caused 
an increase of consumer’s queues. In early 1954, the minister of trade admitted, “The 
increased real wages of workers, the rise in the living standard of the rural population, 
and the systematic reductions of prices have all occasioned a rise in demand for consumer 
goods, which has outstripped production of certain items such as meat and animal fats. 
Some people even have the impression that there are fewer foods to be had now than 
these were several years ago.”  
 The emerging budget deficit resulted in longer lines for consumers, inflation in 
the private and skyrocketing savings. The iron triangle took advantage of the opportunity 
provided by Khrushchev’s breakout in the latter half of 1954. On Dec. 27, 1954, 
Khrushchev announced that heavy industry would be given still greater precedence in 
Soviet budgets and plans. By January 1955, Khrushchev denounced attention to 
consumer goods as a right-wing deviation, and announced the Virgin Lands Program, 
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which, in the short run, limited growth of the consumer goods industry. The 1955 budget 
reflected an 8.71% increase in heavy industry, a 12% jump in defense, a 25% drop in the 
investment in light industry, and the slowest growth in the consumer goods industry in 
ten years. Wages rose at their slowest rate for the 5-year plan period—1.5 percent against 
an annual average of eight percent for 1951-1954. For the first time since 1945, retail 
prices were not reduced, and mandated bond purchases for each worker disabled in 1955 
were established. 
 
1. Collective Leadership After Khrushchev’s Ouster 
After Khrushchev's ouster, collective leadership once again resulted in policy 
inconsistencies including proposals both for and against reform. However, bigger 
constraints on differentiation than in previous successions narrowed divergence. Alexei 
Kosygin and Nikolai Podgorny advocated policy innovations that would shift priority to 
either the consumer goods industry or social programs and also proposed reforms for 
increasing material incentives. Podgorny spoke in May 1965, proposing expansion of 
housing construction, urban amenities, health care, and services for the daily needs of the 
people. These proposals were not nearly as bold as Malenkov's “New Course.” Again, the 
collective leadership tried to satisfy the demands of all factions in the 1965 budget, 
increasing wages at faster rate, cutting collective farm income taxes and expanding 
investment in consumer goods, while also expanding investment in defense, agriculture, 
and heavy industry. As before, this combination resulted in deficits and accelerated 
savings growth rates.  
 
    2. The Post-Brezhnev Succession 
The breakout of Brezhnev within collective leadership (that is an attempt to shift 
the balance of power toward a directive rule) was again used by the iron triangle to 
satisfy their demands. In his major speeches, Brezhnev criticized emphasis on material 
incentives and insisted on investment in heavy industry and defense. The budgets for 
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1966, 1967, and 1968 (the years of Brezhnev's breakout) were similar to the budgets in 
preceding years in their emphasis on heavy industry and defense. However, increased 
balance within leadership and greater checks on Brezhnev's breakout than on 
Khrushchev's resulted in greater incoherency and inconsistency in policies. While growth 
in spending on heavy industry seemed stable over time, spending on light industry not 
only lagged, but was erratic. 
The post-Brezhnev succession, from November 1982 through December 1986, 
was the longest period of stable (uncontested) collective leadership. Each of the three 
General Secretaries of that period (Andropov, Chernenko, and Gorbachev) reached out to 
different constituencies, primarily in the iron triangle, and departed from modern 
Brezhnev reforms. Emphasis shifted to investing more in heavy industry and defense. In 
Gorbachev's first budget for 1986 and 1987, defense spending was permitted to grow; the 
trend was reversed in early 1988. However, in the absence of strong pressure for reform 
during Gorbachev’s decisive breakout attempt to change the contested rule for a directive 
one, the departures from Brezhnev's moderate reforms were mild—far from being a 
conservative backlash. 
 
3. Khrushchev’s Directive and Contested Leadership 
Again, in his breakout (an attempt to shift the balance of power toward a directive 
rule) Khrushchev started building a coalition with the iron triangle. Also, he cautiously 
began to reach out to other constituencies. The sixth five-year plan (1956-60), adopted in 
Feb 1956, largely restated the priority of heavy industry. However, there were some signs 
of change. For 1956, expenditures projected for heavy industry fell by three percent, 
while light industry spending was projected to hold steady. In addition, defense expenses 
were down in 1956 by 9.4%, the start of a steady four-year decline.   
 Two years of Khrushchev's established directive leadership were characterized by 
additional policy reforms. Initially, the seven-year plan adopted on February 5, 1959, 
took an orthodox approach to spending: it stated that producer goods would still grow at 
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higher rates than consumer goods (9.3% vs. 7.3%). However, within months the plan was 
revised to put greater emphasis on consumer goods. A decree criticizing regional 
economic administrations for ignoring consumer goods production, issued on Oct 16, 
1959, was followed in May 1960 by a revised plan aimed at increasing consumer goods 
production from the original seven percent annual rate to twelve percent. Khrushchev 
announced that an additional 25 to 30 billion rubles would be invested in consumer goods 
production.  
However, in 1961 Khrushchev announced that part of the investment originally 
planned for the producer goods industry would be diverted to agriculture and consumer 
goods, although it is not clear whether this plan was ever carried through. At this time, 
Khrushchev's policy was increasingly contested, causing it to become less coherent and 
less consistent.  
One example of incoherence was conducting assertive foreign policy while 
pressing for defense cuts on behalf of Khrushchev. Eventually the incoherence 
manifested itself in a departure from previous policies (inconsistency). For instance, 
while the 1961 budget, adopted on December 22, 1960, had cut defense allocation by five 
percent despite the pressure of the iron triangle to support the activist policies in Berlin 
and Cuba, the defense spending policy was reversed in 1961, with defense spending 
increased by 24.6%. In February 1963, Khrushchev announced that his consumer 
program had been postponed in order to focus on producers’ goods and defense 
production. However, in 1963 Khrushchev made another reversal and began a new push 
for dramatic reforms in spending priorities. The proposed budget for 1964 contained a 
4.2% defense cut, and in September 1964 Khrushchev proposed a revolution in spending 
priorities in which consumer goods production would be given precedence over producer 
goods. 
 
4.  Brezhnev's limited directorship and contested directorship  
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 With Brezhnev achieving consolidation (that is, establishing directive 
leadership), the conservative priorities in spending were moderated and then slowly 
replaced. However, in comparison with Khrushchev's directorship, reform in spending 
was far more limited due to the institutionalization of “reciprocal accountability.” The 
1969-1970 budgets generally reflected conservative priorities, such as increased 
allocation to heavy industry. However, there were some small signs of change in 
priorities. In both budgets consumer goods production growth and defense spending 
declined: six and 1.1 percent, respectively in comparison with a 15 percent jump in 1968.  
The ninth five-year plan (1971-1975) reflected a more pronounced shift in 
priorities: it forecast that the rate of growth in consumer goods (44 to 48 percent) would 
be faster than the rate for producer goods (41 to 45 percent). The modern reformist 
orientation, in contrast to the priorities of the first five years of collective leadership and 
Brezhnev's breakout of 1966-1970, continued in the next two plans, adopted under 
Brezhnev in 1976-1980 and 1981-1985.  The reformist orientation was characterized by 
increases in consumption, growth in light industry and agriculture, and a decline in the 
proportion of defense spending. In May 1982, the “Food Program” was adopted, 
promising substantial additional investment in rural amenities and agricultural 
infrastructure, including transport and storage. Despite the fact that Brezhnev made only 
small assaults on the privileged position of the iron triangle and did not threaten the 
steady growth of military allocations, Brezhnev's policy in his last year (1982) became 
the subject of contestation, with the tight economy providing an additional boost to it.      
 
  
Procedural Reforms 
1.  Reinstatement of the Politburo, 1953  
 During his last year of life, in 1952, Stalin introduced a broad expansion of the 
leading party organs. The Politburo of eleven members and one candidate was replaced 
by a Presidium of 25 members and 11 candidates. The goal for that change was to 
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institutionalize Stalin's apex role of handpicking the inner-working bodies within the 
Politburo. Even after Stalin's death, the Presidium could erode the collective leadership 
by freeing its leader from many of the constraints imposed by fellow Politburo members. 
And from the constituencies' perspectives, the informal Presidium could threaten the 
interests of the iron triangle. The reinstatement of the Politburo restored the balance 
within collective leadership and secured the interests of the iron triangle. 
 
2. Creation of Sovnarkhoz, 1957, and reinstatement of Ministries, 1965 
Khrushchev created the Sovnarkhoz reform during his breakout (an attempt to 
shift the balance of power toward a directive rule), when he was still constrained by 
collective leadership. The move involved dismantling much of the central state’s 
economic apparatus and transferring power to the regions, provinces and republics. 
Arguing that Moscow could not effectively administer all enterprises, Khrushchev 
proposed replacing ministries with regional economic councils that would be responsible 
for practically all production in their territory. This organizational reform eliminated 
Khrushchev's major competitors by undermining their power bases and transferring 
power from the Council of Ministries to organs he could more easily control. In the 
process, Khrushchev reached out and strengthened relationships with two other 
constituencies, the republics and provinces, and the first-tier actors of the party apparatus 
as they fought with the prerogatives of the state as represented by the Council of 
Ministers. Because the leaders of every district in the country demanded their own 
economic council, Khrushchev eventually had to break the country into more and smaller 
fractions than originally planned. 
The main argument for reversing the Sovnarkhoz reform was that it had changed 
the balance between party and state in a way that could threaten the first-tier balance. To 
reinstate ministries, the support of the second tier was targeted by collective leadership. 
The reinstitution of ministries was tightly linked to the proposed reform to expand the 
financial resources and decision-making prerogatives of the enterprises (Khozraschet). 
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The elimination of party control (the case of Sovnarkhoz) was emphasized as a 
precondition for rising material incentives of the enterprises. The reliance on economic 
incentives by ministries as means of control over enterprises further diminished 
opportunities for party intervention. 
 
3. Bifurcation of the party apparatus, 1962, and reunification of the Party 
Apparatus, 1964 
 The idea behind this reform was to remove constraints placed on the General 
Secretary by his coalition constituents, especially the party apparatus. In November 1962, 
Khrushchev won adoption of a scheme to divide the lower reaches of the party into two 
parallel hierarchies. The party organizations at the provincial level were divided into 
separate industrial and agricultural organizations, each with its own first secretary. 
Bifurcation was meant to increase Khrushchev's control over the party apparatus by 
expanding his patronage opportunities. That measure posed a certain threat to 
“apparatchiks” that might have been turned out of the office in late 1962 local party 
elections as part of the renewal of their organizations’ leading organs. Along with 
weakening incumbents, this political reform strengthened Khrushchev's control over his 
most important second-tier constituency. 
Some months after removing Khrushchev, the collective leadership began to 
reverse this reform in order to reestablish the balance in the collective leadership. The 
November 1964 Central Committee Plenum adopted a decree aimed at reunification of 
industrial and rural party organizations. In most instances, this resulted in the return of 
former first secretaries to their posts. The reversal of reform meant the restoring of power 
of the party apparatus in the selectorate during successions. 
 
4. Creation of Production Associations, 1973  
 The least significant of the procedural reforms was the introduction of an 
intermediate layer of economic administration between the ministries and enterprises, the 
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production associations. The political aspect of this reform was engineering Brezhnev's 
breakout. In his effort to consolidate leadership Brezhnev tried to shift the balance 
between party and state. The introduction of production associations meant a shift in 
decision-making back to intermediate levels of the territorial administrative hierarchy. It 
also reversed the accountability of enterprises that were given some autonomy during 
Kosygin's economic reform in 1965. Creation of production associations reinstated 
superiority of administrative levels over economic levels. 
Because institutionalization of reciprocal accountability created a strong obstacle 
to a greater level of consolidation, the introduction of this reform was more protracted 
than the other ones. The First resolution, launching production associations, was adopted 
on April 3, 1973. A renewed effort to extend associations throughout the economy was 
undertaken by Brezhnev at the 1976 party congress. 
Summing up the discussion and historical accounts, it could be noted that the 
potential for reform rose with the emergence of a strong (uncontested) directive 
leadership. Reforms implemented by Khrushchev, who had the strongest directive 
leadership, had a real chance of threatening reciprocal accountability and balanced 
leadership. But even during his strong directive leadership, Khrushchev did not escape 
pressures from iron triangle constituencies, and his bravest reforms were still incoherent 
and inconsistent. The next successions were characterized by retreat from reforms, 
although sometimes a step forward made during the new cycle of leadership has led to a 
half-step back. With every new cycle, prospects for reforms diminished, due to the 
institutionalization of reciprocal accountability. 
 
  Constitutional Reforms 
  The main difference between policy and constitutional reforms in regard to 
instability is that while the former cannot shake equilibrium, the latter can cause so much 
disequilibrium that reform could either be converted into a new equilibrium or result in a 
return to an old one. Hence, the level of instability caused by a constitutional reform is 
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significantly higher than that caused by policy reform. In some periods constitutional 
reform in the USSR overlapped with policy reforms, as well as with the breakdown of the 
“social contract” and economic crisis.  
 Although it is hard to define an exact date for the launching of constitutional 
reform, it could be traced fairly reliably to January 1987. It lasted until Gorbachev's 
resignation on December 25, 1991. This period was punctuated by the following dramatic 
events: 
 
January 1987 The Central Committee of the Communist Party starts the 
democratization program 
June 1988  The 19th Party Conference endorses democratization 
December 1988 Parliament amends the Soviet Constitution 
March 1989  Elections to Congress of People’s Deputies 
Spring 1990  Republic and local elections 
August 1991  Armed coup d’état fails  
December 1991 The USSR formally dissolves 
 
The instability of the constitutional reforms period stemmed from several 
interrelated factors. First, it was not clear whether the outcome would represent a new 
equilibrium, or if there would be a return to the old institutional system typified by 
reciprocal accountability. Second, the lack of vision or a proper ultimate goal by the 
leader led to inconsistency in constitutional reforms. Third, limitations of the existing 
institutional environment led to inconsistency and reversals of constitutional reforms. 
Fourth, resistance from bureaucrats and the iron triangle added to the period’s instability.  
There were three preconditions that initiated the constitutional reforms. First, the 
politics of “glasnost” (“openness”) was introduced in 1986, which included openness in 
public debates and easing censorship on mass media. This began before the actual start of 
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constitutional reforms. The importance of glasnost for the reforms was due to the fact 
that it allowed criticism of policymaking and the existing institutional order. 
The second precondition was the expansion of the selectorate and changes in 
criteria for membership. In February 1990, Gorbachev proposed new rules for the 
election of the delegates to the upcoming Congress, but in the face of resistance it was 
decided at the Central Committee Plenum to let each regional organization establish its 
own regulations for electing delegations to the Congress. This opened up the process 
somewhat, but many competitive elections were still controlled by the Party secretaries. 
The other path to changing the selectorate included the creation of a Presidency, 
expansion of the legislative authority of the Soviets, and devolution of central powers to 
the lower levels of government. This process began with the adoption of an amendment 
to the Soviet Constitution in December 1988. The accountability of the President to the 
population according to this amendment was indirect, but by another constitutional 
amendment adopted on March 1990, future candidates for the post of the President of the 
USSR would stand for popular elections every five years.  
December 1988's amendments to the Soviet Constitution shifted legislative 
powers from the Central Committee of the Communist Party to the new Congress of 
People’s Deputies and the Parliament (Supreme Soviets). It resulted in bringing in a 
broader spectrum of constituencies that compromised the monopoly on power by the 
previous constituencies. Transferring central powers to lower levels of government was 
supposed to result in a greater responsiveness to the populace in a policymaking. 
Elections to the Congress of People’s Deputies were held in March 1989, with 2,895 
candidates standing for election to the 1,500 seats allocated to popular constituencies.  
The apotheosis of constitutional reform was the amendment adopted in March, 
1990, the article of the Soviet Constitution that removed restrictions on social 
organizations outside the Communist Party. The article that guarantees the rights to form 
alternative parties was also adopted.  In October 1990, the law was adopted that gave 
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legal status to political parties as groups seeking representation in the Soviets and seeking 
to form the bodies of state power and administration.  
The third precondition that initiated constitutional reform involved improving the 
control of elected officials over bureaucracy. Such control was a requisite for 
transforming bureaucratic reciprocal accountability. As a consequence of the amendment 
to the Soviet Constitution adopted in December 1988 and legislation adopted at the first 
sessions of the new Congress of People’s Deputies and the Supreme Soviets were given 
the right to ratify and remove the Premier (Prime Minister). In December 1990, the 
President gained direct control of the power of appointment over the new Cabinet of 
Ministers and over the Prime Minister. After the August 1991 coup, Gorbachev was 
forced to resign from the post of General Secretary of the Communist Party. 
Subsequently, in his new role as President, he began to build a presidency that was 
completely independent from the Communist Party.  
Thus, instability manifested itself in inconsistencies through the statements and 
policy of the General Secretary, resistance from the iron triangle, and the unpredictable 
outcome of constitutional reforms. Gorbachev shifted the political balance by creating 
new political bodies and making new appointments of reformists in the Politburo. 
However, there were several reversals in promoting more reformist oriented allies and 
substituting them with the conservative ones. The statements on a multi-party system and 
market economy were inconsistent and vague. 
The magnitude and scope of instability reached its climax in 1989 and especially 
in 1990 and 1991. The inclusion of Union republic representatives in the Congress 
allowed them to raise the issue of secession from the Soviet Union. Facing the threat of 
succession in April 1989, troops were sent to Tbilisi, the capital city of Georgia, killing 
19 demonstrators. Several killings took place in Lithuania in early 1990. The republic 
demanded, along with secession, the creation of a strong presidency that would oppose 
the iron triangle. After losing badly in the Republican elections on March 4, 1990, many 
Russian conservatives united to create a new Republican Communist Party. They used 
  
43 
 
this newly formed party both to oppose Gorbachev's reforms in the USSR and to oppose 
reformers in Russia that organized around Yeltsin. The reformers pressed for the creation 
of a popularly elected President of the Russian Republic. In June 1991, Yeltsin won the 
election with 57 percent of the popular vote. 
The empowerment of new social forces and the threat of the breakdown of the 
Soviet Union brought two developments crucial for stability in 1990-1991. The first one, 
in the latter half of 1990, was the proposed economic plan of the academician Shatalin. It 
not only called for sharp cutbacks in spending on the military and police (examples of 
policy reforms), but also suggested selling off many of the state-run enterprises run by 
the actual ministries, transferring economic and fiscal planning to the republics. The plan 
also limited the central government’s role in issuing currency and in control over 
monetary policy. 
In September 1990, Gorbachev proclaimed his support for Shatalin’s Plan over 
more conservative programs. Under pressure of conservatives who demonstrated their 
muscle by exercising military maneuvers around Moscow, Gorbachev backed down and 
supported a more centrist plan, causing desertion of the reformists from his coalition. To 
maintain power, Gorbachev appointed several conservatives at high positions, all of 
whom later participated in a coup d’état and an attempt to strip him of the presidency. 
The second development came the following year. Gorbachev planned to restart 
the process of institutional transformation by pressing for a new union treaty that would 
shift power to the republics. The iron triangle tried to block the shift of power to the 
republics through an institutional maneuver, which failed. The treaty that would create a 
new Union of Sovereign States, in which the central power of the iron triangle would 
decisively shift to the republics, was scheduled for signing on August 1991. The day 
before the Union Treaty was scheduled for signing, the iron triangle staged a coup d’état. 
The plotters created a State Committee for the State of Emergency and declared 
preservation of the Soviet Union as their goal.  
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 The defeat of the coup d’état within a week accelerated institutional change. 
Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who played a significant role in defeating the coup 
d’état, signed a treaty proclaiming a Commonwealth of Independent States among three 
republics—Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The leaders of other republics declared 
secession from the USSR and joined the Commonwealth. On December 25, 1991, 
Gorbachev resigned as leader of the state that didn't exist anymore, the USSR. The 
breakdown of this communist empire ended the period of institutional reform. 
 
            Social Contract 
Major periodization in the delivery of the social contract, according to Cook 
(1993), may be established as follows: 
1. Stable provision of the main elements of the social contract (1961–late 
1970s) 
This period is typified by employment security, broad social welfare, increasing 
income equality, and stability of retail prices and wages. 
 
2. Deterioration of the social contract (late 1970s–early 1980s) 
The beginning of a deterioration of the social contract started in the late 1970s 
(around 1978), but became more profound by 1981. This period is often described as 
stagnation, some of which was related to government control of such elements of the 
social contract as prices and wages. The stagnating economy also had an impact on the 
other elements of the social contract, such as welfare and medical services. 
Rising levels of repressed and hidden inflation characterized the economy of the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. The results of repressed inflation included persistent 
shortages of consumer goods, steady increases in the ratio of collective farm market 
prices to state retail prices for comparable goods, rapid increases in the population’s 
savings, proliferation of gray and black markets, growing corruption and, eventually, 
formal and informal rationing. Although shortages of goods had long been a problem in 
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the Soviet economy and is considered a built-in trait of a command economy, in the late 
1970s shortages began to show up in some goods that had previously been in surplus. 
Lines grew longer, poor harvests exacerbated food supply problems, and, in 1981, formal 
rationing was instituted for some goods. Chronic shortages and unsatisfied consumer 
demand provided fertile soil for the growth of a second black market economy. Those 
directly involved in black market activity, both bribing and bribed, became recipients of 
an unofficial, unrecorded income. Official wages grew during the period, but at a slower 
rate. 
The delivery of other important elements of the social contract, such as welfare, 
medical services and childcare, also deteriorated. Poorly trained caregivers, along with 
caregiver shortages, resulted in grandmothers taking care of children. The pattern of 
stagnation and decline was repeated in health care. In the early 1980s, expenditures had 
dropped to a negative per capita growth rate, with health conditions significantly 
worsening. Brezhnev was able to fulfill the social contract--though at a declining level of 
performance -- until 1981. After that, per capita spending on critical social services began 
to decline.  
 
  3. Reform Policies and the Erosion of the Social Contract (1986–1990)  
  From 1986 through 1988, Gorbachev initiated or stated intent to institute policies 
that threatened to undercut the basic provisions of the social contract in all major policy 
areas: employment security, wage equality, price stability and socialized services. 
Changes in industrial policy began to erode employment security and stability, 
heightening demands for productivity and exacerbating workers’ fears of displacement. 
Wage reform, which increased differentials among skill grades, was also introduced. In 
addition, a limited cooperative sector was legitimized that began to weaken state control 
over consumer prices and challenged the monopolistic position of state enterprises in the 
consumer sector. Proposed price reforms threatened state subsidies. 
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  In the context of this research it is important to look at the wage dynamics of this 
period. The idea of wage reform was to diminish egalitarian distribution of income and to 
tie wages to quality and productivity. In many enterprises, reform produced labor 
productivity gains and cuts in the labor force. Because new jobs had been created, wage 
reform did not necessarily lead to increased unemployment. Throughout 1987, overall 
increases in industrial productivity exceeded wage increases. Greater differentiation in 
wages introduced by wage reform correlated with higher productivity. 
 In 1988, however, the impact of reform policies on wages markedly weakened, as 
workers used new political freedoms to strike against lower wages. Although the strikes 
were not massive, the government mostly stuck to the social contract and forced 
managers to comply with workers’ demands. Also, by late 1988, industrial managers 
were motivated to increase wages due to inflation in the consumer economy. Thus, the 
drop in wages in 1987 was followed by an increase.  
Although the emergence of the possibility of linking wages and employment with 
productivity threatened broader instability related to the deterioration of the social 
contract, ultimately this possibility was not fully realized. Reform policy did result in 
significant erosion of labor’s social contract guarantees: some workers were released 
from their jobs, others experienced the fall of wages, and many experienced 
unaccustomed economic insecurity. But by early 1989, concessions had limited the 
painful effects for workers: factories were allowed to reabsorb released workers, bankrupt 
enterprises were bailed out, wage discipline was relaxed, privatization was severely 
limited, and retail price reform was indefinitely delayed. 
A similar retreat from initial reforms threatening other provisions of the social 
contract occurred in 1988–1989. A new law slashed subsidies to unprofitable state 
enterprises, with the goal of reducing subsidies to the loss-making plants by 30% in 1989. 
However, this hard decision was delayed several times and, in fact, industrial subsidies in 
1989 and 1990 actually increased.  
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Another important decision was related to the restructuring of the health sector, 
including privatization of some medical services and the creation of medical 
cooperatives. According to the plan, paid services would have affected only about two 
percent of medical services over the next 15 years. The legalization of cooperatives was 
formalized by the adoption of Law on Cooperatives in May 1988 and, by the Fall of 
1988, medical cooperatives were rapidly developing. The results of the cooperatives’ 
establishment were mixed and included public complaints about abuses and corruption in 
that sector. The government responded by placing restrictions on all cooperatives, but 
especially medical cooperatives. In October 1988, the USSR Ministry of Health issued an 
order prohibiting the leasing of “expensive” and “unique” diagnostic equipment to 
cooperatives. In late December 1988, the Council of Ministries adopted a resolution 
further restricting the activities of virtually all medical cooperatives. As a result, a 
significant number of cooperatives were closed, and many of them faced accusations of 
violating the law. In the long run, the number of medical cooperatives continued to grow 
but at a very modest rate in comparison with the rate of growth in 1988. 
The years of 1989 and 1990 were marked by unprecedented levels of strike 
activity. The national miners’ strike of summer 1989 confronted both national and local 
leaders with new challenges. The relationship of strikers’ demands with social contract 
provisions was complicated. Strikers demanded improved pay and pensions, better 
provision of food, more housing construction, and municipal and medical services, all of 
which were elements of the social contract. On the other hand, their central demand was 
that the enterprises become economically independent and self-managed by the labor 
collective, in accord with the provisions of the law on state enterprise. This included 
demands for the right to control disposition of plant output, the right to manage profits, 
and autonomy from the Ministry. In other words, it meant a departure from the social 
contract. In 1990, the strike reached its peak. The main focus of the strikers now was not 
local economic conditions, but a political demand to end the dominating role of the 
Communist Party. What increased the instability was that, along with the political 
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consequences of the strike, fulfilling the miners’ demands would have resulted in higher 
energy costs for all domestic consumers. 
 
Instability Related to Economic Crisis 
Not every economic crisis is related to instability. In communist countries, there 
are permanent, built-in crises such as shortages. In these cases, there is no sign of 
instability; the crisis is stable. The stagnation of the late Brezhnev years can be explained 
by a combination of the exhaustion of readily available resources and a growing systemic 
dysfunction as the distorted incentive structure increasingly dissuaded people from honest 
work.  
The first years of Gorbachev's reforms (1985–88) were not characterized by a 
sudden crisis of a new origin. In these years, national income did not fall, although it 
remained nearly stagnant. Unemployment was predominantly regional (concentrated 
mostly in Central Asia and Caucasus) and remained low. The built-in and aggravated 
systemic flaws thus could not explain the severe economic crisis that exploded in the 
USSR in 1989 and culminated in 1990, when it seemed the economy would disintegrate 
altogether. The crisis was caused by the reforms themselves— reforms that led to 
growing monetary imbalances, aggravated fiscal imbalances, an administrative stalemate, 
calamities in foreign trade, a decline in price stability (severe inflation) and shortages of 
the most basic goods. 
After the breakdown of the USSR in 1991, the liberal economic reforms by 
Russian Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar brought severe inflation due to loosening of price 
controls as well as a sharp polarization of society. As noted by scholars (Aslund 2007, 
2008), a tiny class of wealthy “New Russians” had emerged, while a majority of the 
population, especially senior citizens and those who were disabled, sank below poverty 
level. The middle class was very small and consisted mostly of banking clerks. By 1997–
1998, the economic situation had somewhat stabilized. Inflation had slowed down, 
economic indicators showed some signs of growth, and Russian companies' shares 
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soared. Then, in August 1998, the severe plunge of the ruble, Russia’s national currency, 
marked a new wave of economic instability.  
 
 Periodization of different types of sociopolitical and economic instability and 
crisis 
The provided historical survey and corresponding conceptualizations allows for 
the instability and crisis periodization and ranking that is represented in Table 2.1. The 
hierarchy of the levels of instability is defined by the previous analysis of the various 
kinds of instabilities related to the power struggles among political elites (within 
“reciprocal accountability” theory), and to the stages of social contract deterioration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.1. Ranking of strength of various types of instabilities in the 
USSR/Russia 
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             (1 to 6 – arranged from lowest to highest) 
 
Rank Type of instability Corresponding years 
1 
2 
3 
4 
 
5 
6 
Brezhnev’s breakout 
Khrushchev’s breakout 
Brezhnev’s contested 
directorship 
Khrushchev’s contested 
directorship 
Deterioration of social contract 
Erosion of social contract 
 
1965-1969 
1954-1957 
1982 
1960-1964 
 
1978-1985 
1986-1990 
 
Some of these instabilities types overlap with each other and, what is very 
important for future hypotheses testing, coincide with the unfolding economic crisis. As 
mentioned in the previous discussion on the topic, the latter has started to show up in the 
mid-1980s and has rapidly accelerated in the late 1980s. According to theories introduced 
in this Chapter (the ones by Roeder and Cook), the strongest instability is experienced at 
the times of deterioration and, especially, the breakdown of the social contract in the late 
1970s and 1980s. Constitutional reform is ranked second in the instability’s strength. At 
one point, it coincides with “social contract” deterioration and provides the researcher 
with an opportunity to check on combined effect, along with an effect of each factor. 
Contested leaderships (years 1960-1964 and 1982) scored lower, and the slightest 
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instabilities are conducive to leaders’ breakouts. According to reciprocal accountability 
theory, each successive breakout causes a lesser degree of instability, due to the 
institutionalization of reciprocal accountability. Thus, according to Roeder’s logic, 
Brezhnev’s breakout in 1965-69 is represented with lower height of instability than the 
years of Khrushchev’s breakout in 1953-57. A separate curve shows the progression of 
economic crises from the built-in crises of command economies to the severe crisis in late 
eighties and nineties (based on the periodization provided by Aslund). 
Periodization and ranking of instability and crisis allow for testing the hypotheses 
about their effect on fertility behavior. In order to perform this research, however, one 
also needs a theory that links instability and fertility and provides explanatory claims of 
why and how the former affects the latter. These issues are explored in Chapter 3. 
 
 
Chapter Three 
 
Theoretical and Methodological Approaches to the Application of                             
Demographic, Economic and Sociological Theories to the Research Questions 
This chapter works out a strategy for applying existing theories—whether in their 
original or modified form—to the area of interest, that is explaining short-term 
fluctuations in fertility behavior in states of societal instabilities of different types and 
scale. The first section discusses the nature of short-term fluctuations of fertility, their 
consequences, and identifies the persistent questions in the existing research. The second 
section is devoted to an analytical overview of existing demographic theories of fertility 
with the goal of finding one that may potentially apply to the research questions. In the 
third section, theories of fertility are analyzed from a broader rational choice perspective, 
and the case is made for employing rational choice based uncertainty reduction theory. 
The strategies for modifying this theory to apply it to the given research are discussed, 
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and the testable model linking societal instabilities with fertility outcome is developed. In 
the final section the hypotheses based on the model related assumptions, are formulated. 
 
 3.1. Short-Term Fluctuations in Fertility  
 Like natural and man-made disasters, social and political instabilities often cause 
fluctuations in fertility that in many cases are short-term. For the purposes of further 
analysis and application of theories in order to explain this class of fertility dynamics, we 
will look at examples of the latter, outline the problems of adequate and coherent 
explanations and demonstrate the significance of short-term fluctuations in fertility.  
Short-term fluctuations in fertility remain one of the most under-researched areas of 
demography, with many examples of short-term fluctuations in fertility that cannot be 
adequately explained within the existing theoretical framework. For instance, during the period 
from the early 1980s to the late 1990s, Sweden experienced stronger swings in fertility rates 
than any other Western country. During this period, the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in Sweden 
rose from its lowest-ever level of about 1.6 in 1983 to around 2.1 in 1990-92, then dropped to a 
new low of about 1.5 in 1997 (Hoem, 2000). Potential explanations name worsening economy and 
cuts in social welfare as the major causes of fertility decline.  However, these potential causes fail 
to resolve the question of why Sweden’s fertility swings were not matched by European 
countries with similar or worse economic conditions—especially since, by some accounts, 
fertility in Sweden had begun to decline before benefits were trimmed (DeVanzo and 
Grammich 2000). 
Short-term fluctuations in fertility in the former USSR during the mid-1980s also 
puzzle demographers (Andreev 2016; Arkhangelsky 2015). In 1981, the government of this 
communist state introduced a pronatalistic population policy that included such measures as 
partially paid maternity leaves, tax deductions for families with two and more children, and other 
bonuses. For several years, fertility showed a steady increase, but then started to decline, a 
pattern typical for countries that instituted similar population policies, including France, 
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Eastern Germany and Poland. In the former USSR, a new puzzle 
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emerged when fertility suddenly started to increase again in 1985, reaching its peak in 1986, and 
then began to decline once more. This trend was seen across most regions of the country, both in 
urban and rural areas. Despite many attempts to explain the “mystery of 1986,” there has yet 
to be a clear understanding of the social factors that produced these short-term 
fluctuations in fertility. 
Also, the sudden and short-lived fertility increase in Czechoslovakia in 1969, 
occurring shortly after the Soviet invasion, has yet to be explained.  No population policy was 
implemented in the years before the trend, nor was there any other noticeable factor present 
that is traditionally related to fertility swings. There is one possible explanation, the 
paradoxical, counter-intuitive effect of political and social instability that followed newly 
achieved political freedoms of the “Prague Spring,” that is conducive with the premises of this 
research outlined further. 
We see rapid and steep declines in fertility nowadays in countries undergoing the 
transition from an administrative-command economy (characterized with the total control on behalf 
of state and a lack of competition) to market economy and democracy. There is wide controversy 
among scholars about the causes of these fertility trends in the countries of the former Soviet bloc. 
Demographers variously point to declines in standards of living, stress related to rapid changes 
in socio-economic systems, the start of the Second Demographic Transition, and the postponed 
effect of spliced birth intervals during previous decades, to name but a few, as the major causes 
accountable for steep fertility decline (Da Vanzo and Grammich 2000; Naseleniye Rossii 2002; 
Perevedentsev 1999: 17-40; Vishnevsky 1996: 1-34; Zakharov and Ivanova 1995). Accordingly, it 
remains subject of academic and, increasingly, political debate, whether these fluctuations are of a 
short- or long-term nature (Da Vanzo and Grammich 2001: 21-25;  Field 2000: 11-42; Vassin 
1996: 175-200; Zakharov1999: 292-317). 
Among the most curious and the least researched short-term fluctuations in fertility are 
those occurring during times of societal instability, whether that instability is taking place in 
states, world systems, economy, political processes, or ideology. There are many examples of 
such instability throughout history. The terrorist attack on the World Trade Center on September 
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11, 2001, for instance, caused fear of instability related to citizens’ security, functioning of the 
airline industry, and the safety of the Internet, to name but a few; actually, the very vitality of 
Western civilization was challenged. It has caused short-term fluctuations in fertility in 
the areas neighboring Lower Manhattan (this case is discussed in greater detail later in 
the section). 
Short-term fluctuations in fertility are consequential for many reasons. First, they 
have a huge impact on social and economic dimensions of society, and in particular on 
education, labor markets and social security. Second, short-term fertility fluctuations' 
impact is not limited to the timing of the fluctuations themselves: Short-term fluctuations 
in fertility create an “echo effect’ that affects society for long periods, often several 
generations. The “echo-effect” is a demographic phenomenon of the long-term and 
repetitive consequences of fertility rates for the future sex and age structure of population 
and, in turn, its further impact on fertility rates. Third, short-term fluctuations in fertility 
often create new social and economic environments for the corresponding generations 
that lead to new demographic patterns, social strategies and specific lifestyles. These, in 
turn, heavily impact the social, cultural and political elements of society. Finally, various 
natural and man-made disasters may lead to different durations and spatial distributions 
of short-term fluctuations of fertility that result in diverse consequences for societal life. 
I will illustrate these points with several examples from modern US history. 
Short-term fluctuations in fertility have clearly manifested themselves in the period from 
the 1930s to the present. Scholars identify four distinct periods over the past 80 plus years 
in regard to fertility in the US: 1) the Depression era (1930s), with low TFR and small 
birth cohorts; 2) the post-War Baby Boom (1946-64), during which the TFR increased by 
almost 50 percent; 3) the Baby Bust (from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s), typified with 
a sharp falling of TFR; and 4) an “echo phase” (from the mid-1970s to the mid 1980s), 
with the stable and below-replacement TFR, however, marked with increasing number of 
births due to a large portion of childbearing age population reflecting an “echo effect” 
from the large number of births following World War II (Shapiro 1997). 
  
55 
 
Although these short-term fluctuations in fertility impacted multiple societal 
spheres and areas, in the following discussion, I will limit illustrations of these impacts to 
three important societal spheres: education, the labor market, and social security. As for 
the first sphere, growing numbers of baby boomers resulted in increased demand for 
primary schools and, therefore, primary school teachers. This growing demand was not 
met, as new college graduates were from the small cohorts of the 1930s. This imbalance 
was repeated in the late 1950s and early 1960s at the secondary school level. As a result, 
persistent shortages in the market for schoolteachers occurred, leading to upward 
pressures on teachers’ salaries, compromising hiring standards, and resulting in low 
unemployment for qualified teachers. 
The Baby Bust, in turn, has led to a decline in primary school enrollments, and 
later, to a decline in secondary school enrollments. Significant fluctuations in the market 
for Professors were also seen at the college level. With the core demographic pool for 
college enrollments (aged 18-22) shrinking, colleges began seeking enrollment of 
nontraditional students more intensively. 
Several decades later, in the late 1980s, we witnessed a small-scale replication of 
what happened with the advance of baby boomers. The increase in fertility at this time 
impacted primary school enrollments and hence, the demand for schools and teachers. 
Increase in fertility in the late 1980s is largely attributable to the “echo effect” of the 
Baby Boom, that large segment of the population that came after WWII who were now 
bearing children.  To sum up, short-term fluctuations in fertility led to long-term cycles of 
fluctuations in demand for schools and teachers, consequences for educators in regard to 
salary, changes in the proportion of college students seeking careers in education and 
changes in enrollment policy. 
Short-term fluctuations in US fertility over the last 80 plus years were equally 
consequential for the labor market as a whole. As noted by scholars (Shapiro 1997), 
fertility has a direct effect on the number of labor force entrants, with a lag of roughly 20 
years. Also, it has affected the number of retirees, with a lag of 55-65 years. Therefore, 
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short-term fluctuations in fertility over the analyzed period of time impacted both the 
growth rate of labor force and its age composition. 
For instance, the small number of new entrants to the labor force in the 1950s, 
drawn mostly from the small birth cohorts of the Great Depression of 1929 to early 
1930s, contributed to an increase in the average age of the working population. The 
smaller numbers of young labor market participants was also the major factor in 
declining rates of job mobility (not behavioral changes, as was mistakenly assumed). 
Likewise, in the late 1960s, the average age of the work force was reduced due to the 
influx of baby booming cohorts into the labor market. While an expanding economy at 
that period allowed for placement of this cohort, by the 1970s such an outcome was no 
longer the case. Changing demographic composition contributed to the increase in so-
called natural rate of unemployment (the one not related to cyclical unemployment). The 
entrance of baby boomers into the labor market also contributed to the decrease in 
relative earnings of young workers, as was noted by various scholars (Shapiro, 1997; 
Easterlin 2000; Olsen 1994). 
Alternations between small and sizeable cohorts due to short-term fluctuations in 
fertility continued for a long period of time, resulting in corresponding outcomes for the 
job market. For instance, the entrance of the relatively small cohorts to the job market in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s resulted in a relative reduction in unemployment despite 
the cyclical recession of the early 1990s. 
During this period, short-term fluctuations in fertility also significantly affected 
the very core of the social security system. This is the area where long-term 
consequences of short-term fluctuations of fertility are strongly and directly visible, even 
without taking into account the “echo effect.” Indeed, the impact of Baby Boom 
generation retirement began around 2001, 60 plus years after the actual births of the first 
representatives of this cohort. The impact will last to almost 2040. The period from 2011 
to 2030 will be typified by a steep increase in numbers of retirees, reaching some 70 
million in 2030. 
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The impact of such a rapid “graying” of the population on the US social security 
system is huge, since the latter is arranged on the basis of a principle described as “pay-
as-you-go.” Pensions for retirees are paid from the revenues generated from the taxes of 
today’s employees. In case of the Baby Boomers’ retirement, this means that the taxes 
funding their pensions will be collected from the smaller numbers of the Baby Bust and 
subsequent birth cohorts, increasing the dependency ratio and thus requiring increases in 
social security taxes. 
As noted by various scholars (e.g. Knickman and Snell, 2002), the choice between 
increasing Social Security taxes and reducing benefits for retirees is a very delicate and 
emotionally charged issue. Many approaches have been offered in order to keep the 
social security system sound, including gradually raising the retirement age, mandating 
private savings and creating individual retirement accounts. All of these changes would 
result in significant social, economic and political consequences. The primary reason 
these changes are needed is these very short-term fluctuations in fertility, while increases 
in lifespan and rising rates of women participating in the labor market are distant second 
and third causes. (Shapiro 1997). 
The third consequence of short-term fluctuations in fertility is that new patterns of 
social, economic and demographic behavior are adopted, largely due to the size of the 
cohort and corresponding economic challenges. In that regard, the US Baby Boom cohort 
is a perfect example. A short-term increase in fertility, as already mentioned, was the 
primary reason behind the emergence of Baby Boomers. When the first representatives of 
this cohort entered the job market in the second half of the 1970s, they faced adverse 
labor market conditions. In part, this was due to the economic situation that was defined 
as a “quiet depression”, and in part with the very size of this cohort that, according to 
Easterlin’s theory, shifted the balance of the “supply-demand” equation of the labor 
force. 
Indeed, the relative income of the first Baby Boom cohorts entering the labor 
market in 1977 proved smaller than that of pre-Baby Boom cohorts. However, Baby 
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Boomers were able to reverse that unfavorable trend by making adaptations to their 
economic and, especially, demographic behavior. These adjustments included deferred 
marriage, reduced childbearing, increased labor force participation of wives, and 
formation of unmarried-couple unions living with grandparents. 
As noted by Easterlin, MacDonald and Macunovich (1980, p.781), there was a 
…”marked decline in proportion of baby boomers that are members of married couple, 
two-parent families, from 73 to 48 percent. Of this 25 percentage point decline, four-
fifths is accounted for by a shift to childless living arrangements; the remainder, by a rise 
of those in single-parent situation.” Scholars also stress the implications of these 
demographic shifts for the Baby Boomers’ economic status. Most importantly, the 
average income of childless persons is about 55 percent higher than that of persons in 
married, two-parent families. And although the income of a single parent is still one 
quarter lower, the upward shift in Baby Boomers’ income prevails. Easterlin et al. (1980) 
identify two reasons for the increase. First, the magnitude of the demographic shift to the 
higher income is greater. And second, there is a greater income gap between the higher 
income and traditional two-parent married couple than the one on the lower income side. 
Other explanations for this changed demographic patterns could be, however, also 
brought up, ideational changes (not linked with the unfavorable trend at the job market) 
being one of them. 
The Baby Boom generation’s behavioral adjustments to adverse economic 
conditions include not only becoming childless but also reducing the number of children 
by some 0.5 in comparison with the previous cohort. That meant fewer consumers of 
family earnings. It is worth noting that although Baby Boomers postponed the births of 
their children for the ages after 30, and fertility in these age groups thus increased, the 
complete fertility of this cohort was still lower than that of their predecessors.  
The next important adaptation strategy of Baby Boomers was, arguably, an 
increased female participation in the labor force. The correlation between the latter and a 
family income is clearly positive.  However, the question is to what extent this 
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phenomenon could be attributed to cohort size, or it is rather changes in values and job 
opportunities that are the main contributors. Pampel and Peters (1995, 176) cite scholars 
claiming the validity of primary impact of the cohort size. Easterlin, for instance, notes 
that employment of young women stayed low in the 1950s despite many job 
opportunities, but then rose during the 1960s. Another cited scholar, Wacheter (1977) 
demonstrates close correspondence of rate changes in female participation in the labor 
force with the dynamics of male relative income. Moreover, the opposite pattern emerged 
for older women. Their participation in labor force in the 1950s rose while that of 
younger women declined. Pampel and Peters (1995, 176) conclude that “… if demand of 
ideology explains changes in female participation, we would expect to have similar 
changes among younger and older women.” However, this claim is not a proof since the 
ideological change could have occurred only among younger women. It is also possible, 
that just the changed pattern of fertility (having more children) among the younger 
cohorts was the main factor of their reduced participation in labor force. 
There are also other important behavioral changes that stem from cohort size and 
are related to the above-mentioned social, economic and demographic adaption strategies. 
These changes include a decrease in self-fulfillment as a motivation in the job search, 
diminishing interest in public interest-related work and causing a decline of interest in 
political involvement. Easterlin and Crimmins (1991, 529-530) argue against linking 
shifts in Baby Boom cohort attitudes and behavior to alternative explanations. Examples 
of such links include connecting changing political and social climate with greater 
cynicism and disillusionment, personal prospects or societal outlooks, and/or 
socialization experiences, including break-up of families, decline in family size, personal 
wealth, TV exposure, or changes in religiosity. So, Easterlin and Crimmins (1991) 
attribute these negative behavioral changes primarily to the growing sense of economic 
deprivation that, as mentioned before, is explained by both economic decline and huge 
cohort size and “…the behavioral changes thus induced, such as greater labor force 
participation of mothers and reduced childbearing” (1991, 530). 
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Finally, short-term fertility fluctuation-induced changes in cohort size impact 
important parameters of social disorganization such as malaise, crime, suicide and 
alienation. Some scholars link the increase of these social indicators with the above-
described adaptations to adverse economic conditions. Pampel and Peters (1995, 160), for 
instance, write:  
“With these adaptations, however, men in large cohorts may feel stress and 
disappointment because they are unable to fulfill traditional roles. The sacrifice 
of family life to maintain economic status likely induces stress, which results in 
social malaise, crime, suicide and alienation. In contrast, members of small 
cohorts do not face the same conflict between resources and aspirations; their 
relative income allows them to meet their consumption aspirations even while 
marrying early, having many children, and maintaining traditional family roles”. 
In a similar vein, scholars bring attention to the studies concluding that weak ties 
among members of the large cohort to traditional family roles and to the labor 
force contribute to harmful social behavior.” 
Pampel and Peters (1995, 186-189) cite research by Easterlin and Schapiro 
(1979), Holinger et al (1988), and O’Brien and Gwartney-Gobbs (1989) supporting the 
relationship between large cohort size and increased rates of homicide, suicide and 
political alienation. These researchers use various statistical techniques, including the 
implementation of the APC models, in order to single out the cohort size effect. Most of 
the research supports Easterlin’s claims and conclusions. 
Easterlin presents evidence of the relationship between large cohort size and 
homicide victimization among youth. He claims the strong contribution of compositional 
changes in the population, namely, during the 1960s, as Baby Boomers entered 
adolescence, to the homicide. Indeed, homicide rates of 15-24 year old males (controlled 
for age) grew in the period from the late 1960s to the late 1970s.  
Easterlin also shows evidence of relative cohort size impacts on suicide rates. 
Among males 15-24 years old, suicide rates declined during the 1950s and rose again 
  
61 
 
during the 1960s and 1970s, corresponding with the decline and rise of the relative 
number of young adults. Conversely, suicide rates among 45-54 year old males fell 
during the 1960s and 1970s as their proportion in the population fell. 
Finally, short-term fluctuations in fertility related to man-made or natural 
disasters have their own specific consequences. In the first place, it is worth noting that 
some disasters do not cause any changes in fertility dynamics. The idea that they do is a 
popular myth, sometimes reinforced by incorrect media report. Two such examples are 
brought up by Rogers, St. John and Coleman (2005) regarding incorrect reports of 
claimed impacts of the power blackouts in New York in 1965 and in the Northeastern US 
in 2003 on birth rates. Claims of the “blackout baby-boom effect” were disproven by 
careful analyses. 
In cases where disasters have impacted fertility, these impacts have been very 
different across cases in regard to scale, timing, and spatial distribution. Empirical study 
of the impact of the Oklahoma City bombing on fertility led to three major findings:  
“First, the immediate effect of the bombing appeared in and around the Oklahoma 
City area, not elsewhere…Second, the overall persistence of the effect, as well as the 
magnitude of the effect, was primarily in Oklahoma County… Third, the effect of the 
bombing can be observed in the three largest metropolitan counties…” (Rogers, St. John 
and Coleman, 2005, 690). 
It is interesting that a significant increase in fertility (measured by birth rates and 
General Fertility Rate [GFR] was discovered in Tulsa County, an area spatially distant 
from the bombing site. The scholars note that while increase in GFRs in three of the six 
Oklahoma City counties (Oklahoma, Cleveland and Pottawattami) dampened somewhat 
after the first year, in Oklahoma County, where the bombing occurred, the effect was the 
most sustained. 
These trends in short-term fertility fluctuations are not universal across all man-
made disasters. Scholars attribute these fertility outcomes to the unique features of the 
Oklahoma City bombing—“the highly visible and widely reported deaths of babies, the 
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immediate capture of the perpetrator, the apparently small number of individuals who 
were involved in plotting the bombing and the focused and local nature of the damage…” 
(Rogers, St. John, Coleman, 2005,  691). These features allow for fertility predictions 
based on one (or a combination) of the three theories: replacement/insurance, community 
influence and terror management. 
The tragedy of September 11, 2001 (“9/11”) contrasts with the Oklahoma City 
bombing in most of the mentioned features. Reports on the death of babies were less 
emphasized, the organizer of the attack was not captured until a decade later, and a large 
faction of Al-Qaeda was involved in the plot. Correspondingly, research of the event’s 
impact on fertility dynamics was found to be distinctive in some ways from the effects 
after the Oklahoma City bombing (Ruther 2010). According to these scholars, only 
coefficients of fertility change for New York City (Manhattan), NY and Ocean County, 
NJ, were significant. None of the other New York City boroughs (that could be also 
strongly affected by the attack in regard to victims involved) exhibited an increase in 
births in the years following the attack; only one of the four closest counties in NJ 
(Bergen County) was saw an increase in births. The possibility of a linear relationship 
between the proximity of the area to the World Trade Center was also disproven. It is 
also worth mentioning that fertility response in Manhattan was not only the most 
immediate but also the most lasting. In some outlying counties (especially those in NJ), 
there were certain positive hikes in GFR in the first full year during which a response 
could emerge, but within the next year GFR declined. 
There is also an indication of diverse fertility responses to natural disasters as 
well. For instance, Evans, Hu and Zhao (2008), in their analysis of hurricane and storm 
warnings on fertility in US, found a crucial role for warning severity. While low-level 
weather advisories result in increased fertility, with each higher level of warning this 
effect diminishes; and the most severe storm advisories even reverse this sign of effect, 
resulting in decreased fertility. 
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3.2. Analytical Overview of the Existing Demographic Theories of Fertility 
The demographic theory of fertility is a fragmented field. Most recently, 
Greenhalgh (1994), Van de Kaa (1995) and de Bruijn (2006) have attempted to provide a 
typology and analysis of demographic theories of fertility. I combine these scholars’ 
approaches in classifying demographic theories for the purpose of their analysis. The 
major goal of this analysis is to determine if any of the existing demographic theories is 
suitable for explaining short-term fluctuations in fertility impacted by societal 
instabilities. Correspondingly, each theory is analyzed from the perspective of matching 
the following criteria: ability to explain short-term fluctuations in fertility, ability to 
clearly establish macro-micro links, being applicable to period effects on fertility and 
ability to explain fertility dynamics at the periods of rapid and unexpected  
change. 
 
             Classic Transition Theory 
A version of modernization theory, classic transition theory explains the evolution 
in demographic reproduction from a high fertility and high mortality state to one of low 
fertility and low mortality via an intermediate stage typified by mortality decline and 
lingering high fertility. Classical transition theory emphasizes social and economic forces 
as facilitating this change and assumes that the processes it describes occur in similar 
ways across different eras and cultures. 
It views social change as unidirectional and progressive, assuming societies move 
irreversibly toward greater homogeneity. Greenhalgh (1994, 10) formulates the main 
premises of demographic transition theory that are shared by many proponents of that 
theory (see Van de Kaa (1995) and de Bruijn (2006)) in regard to fertility as the 
following:  
 
1. Fertility transition is a phased process. Societies begin at the primitive or 
traditional stage and end at the advanced or modern stage. 
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The concept of demographic transition has four stages, including the pre-
industrial stage, the transition stage, the industrial stage, and the post-industrial stage. The 
pre-industrial stage is characterized by a stable population, with high death rates, due to 
low standard of living, and high birth rates due to the need to compensate for deaths. The 
second stage is the transition stage, which is when the population begins to increase due 
to continued high birth rates and declining death rates as a result of an increase in the 
standard of living. The industrial stage follows and is characterized by continued 
population increase despite the declining birth rates and low death rates, which result 
from increased standard of living and changes in social views. The final stage is the post-
industrial stage, which is when the human population stabilizes, due to low birth rates and 
low death rates.  
2. Fertility transition is a homogenizing process that produces tendencies 
toward convergence among societies. 
Most of demographic transition theory proponents claim that in the long-run all 
countries that undergo the transition will have the similar fertility rates, with Total 
Fertility Rate approximating 2.1-2.2, or falling below it. 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Fertility transition is a process of Europeanization (or Americanization).  
Demographic transition is an inductive theory that started with the empirical 
based analysis of how Western populations have changed over time. Unlike many other 
theories on population, the demographic transition theory was based on the actual 
experience of the European countries and the US. This theory is in fact a generalization 
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of the historical sequence and pattern of changes in the vital rates typical for Europe and, 
to a certain extent, of the US. 
 
4. Fertility transition is an irreversible process. Once started, it cannot be 
stopped. 
This claim implies there is no way fertility rates will never return to the pre-
transitional level, though proponents of the theory don’t rule out certain fluctuations in 
the fertility rates (including slight increase) after the completion of the demographic 
transition. 
 
5. Fertility transition is a progressive process; in the long run, it is desirable. 
The progressive tendencies is seen in the mutual adjustment of reproductive 
function and self-actualization of women as well as potential for investing more time and 
financial resources in upbringing, health and education of the children. 
 
6. Fertility transition is a lengthy process. 
When applied to the demographic developments in Europe, it takes up to two 
centuries; whereas in some modern societies (e.g. four “economic tigers” of South East 
Asia-South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore) demographic transition lasted for 
decades. 
The pioneers of what has become demographic transition theory, Thomson 
(2002), Davis (1986), Kirk (1996) and Notestein (1945, 1983), initially attempted to 
provide an explanation of the dynamics of European demographic developments for the 
period from the early 19th century to the early 20th century. To explain these changes, 
they employ the concept of social change. Though they use various definitions and their 
theories do differ in certain elements, these scholars still unanimously explain the shift 
from the mode of demographic transition typified with high mortality and high fertility to 
the one with low mortality and low fertility in terms of such parameters of social change 
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as progress, industrial development, arrival of “technological civilization,” and other 
characteristics of the modernization process. All of these scholars, to varying degrees, 
refer to biological/technological, structural, and cultural determinants of civilization 
change in defining the causes of demographic dynamics. Scholars have further refined all 
of these three components by introducing the measurable concepts of improved sanitation 
and health services, industrialization, innovative regulation and institutional 
arrangements. So, it is clear that the major scope in which demographic transition theory 
could be applied, are grand shifts that are of long-term, such as industrialization, 
urbanization, etc. 
All of the pioneers of the demographic transition approach adopt the idea of a 
three-stage process of transition sketched by the forefather of this school of thought, 
Landry (1982). The first stage is typified by high fertility and high mortality, the second 
by declining mortality with fertility remaining high, and the third with declines in fertility 
approximating the already low mortality level. Scholars generally explain the first change 
of the demographic transition process, declining mortality, by the advances of the 
industrial revolution and modernization and, more specifically and most importantly, by 
improved sanitation and advances in health care and science. The latter led to a dramatic 
decline in epidemiological diseases, the major cause of death in Europe in the 17th and 
18th centuries. Notestein, for instance, writes: “In short, the whole process of 
modernization in Europe and Europe overseas brought rising levels of living, new 
controls over diseases, and reduced mortality” (1945, 37-57). 
The next major shift within the demographic transition is the decline of fertility 
following the reduction of mortality. According to the proponents of this explanatory 
claim, this phase is much less responsive to modernization and is largely attributable to 
the collapse of ideational and normative systems that supported high fertility. Davis 
(1986, 54), for instance, specifies the mechanism by which adjustment of fertility to the 
new situation was achieved:  
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“The advanced countries have reached these low rates by pushing the principle 
underlying human social organization -- reliance on a division of labor based on 
acquired skills -- to its limit…The destiny of the child (and hence of the parent), 
has come to depend on the child's training and education.  The social structure 
that generates this kind of adaptation is characterized by social mobility, planned 
innovation, formal schooling, urbanization, separation of home and workplace, 
and bureaucracy.” 
According to Davis, normative control plays a huge role in reducing fertility in 
this new type of environment. He writes that normative controls regulating family and 
procreative behavior “…tend to break down when people live in large cities, strive for 
social mobility, work in an impersonal environment, receive income as individuals rather 
than as family members, and acquire formal education in schools beyond parental 
control” (Davis 1986, 60).  
Kirk (1996), among other scholars, notes that demographic transition was initially 
designed to serve as an explanation of demographic developments of a historically and 
geographically defined scope (Europe from the 18th to the 20th century), rather than as a 
universal theory with predictive power. However, as noted by de Bruijn (2006, 552), later 
scholars apply the principles of historic demographic transitions to contemporary 
situations in such a way that any country or nation may be placed on the evolutionary 
track of modernization and mortality and fertility decline. This last version of the 
demographic transition theory is very arguable and thus it is problematic to apply 
premises of this theory to the latest developments including short-term fluctuations of 
fertility impacted by the societal instabilities. 
As mentioned above, mortality decline is considered to be a prerequisite for 
changes in fertility by the proponents of demographic transition theory. The focus of this 
explanatory claim and corresponding empirical research has largely shifted specifically 
toward the relationship between infant mortality decline and fertility reduction. Infant 
mortality, in Notestein’s words, is an indicator of the sanitation and the quality of health 
services (1983, 345-360). In that sense, infant mortality is an indicator of a core concept 
of the modernization process. This proposed link also makes sense at the level of 
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individual/family decision-making. In van de Kaa’s words, “if it is assumed that people’s 
desired family size reflects a specific intended number of surviving children, rather than a 
certain number of births, they can only reduce their fertility once the chances of survival 
of the children born have improved” (1995, 405). 
De Kaa (1995, 407) outlines four formulated hypotheses regarding the mechanism 
of fertility response to a decline of infant mortality. They are: 
1. Child survival hypothesis. If couples wish to have a certain number of 
surviving children, too large a number of surviving children could alert them to 
the fact that fewer births are needed to ensure the desired number of survivors. In 
this approach, it is the excess of living children which triggers a reaction. 
2. Child replacement hypothesis. As long as mortality is high, many families 
will experience the death or one or more children. They will try to “replace” these 
children with further births. As mortality falls, replacement will no longer be 
necessary. Hence, fertility will decline. 
3. Reduction in uncertainty hypothesis. Under conditions of high mortality, 
families must anticipate the loss of one or more children before they become 
adults. Couples guard against having no adult children to care for them in their 
old age by producing a larger number of children than they desire as surviving 
children. They insure themselves against future losses by “hoarding.” As 
mortality declines, the uncertainties involved are reduced. Hence fertility can 
decline. 
4. Insurance against widowhood hypothesis. Where child mortality prevails, 
men and women are also at high risk of being widowed at a relatively young age. 
This may lead to great economic hardship and, particularly for women, can 
endanger survival if a woman has no children to help her to maintain a reasonable 
level of living. Women are, therefore, interested in having children as soon as 
possible after marriage, and have them in quick succession as insurance against 
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becoming a destitute widow. Once mortality declines, the risks and uncertainties 
diminish. Hence fertility can decline. 
The dominating premise of the demographic transition theory of linking fertility 
change with mortality decline (especially with infant mortality) makes it inapplicable to 
researching the impact of societal instabilities on short-term fluctuations of fertility since 
the latter happen with little or no relation to mortality decline. 
Overall, demographic transition theory provides one of the first theoretical 
explanations of long-range fertility decline. Demographic transition theory has been 
criticized for the assumption of universality of demographic mechanism and processes, 
without being sensitive to parochial cultural and institutional specifics (that are important 
for studying the impact of societal instabilities on fertility). It fails to explain short-term 
demographic changes unrelated to changes in mortality. It also does not even attempt to 
explain population dynamics within the third phase of demographic transition. Thus, 
employing transition theory premises to explain short-term fluctuations of fertility in a 
given research study is not appropriate. 
 
Net Wealth-Flow Theory 
The first theory in a family of post-classical transition theories is the one of net 
wealth-flows. It is often times called a restatement of a demographic transition theory. Its 
author and major proponent, John Caldwell researched demographic trends mostly in the 
less developed and historical societies in the mid-1970s. By that time the huge 
opportunities to study demographic transitions had emerged, one of them being an ability 
to undertake large scale sociological experiments. The restatement of the demographic 
transition theory by Caldwell involved both revision of the causal mechanism originally 
specified by the theory’s proponents and anchoring demographic transition to the 
historical and modern developing countries. 
The core explanation of Caldwell’s theory is that fertility behavior is determined 
by the direction of net intergenerational wealth flows. The scholar specifies two basic 
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modes of production: familial and non-familial. The first mode is typified by the net 
wealth flows from younger to older generation, and thus there is no economic gain in 
restricting fertility. In non-familial modes wealth flows take the opposite direction and 
this it is economically rational to reduce births. Caldwell places a special emphasis on the 
role of norms in the reversal of the intergenerational wealth flows. He refers to what he 
calls “social motivations” (1976, 322) that implies the incentive of following the social 
norms of children getting greater education. The latter increases the cost of children and 
reduces the labor benefits to parents contributing the reversal of the intergenerational 
wealth flows. Moreover, in regard to justifying the rationality of keeping high level of 
fertility in familial mode of production, Caldwell goes even further. He states that long 
history of familial mode of production contains not only agrarian but also hunting and 
gathering societies. Caldwell claims that the latter could have been “typified by wealth 
flows from the younger to the older generation, without a specific child-parent flow, and 
fertility may have been valuable more in terms of numbers and security then in terms of 
production before the external imposition favoured highly controlled fertility” (1981, 8). 
The role of family nucleation in the reversal of the direction of wealth flow is an 
important part of Caldwell’s restatement of the demographic transition theory. For the 
“great divide”, a metaphor used by a scholar to describe the reversal of the 
intergenerational wealth flow, the family has to be largely nucleated both emotionally 
and economically. Caldwell stresses that “a fair degree of emotional nucleation is needed 
for economic nucleation” (1976, 355). And, most importantly, “considerable amounts of 
both are required before parents are free to indulge in ever greater expenditures on their 
children” (1976, 355) that actually means the complete reversal of intergenerational 
wealth flows. Caldwell specifically emphasizes the importance of the economy of the 
nuclear family to be largely isolated from that of an extended family for the occurrence of 
the “great divide”. This process implies the change of economic balance in the family so 
that the parents are fully in charge of their own family economy. 
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Caldwell’s basic premise is that familial revolution does not necessarily coincide 
with economic modernization. Accordingly, Caldwell states that in some countries 
economic modernization is not accompanied by certain types of social change (including 
family nucleation): this explains sustained high fertility despite the chance of 
urbanization and proportion of nonagricultural production. The opposite is also true – 
familial revolution could precede economic modernization. In that case corresponding 
reversal of intergenerational wealth flow leads to a fertility decline regardless of 
economic modernization advance. This explains phenomena that demographic transition 
theory failed to account for –for instance, steep declines in fertility in mostly agricultural 
Bulgaria between World Wars I and II or sustained fertility in the urban areas of Egypt 
and Far East in the 1950s.  
Net wealth-flow theory’s major achievement is the restatement of demographic 
transition theory in a way that provides explanations for this demographic phenomenon 
that transition theory failed to come with. The theory is mostly applicable to the 
explanation of grand shifts in demographic behavior, such as transition from familial to a 
non-familial mode of production, or the “great divide” leading to the nucleation of 
family, or the Westernization. (The inseparability of this theory with explanations of 
grand social changes is stressed by van de Kaa: “The proponents of the wealth flow 
concept have at the same time embedded it so intricately in the overall process of social 
change, that its own explanatory power is seriously impaired” (1995, 418)). Therefore, 
net wealth-flow theory cannot be used in explaining short-term fluctuations in fertility. 
The net wealth flow theory has also attempted to explain the recent fertility 
changes, too, however, mostly in modern developing countries. Therefore, it is 
problematic to apply it to explaining current demographic changes in developed 
countries, including the ones affected by societal instabilities. 
 
Microeconomic Theory 
General Approach. Chicago-Columbia School 
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The next post-classic transition theory is microeconomic. It was first formulated 
in 1957 by Leibenstein, and later advanced by Becker. The micro-economic approach is 
often referred to as a “demand theory,” “The Chicago School model,” “New Home 
Economics,” and “New Household Economics.” As mentioned above, the major premise 
of the demographic transition theory is the impact of society’s modernization on 
changing mortality and fertility rates. The early explanations of the demographic 
transition emphasize the role of macro-economic parameters in affecting these processes. 
Among these parameters are the levels of industrialization and urbanization; according to 
the transition theory, they are the very reasons for spreading traditional values 
contributing to the reduction of fertility. 
The microeconomic approach retains the central premise of the transition theory 
that reduced demand for children is the major driving force for the demographic 
transition. However, it shifts the focus from macroeconomic parameters to the decision-
making on fertility at a micro-level unit of a family. The microeconomic theory of 
fertility is a branch of the theory of consumer choice. The key assumption of that theory 
is that family members are rational, self-interested actors, maximizing their behavior in 
all decision-making situations (Becker 1960). This kind of behavior is the same for 
making decisions about purchasing a house or giving birth to an “additional” child (the 
term used for defining children in this approach is (not accidentally) the one of 
“consumer durables”). The key unit where this decision-making process takes place is the 
household; and the “household production function” approach links fertility decision to 
other household processes including consumption. 
As noted by Pollak and Watkins (1993, 474), the microeconomic approach is an 
elaboration on a simple and restrictive model called the “household consumption model” 
that was further extended and generalized as the “household production model.” The 
household consumption model emphasizes deriving utility from consuming market goods 
upon purchasing them. In that sense this model employs consumer behavior theory. The 
latter uses such explanatory variables as a given household’s resources, prices of all 
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goods, and budget constraints that constitute the boundaries of the purchasing 
opportunities. Thus, “constraints” and “opportunities” refer to the set of various 
alternatives available to the household. 
Microeconomic theory states that what is maximized by the members of a family 
is well-being (i.e. utility); and the immediate sources for it are produced in the household 
by its members by combining their time with market goods and services. These 
immediate sources are called “household commodities.” Becker defines them and their 
sources in the following way: “These commodities cannot be purchased in the 
marketplace but are produced as well as consumed by households using market 
purchases, own time, and various environmental inputs. These commodities include 
children, prestige and esteem, health, altruism, envy, and pleasures of the senses, and are 
much smaller (sic) than the number of goods consumed” (Becker, 1991). For example, 
health is a function of hygiene, and clothes need to be clean. Cleanliness requires effort 
and time from household members, as well as investment in the market purchases of 
laundry supplies. This kind of activity represents the “household production function” for 
such a “household commodity” as health. 
Families are supposed to aim to maximize utility (i.e. well being), while limited 
by two constraints: available financial resources and available time. These constraints 
determine “opportunities” (including children). The maximization of total utility by the 
household by using the constrained total resources leads to the utility-maximization 
equilibrium, such that “no reallocation of available resources would increase total utility” 
(Robinson 1997, 51). 
The most important assumption of the microeconomic theory of fertility is that of 
fixed preferences that are constant across time and social groups. Only change in 
opportunities (and related constraints) determines change in producing different 
“commodities” including children. As Pollak and Watkins put it: “Individuals are 
assumed to be an ordering - complete, reflexive and transitive. In the household 
consumption model, preferences are generally assumed to be monotonic, convex, and 
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continuous as well. It can be shown that such preferences are ‘representable’ by a real-
valued function in the sense that numbers can be assigned to collections (‘bundles,’ 
‘vectors’) of goods in such a way that higher numerical values are assigned to collections 
that rank higher in the individual’s preference ordering. Economists call a function that 
represents an individual’s preference ordering ‘a utility function’. Thus, when economists 
speak of ‘utility maximizing behavior’, they mean only that the individual when faced 
with a set of opportunities chooses from that opportunity set the ‘best’ (i.e. highest 
ranking) alternative, where the ranking is that specified by the individual’s preference 
ordering” (Pollak and Watkins 1993, 480). 
Several factors could affect households’ allocation of resources. First, households 
can increase their financial resources; second, they can increase effective time for 
household production by investing in their human capital; and third, they can introduce 
technological advances that will improve household production efficiency. Because 
resources are assumed to be optimally allocated, one can predict changes in 
“opportunities” and “constraints” (money, time and technology). For instance, the 
increase in wages will result in the increase in demand for all household commodities, a 
substitution in consumption that will cause the reduction of the intake of time-intensive 
household commodities, and in the replacement of labor-intensive methods with good-
intensive methods in household production. The important point of this model is that 
these assumptions about the given relationships hold only when family allocations are in 
equilibrium, and the family is operating in an optimal (resource allocation) manner.  
Now we turn to the specification of the place of children among other 
“commodities” in a microeconomic model. As mentioned above, the household 
production function is aimed at maximizing its own utility with the help of internal and 
purchased external resources and the use of “household technology.” That means that the 
“demand” for children is actually a demand by parents for the flow of services that 
children produce over time. Consumption of these child services generates pleasure or 
“utility” for parents (the household).  The child-services (and other services) are 
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produced within the household using the time labor of the household members and inputs 
purchased from outside the household, and employ the “technology possessed by the 
household for such production” (Robinson 1997, 63-64). Leibenstein (1957) 
distinguishes three types of utility that parents receive from having children: 1) 
consumption utility (meaning non-economic benefits, such as emotional ones); 2) labor 
productivity utility; 3) old age security utility. Children thus are treated as a special type 
of commodity that produces a flow of services to parents which determines their utility 
for the latter. The volume of the flow of services from the children could be larger or 
smaller, depending on the underlying technology. 
The important element in the microeconomic theory of fertility is relating 
allocation of time to the actual or potential earnings of the wife. This theory places 
special emphasis on the increasing importance of women’s work outside the home and its 
competition with child-rearing for the wife’s time. As noted by Murphy (1992, 236), 
“since women undertake the greater burden of childbearing, the costs of childbearing, 
especially in terms of earnings foregone while they are looking after children and future 
labour market prospects, fall most heavily on them.” Since these costs are assumed to be 
greatest for those women in highly paid jobs, the theory predicts a strongly negative 
relationship between wages of wives and the number of children. This logic comprises 
the core of the microeconomic theory’s explanation of the declining fertility 
accompanying the increase in women’s participation in labor force. Also, as Cleland and 
Wilson noted, the “emphasis placed by neo-classical household economists on the value 
of mother’s time and its relationship to the cost of children, has strengthened the long-
held view that the social status and economic independence of women may be an 
important intervening factor between economic modernization and fertility decline” 
(1987, 8). 
Becker later added two major theoretical points to the original microeconomic 
model. The first one was bringing other members of the family by: 1) adding “altruism” 
as a source of utility to the decision-maker, thus bringing meaning to the utility of other 
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members; 2) extending the decision-making process to be “dynastic,” meaning that 
present decision-making acts on behalf of future generations by adding bequests and 
investments to the current expenditures. 
The second point Becker introduced to the model of utility maximization is the 
concept of “child quality.” The reason for that innovation was what appeared to be an 
inverse relationship between income and fertility: while income rose, family size declined 
during the European Demographic Transition. This appeared to be in conflict with classic 
microeconomic theory’s premise of positive income elasticity of demand for children. 
Becker solves that problem by elaborating on his theory’s thesis that the demand is not 
for children per se but for child-services; while total child services equals number of 
children times an average quality per child, one way to increase total child services is to 
contribute to their quality. So, there are two ways, Becker states, to increase prospective 
child-services: (1) have more children; or (2) increase children’s quality (Becker and 
Lewis, 1973; Becker and Tomes, 1976; Becker, 1991). And they are not simple trade-
offs. 
 Generally, as evident from the above, this variant of micro-economic theory has 
several properties that are essential for the explanation of the instability’s impact on 
short-term fluctuations in fertility. First, it could be applicable to short-term fluctuations 
of fertility, unlike demographic transition and net wealth flow theories, since such factors 
as income, or demand for children services could change many times within any of the 
mode of production or within any grand scale process like modernization. Second, the 
theory provides macro-micro connections linking macro-societal changes and fertility 
outcomes with family based decision-making on this demographic process. However, the 
theory is not applicable to rapid and sudden changes at the times of unexpected social 
change; it holds only at the state of relative equilibrium. Therefore, its ability to be used 
for the explanation of societal instability’s impact on fertility is limited. 
 
 R. Easterlin’s Theory 
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 Easterlin (1974) builds on the classic microeconomic theory of fertility; however, 
his own theoretical advance can be distinguished from it in at least three ways. First, 
Easterlin develops the concept of a “births production function” and relates it to the 
demand for children. Second, he introduces “endogenous preferences” into the fertility 
model and develops a theory of “taste formation.” Third, he allows for unintentiousness 
in the utility-maximizing process which is reflected in his concept of “unperceived 
jointness.”  
 The microeconomic model of fertility emphasizes the demand part of the 
decision-making process of fertility. The other factor that also is a part of the “optimal 
solution” – the birth production function, or output of children, or, as Schultz calls it, a 
“supply” factor (Schultz 1976, 89-124) is not adequately addressed. Easterlin fills that 
gap, elaborating on the concept of potential production of children (i.e. supply factor). He 
defines that concept as “the number of surviving children a household would have if 
fertility were not deliberately limited” (Easterlin 1974, 55). The key factors that 
determine the potential output of children are natural fertility and probability of infant 
survival. Among the factors that, in turn, affect these two variables, are health, quality of 
nutrition and medical care. The key point in developing the “supply” factor is that it plays 
a role in the utility-maximizing decision on fertility: it is number of children surviving to 
adulthood that parents aim for, not just number of children per se. Thus there is an 
implication for the model: the information about, say, a drop in infant mortality could 
alter the demand for giving birth to a certain number of children (in that example, the 
result could be a reduction of planned births). 
The second distinction of Easterlin’s approach, as mentioned, is the incorporation 
of “endogenous tastes” (e.g. preferences) into the fertility decision-making model. As 
stated before, the classic microeconomic mode assumes fixed preferences, both across 
time and households. The differences in fertility decisions are explained only by changes 
in opportunities. Easterlin recognized the incompleteness of such a model and introduces 
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what he calls “interdependent preferences” – both for fertility and consumption. Two 
versions of interdependent preferences models are introduced.  
The first version, the “socialization” model, assumes that family’s preferences 
depend on the average consumption and family size of all families in the previous cohort. 
This specification could be modified by limiting these families to a certain 
socioeconomic status or tracing preference formation to the more distant past. The second 
version, the “intrafamily” model, assumes that each family’s preferences are determined 
by the consumption and family size the husband and wife experienced during their 
childhood and adolescence.  
The main difference between these two versions is that while “socialization” does 
not imply the existence of systematic differences within a group of families with the same 
socioeconomic status, education and religion, the “intrafamily” version predicts 
heterogeneity within such a group because of the differences in the consumption and 
family size experienced during childhood and adolescence. The interdependent 
preferences are formalized by postulating that each family’s tastes depend on “normal 
levels” of commodity consumption and family size, with “normal levels” interpreted as 
“aspiration levels” or “bliss points” and assuming their relation to the past consumption 
and family size decisions of other families.   
If preferences are taken into account, fertility decline in developed countries could 
be explained not by demand for higher child-quality services but by the fact that “...shifts 
in the budget constraint favoring children are offset by an endogenous preference 
mechanism functioning as a lagged result of income growth that disfavors children” 
(Easterlin, Pollak and Wachter, 1980, 116-117). As a source for taste change, the increase 
in non-labor income is mentioned: in the relative income model, aspirations could be 
altered by an increase of income.  
Easterlin’s third contribution to fertility theory is the introduction of the concept 
of “unperceived jointness.” Classic microeconomic approach was often criticized for 
assuming that a family has complete information about the factors affecting their optimal 
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decision-making on fertility. Easterlin and his associates address this criticism by 
introducing the concept of “unperceived jointness,” which describes the situation when 
the family does not recognize the relationship between its consumption pattern and its 
fertility and infant mortality. For instance, increases in income could lead to better 
nutrition which would also increase fecundity. The resulting increase of fertility would 
not stem from conscious utility maximization; rather, it will be a case of an unperceived 
jointness. Better nutrition could also lead to decreases in infant mortality. As mentioned 
above, in the discussion of “supply” of children, this could be a factor in changing the 
demand for actual numbers of births. Yet this would hardly be a part of conscious 
maximization, and improved nutrition would be an illustration of unperceived jointness 
of fertility change. Easterlin stresses that unperceived jointness does not imply complete 
ignorance. Actually, unperceived jointness would be consistent with any kind of 
knowledge except a perfect one. 
Indeed, Easterlin has significantly advanced the original microeconomic theory in 
several ways (including introduction of the non-economic predictors of fertility). Still 
even this advanced version of a microeconomic theory has one significant trait that 
prevents from applying it to investigating the instability’s impact on fertility swings: 
Easterlin traces formation of fertility intentions to the periods of childhood and 
adolescence, while for researching sudden instabilities’ impact on fertility one has to look 
at the change of such attitudes at childbearing years. 
 
Cultural Theory 
Cultural theory has largely appeared as an attempt to address the major critical 
points of the three above mentioned theories that are largely based on rational choice 
assumptions. Much of cultural theory was constructed inductively, basing its premises on 
empirical findings. Cultural theory is about innovation, diffusion and ideational / 
normative changes that impact fertility. In a narrow sense the theory includes the 
development of birth control means, and the spread of its use and attitudes toward these 
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practices. The broader concept of cultural theory also includes the greater scope of 
ideational changes that are ultimately related to the formation of a new level of a desired 
fertility as well as new attitudes toward new patterns of fertility behavior including 
calendar of births and types and timing of marriages that stem from employing practices 
of birth control. Both narrow and broad meanings of cultural theory premises are strongly 
interrelated. 
Explaining fertility changes by cultural properties such as innovation, diffusion 
and ideational shifts has meant breaking away from major premises of transition, wealth-
flow and microeconomic theories. In other words, postulating above mentioned cultural 
properties as the major causes of fertility dynamics implies demonstrating the weaker 
impact of the socioeconomic variables emphasized by the preceding three theories, on 
fertility process. These socioeconomic variables include levels of modernization, 
urbanization and infant mortality, education, female participation in labor force, shares of 
familial and non-familial modes of production and security motives.  
Research and corresponding findings in this area, as noted by de Kaa (1995, 420) 
was conducted in three various contexts. The first one is the historical decline of fertility 
in Europe, the second one is in contemporary developing countries and the third is 
related to the Second Demographic Transition in modern advanced countries. Let us 
discuss the research conducted in the third context. 
The strong ideational shifts accountable for changes in fertility dynamics are 
not limited to just use of contraception. This claim is strongly supported by the 
scholars in regard to the third context, the Second Demographic Transition (SDT). A 
major premise of this theory, as well known, is the explanation of changes in 
demographic behavior by huge shifts in the prevailing societal values. Van de Kaa 
emphasizes these new values of the “postmodern epoch.” Among them he mentions "...the 
overwhelming preoccupation with self-fulfillment, personal freedom of choice, personal 
development and lifestyle, and emancipation..." (de Kaa, 1996, 425). The European Value 
Survey, conducted in the Northern, Eastern and Southern parts of the continent, has 
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confirmed connection between new models of demographic behavior and such values 
conducive to Second Demographic Transition theory as stressing individual autonomy, 
weaker civil morality, world orientation, and tolerance toward minorities, self-fulfillment and 
other postmaterialist values (Surkyn and Lesthaeghe, 2004, 54).  
Van de Kaa stresses relationship of these values' emergence with social, economic 
and structural conditions of societies: "Rising incomes and the economic and political 
security which democratic welfare states offer their populations has helped trigger a 'silent' 
revolution", a shift in a 'Maslovian' post-materialism direction where an individual's 
sexual preferences are accepted for what they are, and decisions on cohabitation, divorce, 
abortion, sterilization and voluntarily childlessness are largely left to the discretion of the 
individuals and couples involved" (1996, 425). According to the SDT theory, there are 
following manifestations of demographic behavior conducive with acceptance of the above 
mentioned values and norms: increase in the numbers of consensual unions; increase in 
proportions of non-marital childbearing with an accompanying increase in the mean age at 
childbearing outside marriage; decline of induced abortions and increase in use of modern 
contraception; change in the position and shape of distribution of birth by age including shift 
in the share of teenage fertility; increase of the mean age of legal marriage, mean age at 
giving first birth, and mean age of maternity. 
Cultural theory had illuminated the important variables in fertility decision-
making. However, as even cultural theory proponents recognize, large portions of it is not 
a theory as such. The role of culture is defined, the mechanism of spreading out of norms 
and values (diffusion) is specified, but the mechanism and path of culture’s impact on 
fertility is not discovered in full, especially when it comes to short-term swings. (A good 
example is the recent trend of reversing postponing first births in some European 
countries (Rykova, 2006, 60)). Most of the theory deals with grand long-term social 
changes (e.g. the spread of post-materialistic values, or demographic transitions) and 
therefore is not suitable for using in the study of short-term fertility fluctuations. 
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Institutional Theory 
As well as cultural, the institutional theory of fertility was brought to life largely 
as a response to shortcomings and unsupported claims of “universality” of classic 
transition theory and its post-classic versions.  It emphasizes, as cultural theory does, the 
contextual, often times situational character of fertility decision-making. Institutional 
theory, however, introduced several explanatory claims of its own. First, the theory 
proponents elaborated on the very concept of institutions and singled out the ones that are 
fertility related. Second, it explained demographic change in terms of path-dependency 
that is closely related to the uniqueness of institutional contexts for any given country or 
groups of counties. And, third, it came up with the explanation of the mechanism of how 
institutional settings are perceived by individuals and impact their fertility decision-
making. 
Let us start with the elaborations on the first point. Institutions that could be used 
as determinants or predictors of fertility behavior, are not, as one of the main proponents 
of institutional theory, McNicoll, puts it, “...tangible public entities like prisons or 
hospitals” but “clusters of behavioral rules governing (or, to put it more neutrally, 
regularities describing) human actions and relationships in recurrent situations” 
(McNicoll 1994, 4-5). The rules could be written or unwritten but it is known that there 
are sanctions for violating them coming from the authority or self-imposed. 
McNicoll also emphasizes the multifaceted character of institutions. The latter 
have both material and cultural antecedents, with the latter sharing with culture such 
properties as symbol and belief. Social institutions impacting fertility plausibly have this 
multifaceted nature. This trait could be illustrated by Guyer’s elaboration on the 
institution strongly related to fertility, the sexual division of labor. She writes: “The 
sexual division of labor is, like all fundamental institutions, multifaceted. Within any 
particular society, it is an integral part of the ideological system, economic organization, 
daily family life, and often the political structure as well... In any one case all these 
dimensions reinforce each other, so that the current structure seems both heavily 
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overdetermined and ultimately mysterious since it is difficult to assign weight to one 
factor over another” (Guyer 1980, 356). Likewise, Migdal (1988, 27) emphasizes 
integration of material and moral in the establishing systems of social control where 
tangible rewards and sanctions are combined with symbolic ones. 
Acknowledging that institutions are not neatly classifiable, McNicoll (1984, 11) 
suggests following enumeration of some supposedly fertility-related institutions: (1) 
family and local community, (2) family and property law and the local dimension of 
public administration; (3) family and the stratification system and the mobility paths it 
accommodates; and (4) family and the labor market. In addition, the scholar lists the 
institutional context of state-individual relations since governments attempt to influence 
fertility in a form of a public policy. Mason (1984, 77) recommends emphasizing macro 
properties of such institutions as mass education, women’s legal status and systems of 
gender stratification, and recommends concentrating on the aggregate-level analyses.  
The major reason for the various outcomes was plausibly the differences in the 
countries’ institutional contexts, most importantly, in political systems (see Klupt, 2008). 
According to McNicoll (1993, 9), in totalitarian states the expansion of power at the 
expense of other social institutions was virtually complete. That allowed Chinese 
Communist party local communities to ostracize and punish those in the communities and 
enterprises not complying with the party line and refusing to limit births with one child. 
India’s democratic institutional context along with being a multiconfessional country 
prevented the success and durability of authoritarian and administrative population 
policy. 
The second, arguably, the most important explanatory claim of the institutional 
theory is the one employing the concept of path-dependency. The latter implies the partial 
dependence of the emerging institutions, or “clusters of behavioral rules,” on the way 
previous choices and developments were made. These previous choices stemmed from 
behavior and are impacted by both previous history and various expectations of society. 
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These newly established institutions determine the choices to come: their array is largely 
dependent on what kind of institutions was already present at the previous “path.” 
The key word in the institutional theory’s path-dependency approach is 
“uniqueness.” As van de Kaa (1996, 427) puts it: “The institutional endowments of a 
society will reflect its unique history; hence, the demographic response of societies to 
changes in economic circumstances, in the probabilities of survival, in security risks of 
families and individuals, in sex roles, or in the policies pursued by their government, will 
in some measure be unique.” The theory’s emphasis on the uniqueness of demographic 
developments due to the specifics of institutions relevant to fertility behavior challenges 
the universality of the wealth-flow, microeconomic and especially demographic transition 
theories. However, institutional theory’s premises are not totally incompatible with the 
latter. They rather add up regional and/or national flavor to the commonalities of 
demographic developments in various countries that are emphasized, in particular, by the 
demographic transition theory. 
As mentioned above, a path-dependency based institutional approach emphasizes 
uniqueness of a given continent’s, country’s or region’s impact on demographic 
development, in opposite to the universalistic assumptions of demographic transition 
theories. However, the work of Rindfuss, Guzzo and Morgan (2003, 411-438), written in 
the vein of institutional theory, offers a somewhat distinctive approach. This work takes 
into account not only the uniqueness of countries’ institutions in regard to their impact on 
fertility but also commonalities in countries’ institutional settings that allow for 
specifying the patterns of institutional settings for the various groups of countries and 
determining corresponding demographic responses. In authors’ words, they “…look at 
the interplay between the uniqueness of countries (or individuals) and their response to 
similar forces and constraints” (Rindfuss et al, 2003, 413). 
The authors have examined the changing institutional context of low fertility in a 
set of 22 countries that had achieved moderate or low levels of fertility by the 1960s. The 
authors specifically looked at two major institutional incompatibilities that supposedly 
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play a great role in fertility swings: the ones between the mother and the worker roles and 
between marriage and child-rearing. Rindfuss et al single out institutional constraints that 
affect existence and degree of reducing both incompatibilities. They include religious 
issues, labor market issues, educational policies and opportunities, legal issues and 
familial context. 
All of these institutional contexts vary across countries. This is very much evident 
when it comes to institutions accounting for the reduction of the first type of 
incompatibility, the one between the worker and mother roles. The institution that 
Rindfuss et. al believe is of a paramount importance for reducing these roles 
incompatibility is child care. The authors conceptualize this institution, specifying 
availability, acceptability, accessibility, quality and cost of child care, and demonstrate 
various patterns of each across groups of the countries. 
For instance, Rindfuss et al single out Norway as a “…good example where the 
state has been actively making child care more widely available” and mention that while 
US government plays a relatively minor role in the provision of child care services, it 
“provides an example of business and volunteer organizations increasing the availability 
of child care (Rindfuss et al, 2003, 416). 
In regard to acceptability (that refers to the degree of negative or positive attitude 
toward the use of child care within a country) authors cite the huge differences between 
US, Germany and Japan. In the latter, typified with lowest low fertility, the great 
emphasis is placed on mother’s responsibility to stay home with children. Married 
women living with their mothers-in-law consider the latter to be an acceptable provider 
of a child care; these very women are both more likely to work and to have more 
children. In West Germany in 1996, 76 percent of the adult population believed small 
children suffer if their mothers work, while in the US, the proportion of adult population 
that thinks the same way had declined from 68 percent in 1977 to 48 percent in 1991. 
Rindfuss et. al touch upon a related issue of the institutional inertia related to the 
gap between greater involvement of women in employment and career and the degree of 
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attitudinal resistance toward this development. This inertia very much affects family lives 
including fertility rates, and strongly varies across groups of countries. Italy and Spain, 
for instance, are still typified with the resistance of society as a whole and particularly of 
men toward any deviation from women’s single role as a housewife regardless of having 
or not having children, while in UK, West Germany and US there is less of this attitude 
and it mostly relates to the employment of those women having children. 
As for the second type of incompatibility, the one between marriage and 
childbearing, Rindfuss et al focus on the very meaning of the institution of marriage in 
various groups of countries. That also includes the degree of acceptability of nonmarital 
childbearing. Authors single out three countries, Austria, Sweden and Norway that have a 
long history of nonmarital fertility and are typified by a relative tolerance toward it. On 
the other hand, in Japan not only is nonmarital childbearing rarer and less accepted, but 
the very concept of marriage is different: it is more than just a union between a man and a 
woman but also the vehicle for carrying on the parental line. In Ireland, Spain and Italy 
there is a strong impact of Catholic Church, according to which sexual activity and 
childbearing should be confined to marriage. 
These differences have an impact on fertility since it affects women’s decision on 
having a child when she for whatever reason doesn’t want to get married. As Rindfuss et 
al put it, 
“…if a country’s normative and practical woman who desires a child but not a 
husband may chose to remain unmarried and childless. Under this set of 
scenarios, as part and parcel of the broad set of changes in the institution of 
marriage that swept across low fertility countries, those countries that have (or 
move toward) a more permissive normative structure regarding non-marital 
childbearing and that have fewer practical limitations against non-marital 
fertility are likely to both have higher TFR’s and a higher proportion of all births 
non-marital” (Rindfuss et al, 2003, 421-422). 
 Institutional theory in this very part that defines and specifies certain 
commonalities in the impact of institutional settings on fertility could be indirectly used 
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in investigating fluctuations in fertility (in cases when instabilities are related to changes 
in these institutional settings). 
The crucial factor for the understanding of institutional theory and its potential for 
the explanation of short-term fluctuations at the states of societal instability is the very 
mechanism through which institutions affect fertility. McNicoll (1980) provides such a 
model in his other article. In this most developed form, the institutional theory of fertility 
is presented in a form of causal mechanism linking macro-level (institutions) with micro-
level (individual decision-making on fertility). 
Several assumptions allow for creation of a model of the macro-micro interaction, 
involving several intervening variables. The first assumption is that institutional forms in 
the society could recreate an incentive structure. The latter is defined as the one that 
“comprises the arrays of pressures directly or tangentially leaning on fertility” (McNicoll 
1984, 443). Such pressures, according to the scholar, could be either economic incentives 
that work through economic returns to children; legal administrative sanctions, like 
marriage laws or governmental decrees; or, social pressures to conformity. 
The second assumption is that a person does not experience institutional 
environment as a whole, but rather “as a series of domains, within each of which 
behavior is adaptive” (McNicoll 1984, 457). Such domains are called “segmented 
decision environments.” It is these decision-settings that combine delineated institutional 
change with the decision process of a person. It is this structured part of the institutional 
environment that really matters for fertility behavior. 
The last assumption of this model is about the individual who makes this decision 
(the micro-level). The institutional theory borrows the concept of “administrative man”, 
introduced by Simon (1957) as an alternative to an “economic man” that was utilized in 
the microeconomic theory of fertility. In contrast to economic man, administrative man 
does not maximize, he rather “satisfies”.  Examples of such behavior, provided by 
McNicoll, are: satisfying such criteria as fair price, adequate profit, a given share of the 
market, a quiet life. The rationality of individual is bounded or segmented. A segmented 
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decision-making environment provides those boundaries, across which the administrative 
man shapes his plans for fertility behavior. 
Institutional theory introduced and employed several explanatory claims of its 
own. First, the proponents of this theory have specified the most important institutions 
that make an impact on demographic process, including fertility. Second, it explained 
demographic change in terms of a path-dependency concept. Third, on a micro-level it 
utilized the model of “administrative man” and attempted to explain the mechanism of 
acquiring fertility behavior based on the institutional environment.  
The institutional approach in its most developed form comes close to the theory 
construction requirement in defining the mechanism of institutions’ impact on fertility. It 
could be definitely applied to explaining some short-term fluctuations of fertility – those 
impacted by instabilities related to rapid and unexpected changes in institutions. 
However, not all kinds of instabilities are related to changes in institutions. Also, the 
theory failed to provide a clear algorithm of how the intervening variable, the segmented 
decision-making environment, is created out of the institutional change. That leaves the 
possibility for the ad hoc definitions of the segmented decision-making environment and 
multiple interpretations of the way fertility is affected. So, though the theory provided the 
general model of macro-micro links, these connections are not clearly specified 
(discussion on it above involving segmented decision-making areas that are not clearly 
specified, proves that). 
 
3.3. Model for Linking Societal Instabilities with Demographic Behavior  
The analysis of demographic theories was undertaken in the previous section in 
order to determine which one or set of theories could be utilized for the current research. 
None of them, whether in original or modified form, applies, due to the fact that most of 
instabilities and crises are short-term. There are several reasons why existing population 
theories fail to explain short-term fluctuations of fertility including those related to 
societal instability.  
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Most demographic theories including demographic transition, wealth-flow, 
cultural and institutional, focus on changes in fertility over relatively long-term periods. 
While there are some attempts to understand short-term fluctuations of fertility, notably 
the Chicago-Columbia School of microeconomic theory (Becker 1976, 1991), these 
typically relate to changes in the cost-benefit equation in fertility decision-making and 
have been criticized as holding only in the state of equilibrium. Likewise, the 
Pennsylvania School of microeconomic theory (Easterlin, Pollack and Wachter 1997) 
traces formation of attitudes toward fertility to childhood and the early adolescent years 
and thus does not leave much room for the role of rapid social changes. Therefore, such 
theories provide little explanation of short-term fluctuations in fertility and their relation 
to rapid and unexpected social change. 
One explanation for why there is so little work on short-term fluctuations in 
fertility is that existing theories have not effectively developed macro-micro links. 
Institutional theory, for example, may provide a macro-micro link by specifying how 
institutional changes shape the segmented decision-making environment that is taken into 
account when an individual makes a fertility decision (McNicoll 1994). However, this 
theory does not provide a clear algorithm for how the segmented decision-making 
environment is formed, and fails to predict what level and direction of fertility change 
occurs under the influence of any particular societal development. On the other hand, the 
Chicago-Columbia School of microeconomics can take certain macro-societal change 
(such as, for instance, technological developments) into account while explaining 
individual fertility decision-making but pays little attention to social, political and 
economic dimensions. As a consequence, the unique and often a paradoxical nature of 
socio-political and other societal changes that may produce short-time fluctuations 
remain understudied, and the process by which macro-micro level conditions influence 
individual fertility decision-making is largely unarticulated. 
The above-mentioned shortcomings of current demographic theories in explaining 
short-term fluctuations of fertility can also be found in theories exploring such 
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fluctuations during periods of societal instability. This has led the author to a search for a 
more general theory that would address all of the missing points – the one that would 
encompass macro-micro links, be applicable to short-term fluctuations, incorporate value 
changes in periods of societal instability and address the specific impact of societal 
instability on fertility decision-making. 
 
3.3.1. Uncertainty Reduction Theory 
The theory that satisfies all of these criteria is uncertainty reduction theory 
(Friedman, Hechter and Kanazawa 1994). The theory starts with an assumption of a 
rational actor who maximizes value in his fertility decision-making. This initial general 
assumption shares the premise with the rational choice based microeconomic theory of 
fertility. The breakaway point that distinguishes uncertainty reduction theory from 
traditional rational choice explanations is the assumption about what kind of value is 
maximized. Uncertainty reduction theory emphasizes universal immanent value that 
rational actors seek to reduce. Decision-making under uncertainty differs from that under 
risk in the knowledge of probabilities of the alternative outcomes. While failure to 
achieve desired ends could be the case for both states -- situations of risk and situations 
characterized with uncertainty – in risky situations the decision-maker can judge the odds 
of failure, while in situations marked with uncertainty he cannot. The inability to assess 
the odds under situations of uncertainty dictates an actor’s preference for risky situations, 
where judgment about probabilities of different sets of choice outcomes can be made. 
Thus, uncertainty reduction theory assumption could be formulated: Actors will always 
desire to reduce uncertainty by converting it into a certain, even if risky, situation.  
Friedman et. al (1994, 377) claim that values exist in two fundamental varieties: 
instrumental values provide means to a wide variety of ends whereas immanent values 
are ends that are desired purely for their own sake. Because actors value uncertainty 
reduction as an end in itself rather than just as a means to various other ends, it is an 
immanent rather than an instrumental value that actors seek to reduce. 
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 People can reduce uncertainty in two ways. The first one is to gather information 
that transforms uncertainty to risk for a local choice problem. The second one is to pursue 
global strategies designed to reduce uncertainty regarding the future courses of action. 
The authors of the theory point out several such global strategies. The principal ones in 
developed countries are stable careers, marriage and children. Most importantly, 
Friedman et al argue that having children reduces uncertainty because parenthood is 
irreversible and irrevocable. This is because, first, having children involves actors in 
recurrent social relations, and, second, creates an irrevocable commitment to a stream of 
expenditures over a long period of time.     
  There is a question that stems from the uncertainty-reducing character of the 
decision to have a child. Don't children creating new uncertainties while reducing other 
ones? Friedman et al. (1994, 383) list these uncertainties that could increase with 
parenthood: "Will the child be born healthy or with birth defects? Will it grow up to be a 
good child or delinquent? Will it succeed or fail in school? Will it experience major 
illnesses? Why would an actor interested in reducing uncertainty willingly introduce new 
sources of uncertainty?" 
  The answer to that question is a well-established cognitive bias. According to the 
founding of decision theorists and cognitive psychologists, people's perception of risk is 
biased in one predictable direction. People tend to downplay risks that they assume 
(justifiably or not) they are in control of; risks out of their control loom larger in their 
perception. For example: driving a car is objectively riskier than flying an airplane, but 
people subjectively tend to feel otherwise because of their feeling that while driving a car 
they are more in control. Uncertainty reduction theory suggests, "because parents can do 
so much to control their children's fate, risks and uncertainties emanating from 
parenthood are likely to be diminished in comparison with types of uncertainty that 
individuals seek to reduce through parenthood" (Friedman et al. 1994: 383). 
Uncertainty reduction theory thus provides a set of hypotheses linking types of 
uncertainty with strategies for its reduction. Specifically, it predicts that two categories of 
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individuals are more likely than others to seek parenthood: (1) those that face greater 
uncertainty and (2) those that have less access to other means of uncertainty reduction. 
Friedman et al. suggest that an example of the first category is minorities with poorer 
prospects of stable successful careers who will seek parenthood more to reduce 
uncertainty, while an example of the second category is persons with poorer prospects of 
stable marriage. 
Uncertainty reduction theory contains a subsidiary assumption of the 
enhancement of marital solidarity. This assumption asserts that husbands and wives will 
seek to increase solidarity in their marriages. Parenthood thus could be hypothesized 
from the perspective of reducing uncertainty by increasing the stability of marriage 
(possibility correlated with parenthood).  
Propositions from uncertainty reduction theory and its subsidiary assumptions can 
be derived for women acting alone as well as for couples making joint decisions. The 
important point of the theory is awareness that other factors could affect fertility and thus 
should be controlled. For that reason uncertainty reduction theory is said to be 
problematic in application to developing countries, where it is hard to disentangle the 
uncertainty reduction motivation from the economic motivation. Children in developing 
countries may increase a household's production capacity, and for that reason fertility 
behavior leads both to maximization of wealth and to uncertainty reduction. However, 
uncertainty reduction theory could be well applied to the fertility decision-making in 
developed countries. 
The uncertainty reduction theory and its major premises have caused significant 
controversy. One of the dominant examples and arguably, the most challenging such 
controversy has been provided by a text by Lehrer, Grossband, Shechtman and Leasure 
(1966, 133-9), where these scholars criticized the uncertainty reduction theory on three 
accounts: They first argued that the theory had limited potential, furthermore stating that 
it would be internally inconsistent, while finally criticizing that the theory failed to stand 
empirical testing. 
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Regarding to Lehrer et al., a major objection to the uncertainty reduction theory is 
that the central assumption of the theory, namely that people have children to reduce 
uncertainty is counterintuitive. According to the authors, the many other incentives for 
parenthood such as an outlet for creativity and accomplishment, or an opportunity to 
guide, teach, and exert control are no less significant than reducing uncertainty. These 
motives are referred to as the “expansion of self” and have also been acknowledged by 
Friedman et al.; however, without assigning these motives a universal and central role in 
the decision to become a parent. Consequently, in this very line of critique about the 
uncertainty reduction theory, Lehrer et al. were even more radical, suggesting that 
assuming any particular reason for parenthood has poor research merits, therefore not 
providing a good point of departure to explore variations in fertility behavior (Lehrer et 
al., 1996, 133). In this first point of critique, Lehrer et al. (1996, 133) also included a 
disagreement with the premise of the uncertainty reduction “that the uncertainties 
emanating from parenthood are more controllable than those associated with labor force 
participation and marriage”, thus rendering them more preferable. 
Finally, the first critical point of Lehrer et al. also included a timing issue. The 
authors pointed out that children stay with parents long after such uncertainty has settled. 
Because of that, Lehrer et al. doubted the reduction of such short-term uncertainties to be 
a factor in the lifetime decision of becoming a parent. 
The second point of the critique of the uncertainty reduction theory by Lehrer et 
al. addresses internal inconsistency. To support this point, the scholars introduced two 
hypotheses of Friedman et al. that, as the scholars suggest, contradict each other. The first 
hypothesis is that “financial and emotional support from families of origin has a negative 
effect on the propensity to parenthood” (Friedman et al., 1994, 385). The second one is 
that “social and geographical mobility has a negative effect on the propensity to 
parenthood (Friedman et. al, 386). Lehrer et al. suggested that the contradiction between 
these hypotheses lies in the fact that in the latter case “…they assert that couples who 
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cannot rely on friends and family will work harder to make their marriages solid, thus 
decreasing the need for parenthood as an uncertainty reduction mechanism” while first 
hypothesis “…implies that those who move away from their families should have 
relatively high fertility” (Lehrer et. al, 133). 
Finally, in support of the third point of their critique of the uncertainty reduction 
theory, Lehrer et al. discuss numerous examples for where the driving hypotheses of the 
theory fail to generate empirical support. Furthermore, Lehrer et al. argue that most of 
these hypotheses could be derived from other, more plausible, theories of fertility 
behavior (here, the scholars mostly referred to the economic theory of fertility). 
In particular, Lehrer et al. discussed the existing empirical support of the 
hypothesis of Friedman et al., linking marriage prospects to the propensity to 
“parenthood”. According to this hypothesis, women that have a lower prospect of getting 
married (attributable mainly to the lower level of availability of marriageable males) have 
a higher tendency for parenthood as a means to reduce marriage related uncertainty. 
Lehrer et al. argue that this hypothesis not only failed to achieve empirical support 
(they cite several studies evidencing the opposite), but it also suffered from the basic flaw 
that Friedman et al. did not distinguish between marital and nonmarital fertility. Lehrer et 
al. (1996, 135) suggested that it made ”…little sense to talk about a link between 
marriage prospects and parenthood in general without making a distinction between 
marital and nonmarital fertility”. In their reply, Friedman et al. disagreed with this (Ibid., 
139), in turn suggesting that “prospects for marriage” are meaningless for already 
married couples, and are only valid for single women; therefore, this hypothesis only 
applied to the latter category. They also cited several empirical studies, some of which 
partially supporting, while others partially contradicting the claim of the hypothesis. A 
good example is the study of South and Lloyd (1992). Friedman et al. briefly discussed 
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this study in their “reply”, and further elaborated on it in greater detail in their major 
publication on the uncertainty reduction theory (Friedman et al., 1994, 391). 
Indeed, South and Lloyd (1992) provided evidence for the expected effect on the 
availability of marriageable males in the metropolitan statistical area (MSA: a 
geographical region with a relatively high population density at its core and close 
economic ties throughout) on both nonmarital fertility ratios as well as rates for white 
women; however, for African-American women, marriage opportunities were 
significantly and negatively related only to the nonmarital fertility ratio. During another 
empirical study on the topic, Rindfuss and Parnell (1989) reported that poorly educated 
never-married African-American women had the same likelihood of conceiving during 
the subsequent twelve months, as currently married high school graduates.  
Furthermore, Rindfuss and Bumpass (1976) reported that age at marital disruption 
is negatively related to the probability of intermarital fertility, which is a type of 
nonmarital fertility with births occurring during periods of marital disruption. According 
to Friedman et al., this can be used as further evidence against the hypothesis, as these 
sets of findings require the reexamination of this hypothesis as the prospects for marriage 
could easily have been overestimated. This highlights the importance for testing 
uncertainty reduction theory driven hypotheses across various groups, such as age, 
education, and race. 
In their original study, Friedman et al. also reported the findings of many other 
empirical studies that tested major hypotheses, derived from the uncertainty reduction 
theory. Some of these hypotheses generated only supporting evidence, while others 
supplied both supporting and contrary evidence. In many cases, these discrepancies could 
be attributed to differences in the estimations of actual prospects for reducing uncertainty; 
in some cases discrepancies could be attributed to various assessments of the fertility 
rates themselves of the compared population groups. It is often the case that hypotheses 
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are supplemented, specified, or disproved when tested for special subgroups of the 
population and/or under various scope conditions. Friedman et al. (1994, 391) provided a 
good example for this, presenting various findings in the course of testing the hypothesis 
of the decreasing prospect of a good career due to parenthood. The cited research used 
subgroups of women of different races, ages, educational status, and occupational status 
for specification. Friedman et al. started to describe these findings according to Brewster, 
Billy, and Grady (1993), who have demonstrated that white adolescent women are 
significantly more likely to use means of contraception for their first intercourse, if they 
live in neighborhoods with more employment opportunities specifically for women. 
Ritchey and Strokes (1974) reported a contradicting relationship when comparing white 
adolescent women with high school education to those without high school education. 
Finally, Jacobson and Heaton (1991) reported that women with graduate education are 
more than twice as likely to be childless compared to women with less than college 
graduation. 
Friedman et al. (1994, 391) also discussed several studies, describing tests for 
hypotheses of various occupational subgroups. Yogev and Vierra (1983) found that 
faculty women have higher rates of childlessness than the general population of women. 
Bloom and Pebley (1982) reported that above-average proportions of childless women 
hold employment jobs; however, Jacobson and Heaton (1991) found no significant effect 
between occupational classification and likelihood of childlessness. According to other 
studies (Callan 1982; Ramu 1984), childless wives have more education and higher-status 
occupations than mothers. However, it is quite possible to explain these patterns using 
different perspectives; most notably, from the perspectives of the theory on opportunity 
costs for women. 
This discussion inevitably leads to a conclusion about the importance of further 
uncertainty theory driven hypotheses testing, with an emphasis on studying specific 
subgroups and outcomes in various scope conditions. The model proposed in this 
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dissertation research allows separating different types of uncertainties by linking them 
with different scopes and instability types (the next subsection elaborates on this). 
Furthermore, to explain empirical results from the perspective of alternatives to the 
uncertainty reduction theory, this dissertation research specifically focuses on discarding 
any alternative explanation of the obtained results (see discussion section). 
Summing up, uncertainty reduction theory satisfies major criteria for researching 
the impact of societal instabilities on short-term fluctuations of fertility: it encompasses 
macro-micro links, applicable to short-term changes in demographic processes, and 
addresses the issue of values in fertility decision-making. However, there are several 
issues in explaining and researching instability that are not addressed by the original 
version of the theory. 
Thus in the next sections I propose an extension of uncertainty reduction theory 
for the purposes of an application to the empirical research on the impact of societal 
instability on fertility. In doing so, I develop a model that links the macro-societal 
instabilities with micro-level perceptions of them as uncertainties and with fertility 
decision-making.  
 
3.3.2. Application to the Empirical Research: General Model 
The first step in applying uncertainty reduction theory to the empirical research 
linking societal instability with fertility is to define all macro-micro links. Uncertainty 
reduction theory operates mostly on a micro-level, linking individuals or family unit’s 
perceptions of the situation they are facing in regard to uncertainty with the decision-
making (including the one on fertility) that reduces uncertainty. Uncertainty reduction 
theory doesn’t elaborate on connecting societal instability with its perception as 
uncertainty by individuals, leaving macro-micro connections largely implicit. Current 
empirical research, though, deals with different types and levels of societal instabilities 
that are macro-level phenomena (This issue was elaborated upon in Chapter 2). The first 
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general assumption links macro-level societal instabilities with micro-level perceptions of 
it as an uncertainty:  
(1) Instability on a macro-societal level produces uncertainty on an individual 
level or a micro-level of a family unit.  
 
This assumption is based on the connection of societal instabilities with increased 
uncertainty in such institutions as career and marriage, as well as uncertainty related to 
crime, accidents, and fear of war. Different types of societal instability could have 
various impacts on changing individual strategies in career, migration, investments, etc. 
due to perceptions of these instabilities as of uncertainties. The second general 
assumption links a micro-level perception of uncertainty with decision-making on 
fertility, with its general premise being borrowed from the uncertainty reduction theory: 
(2) The greater the perceived uncertainty on a micro-level, the greater the 
number of births per individual or a family.   
 
The second assumption has a large body of empirical support, according to 
Frideman et. al. Whether in a direct or indirect form (that is, linking fertility decision-
making and behavior with individual uncertainty perception or status implying existence 
of such uncertainty), several works support this premise of an uncertainty reduction 
theory. It is, however, important to acknowledge that even if correlations between the 
above mentioned variables is found, it doesn’t necessarily implies causation. 
The hypothesis that arguably gathers the biggest empirical support is the one on 
negative effect of prospects for a stable and successful career on the propensity to 
parenthood. The derivation from this hypothesis is that stable employment and career are 
effective means to reducing uncertainty and thus subgroups with the poorest prospects for 
achieving them (like poor African-American teenaged women) are more likely to seek 
parenthood.  
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The work of Geronimus (1987) strongly supports this hypothesis. Based on a 
large set of data as well as on previous research, the author states that among urban poor 
Black Americans teen pregnancy became a norm. The figures are as follows: according to 
National Center for Health Statistics, 1981, while only 23% of white American first 
births were to teenagers, almost 50% of Black American first births were to teenage 
mothers. The figure was even higher for poor Black urban American mothers, one of the 
most disadvantaged groups in society in regards to having stable and successful careers. 
What looks like even more convincing support of the uncertainty reduction 
theory’s premise is that there is a differentiation in teenage childbearing within that 
group. Geronimus states that there is a different norm in the urban black community for 
teenage and out-of-wedlock childbearing for those women exhibiting exceptional 
academic achievement. The author argues, “Those teenagers believed to possess the skills 
necessary to overcome chronic barriers to achievement and upward social mobility are 
selected out of the peer group and are discouraged from bearing children during their 
teens” (Geronimus 1987: 256). So, even within a group of poor urban Black American 
young women, those having prospects of a stable career as a means of uncertainty 
reduction did not need to use another mean of its reduction - that is, early and/or out-of 
wedlock parenthood. 
 As a support for the hypothesis of the impact of stable and successful careers on 
fertility one can consider the work of Rindfuss, Morgan and Swicegood (1984). Their 
finding is that women with at least a college degree are substantially less likely to 
become mothers than other women. The authors explain it by the fact that “these are 
precisely the women who enter careers that effectively compete with the prospect of 
childbearing for woman’s time” (Rindfuss et al. 1984: 369). 
 The second hypothesis that is derived from the uncertainty reduction theory and 
that has empirical support is the one of positive effect of the possibility of divorce on the 
propensity to parenthood. Divorce is viewed here as an uncertainty, so increased fertility 
is seen as a way to prevent it. The support for this hypothesis surfaced in some 
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interviews, conducted in the course of a scientific study of people who are childless by 
choice (Veevers 1980). The author notes that “marital insecurity often time leads to a 
more immediate decision about having children” (Veevers 1980: 37). Though specialists 
doubt that having a child is an effective solution of marital problems, respondents often 
times believe otherwise. 
Even more convincing evidence of the impact of having children on marital 
stability is demonstrated in the significant number studies of fertility using to solidify and 
cement families, marital unions and step-families with still no signs of marital disruption. 
E.g., the confirmation of the hypothesis on the presence of children lowering the risk of 
marital disruption is stated in Cherlin 1977; Koo, Suchindran and Griffith 1984; Morgan 
and Rindfuss 1985; and Waite, Haggstrom and Kanouse 1985. Morgan, Lye and Condran 
(1988, 111) claim that, according to the published data from June 1980 Current 
Population Survey, in recent years “the children also appear to constitute financial, legal 
and emotional barriers to divorce” and that “the childless have the highest risk of marital 
disruption, except for those with children at the very early durations” (Ibid, 115). 
Morgan et. al also provide an important argument in favor of such an 
interpretation of the link between having children and marital stability. Scholars suggest 
that the association between having children and marital stability may represent the 
opposite causal chain since parents differ from nonparents on a number of dimensions 
besides parenthood. However, as discussed, “the finding of differential rates of disruption 
by sex of children provides indirect support for the overall theory that children provide a 
new basis for marital stability built on parents’ involvement  with an investment in 
children” (Ibid., 124).  
Along with research supporting the claim of children affecting marital stability, 
there are also studies investigating the role of child or children in cementing cohabitation 
relationships. For instance, Wu (1995, 231-236) researched event history data from the 
1990 Family and Friends Survey on 3,015 cohabitation relationships. In the course of the 
study the scholar found a strong and positive impact of the presence of children on 
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stabilizing cohabitation relationships. This conclusion is of great importance for 
projecting future fertility in general and assessing the validity of the uncertainty reduction 
theory in particular since the number of cohabiting unions is on the rise. 
The validity of the hypothesis of the presence of children’s impact on marital and 
consensual unions’ stability is further supported by the studies of stepfamilies. Prskawetz, 
Vikat, Philipov and Engelhard (2003, 108-144) suggest extending the concept of 
stepfamily: “…the term stepfamily that was formerly restricted to marriages only, needs 
to be extended to include consensual unions involving a child or only one partner. This 
definition of stepfamilies takes into account the fact that an increasing proportion of 
higher-order unions are consensual unions” (Ibid, 108). 
Several studies (Vikat et. al 1999; Buber and Prskawetz 2000; Thomson et. al 
2002) have demonstrated the union commitment effect on fertility. In Prskawetz et. al 
words, the latter means that “a birth risk is alleviated if a couple does not have shared 
children” (2003, 108). In the scholars’ opinion, this is “… one of the driving forces of 
fertility in unions where either partner already has children from a previous union” (2003, 
108). Vikat et. al (1999, 211-225) have specifically studied the impact of the number of 
births in previous unions on the desire to have a new child in a new consensual or marital 
union. For that purpose scholars compared fertility of Swedish men and women who 
lived in consensual or marital union in the 1970s and 1980s, the ones where at least one 
of the partners had children, with the demographic performance of the couples without 
any children before the current union. Vikat et. al have found the clear evidence that 
regardless of how many children (if any) they had before the current union, the couples 
wanted a shared biological child. In the scholars’ opinion, the latter served to demonstrate 
a commitment to the union. 
The important part of the discussion related to the proposed hypothesis is whether 
the reduction of uncertainty is reduced by moving from non-parenthood to parenthood, or 
also by increasing the number of children (e.g. giving birth to second or third child). 
Friedman et. al state that the main way of reducing uncertainty is to become a parent. 
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However, there are following reasons to believe that in many instances the increased 
number of children could also serve as means to combat uncertainty. First, there is 
evidence that the number of children is negatively correlated with the rates of marital 
disruption. Several studies (e.g. Cherlin 1977; Morgan et. al 1988; Waite and Lillard 
1991) have convincingly demonstrated that reduced risk of marital disruption is 
associated with a larger number of children in the family. 
Second, sex of a child plays a role in the odds of preserving marital stability. 
According to several studies (e.g. Morgan and Rindfuss 1985; Bumpass and Rindfuss 
1983), the effects of sex composition of children on marital disruption are smaller 
compared with such huge correlates of divorce as race and age at marriage. Still, Morgan, 
Lye and Condrad (1988, 115) note that “for couples with one child, the figure shows that 
the risk of disruption is 9% higher for those with a daughter than for those with a son. For 
two-child families, the risk of disruption is lowest for couples with two sons, followed by 
those with one son and one daughter (9% higher), and the highest observed risk is “for 
the couples with two daughters (18% higher).” 
In the same vein, Raley and Bianchi (2006, 401-421) cite research demonstrating 
a strong preference for having one child of each gender in USA and most of Europe. 
Several studies (Pollard and Morgan 2002, Sloan and Lee 1983, Williamson 1976, 
Yamaguchi and Ferguson 1995) provide evidence that cohorts of US parents born in the 
early 1900s and later, with two children of the same sex, were more likely to have a third 
child than the parents with children of different sexes. The study of Teachman and 
Schollaert 1989 showed that parents with children of the same sex were not only more 
likely to have a third child, but proceeded with that more quickly. The latter point allows 
for hypothesizing that in certain instances the desire to reduce uncertainty could result 
into narrowing birth intervals (this was leading to increase of TFR for corresponding 
years). 
Raley et. al also cite research of Andersson et. al (2006) that also found 
differences in the probability of a third birth for those parents having two children of the 
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same sex in Scandinavia. While in Sweden, Denmark and Norway there is a greater 
likelihood of a third birth if the first siblings are boys, in Finland the third birth is more 
probable when there are two daughters. Finally, as was discussed above, the higher parity 
births could serve as means for marital stability in stepfamilies where joint biological 
child could appear regardless of number of children born in previous marital or 
consensual unions. 
It is also worth mentioning again that uncertainty reduction theory propositions 
are valid for the decision-making in the state of symbolic uncertainty not directly related 
to changes in available economic resources. Thus uncertainty reduction theory premises 
could only be applied to the periods of sociopolitical instabilities that generate mostly 
symbolic uncertainties. 
Finally, the assumption that links micro-level fertility rates is simple: 
(3) Changes on a micro-level will be reflected on a macro-level. 
The general model encompassing these three assumptions can be represented in a 
following way (see Figure 3.1): 
               
 
       
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. The General Model for Evaluating Societal Instability’s  
                                                   Impact on Fertility 
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The model is tested by comparing fertility rates at periods marked with different 
types of   societal instabilities. However, the more detailed hypotheses that link these two 
macro-level variables, based upon developing assumptions about macro-micro and 
micro-micro levels connections, are formulated in the next section. 
 
3.3.3. Development of the Model 
The first step in exploring this heuristic model is to speculate about how different 
types and levels of societal instabilities (macro-level) at different periods are perceived 
by individuals and families (micro-level). In Chapter Two I have provided classification 
and periodization of different types and scopes of instability, and in order to maintain the 
first (macro-to-micro) link of the model one has to find corresponding levels of 
uncertainty.  
It is obvious that those macro-level societal instabilities of various types, intensity 
and, magnitude generate different levels of uncertainty at the micro-level of an individual 
or a family. Governmental crises in Italy, for instance, will not generate as much 
uncertainty as the possible comeback of Communists to power in Russia as seen after 
1996 elections. By the same token, uncertainty created by the 2000 presidential elections 
in the US was not reduced to the one related to a routine change in politics of a new Party 
and President. Such uncertainty generating issues as legitimacy of the new presidency, 
actual disenfranchisement of certain groups of electorate and vitality of such institutions 
as separation of executive and judicial branches, were also brought up.  
 Uncertainty reduction theory does not elaborate on ranking uncertainties in scope 
and intensity, much less relating them to corresponding types of instability. The key to 
Uncertainty Fertility 
Decision-Making 
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translating macro-level instabilities to micro-level uncertainty reduction assumptions is to 
look at how particular types of instabilities could be perceived by individual and by a 
family as uncertainty generating. In Chapter 2, I have provided conceptualization and 
analysis of the instabilities of various types, magnitude and intensity. It allows for 
making the following assumptions: 
1. The executive type of instabilities are perceived as generating 
fewer uncertainties than the “social unrest” type of instability; 
According to discussion provided in Chapter 2, the instabilities related to 
“reciprocal accountability” theory, are related solely to executive type. Thus periods 
marked with the instability of this type are characterized with lower level of instability 
that the ones related to the erosion of a “social contract” that are often times marked with 
social unrest such as strikes, civil disobedience, etc. 
2. The instabilities ranking higher on their magnitude, score higher 
on the perceived uncertainties; 
As for this measure of instability, the events typified with social unrest were 
assigned a score created from a set of five measures discussed in Chapter 2 that includes 
number of causalities, extent of property damage, duration of civil violence and area 
encompassed by the most widespread strife. Corresponding periods were ranked 
according to this criterion as well. 
 
3. The instabilities characterized by greater intensity are perceived 
as generating greater uncertainty. 
According to the earlier provided conceptualizations of instabilities, their intensity 
could vary from mild dislocations and internal strife that doesn’t require police action to 
such events as strikes, civil dislocations, riots, coup d’état, power struggle and 
revolutions. Likewise, the periods of instability were ranked along the dimension of 
intensity as well. 
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Based on these three criteria of instability, the cumulative level of instability for 
each period was determined and the hypotheses of each period’s corresponding and 
comparable impact on the individually perceived instability as uncertainty were 
formulated (See following section 3.4). 
Each of these sociopolitical instabilities of various types, magnitude and intensity 
discussed above could be perceived differently at the individual level. Individual 
perception of each of these instabilities is also related to several other factors. One of the 
best works dedicated to these factors (worth exploring for the purposes of linking macro- 
and micro-levels) is comparative research on risk perception in Poland, Hungary, Norway 
and the United States (Goszczynska, Tyszka and Slovic, 1991). In estimating how people 
perceive risks and hazards Slovic developed a "psychometric paradigm" that elicits 
quantitative judgments of risk of diverse hazards, similar to certain kinds of 
psychophysical scaling. The comparison was made of these judgments with others of the 
same hazards on different scales, reflecting risk characteristics.  
Risk characteristics were the following: unknown to the exposed, unknown to 
science, unfamiliar, involuntary, containing unobservable consequences, severity of 
consequences, dread, carrying catastrophic potential. Because of high correlations of 
some of these characteristics with each other they were reduced to two factors. Factor 1, 
called "unknown risk", included such scales as unknown to the exposed, unknown to 
science, unfamiliar and involuntary. Factor 2, "dread risk", was composed of such 
characteristics as severity of consequences, controllability, dread and catastrophic 
potential. These two factors were found to be accountable for some 75% of the total 
variance in the measures. 
How could these risk factors be related to the uncertainty perception? Concepts of 
risk and uncertainty are often times used imprecisely and interchangeably in the decision-
making literature. Risk factors defined by Goszczynska et. al, according to which the 
factor defined as "unknown risk", is actually referred to as an uncertainty. The latter 
differs from risk in one way: it is impossible to assign probabilities in the decision-
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making process because they are unknown. The situations perceived by respondents as 
"unknown risk", as defined by Goszczynska et al., satisfy this criterion. Thus hazards that 
score high on the "unknown risk" scale -- such as social tension, economic crisis, nuclear 
power, shortages of home and medical equipment, shortage of dwellings -- could be well 
perceived as the ones creating uncertainty. 
 The way to employ these findings for the model is, first of all, to relate these 
uncertainty generating factors to the described types of societal instabilities. The first step 
-- translating macro-level instabilities to the micro-level perceptions of them as 
uncertainties for the purposes of formulating research hypotheses -- is to make 
assumptions about this translation. Based on the discussion provided above, the first 
assumption linking macro- and micro-levels could be formulated: 
(1) The more societal instability is related to situations that 
could be perceived as "unknown" factors, the more it is perceived as an 
uncertainty.    
 
Factor 2 is most closely associated with the following scales: dread 
uncontrollability, catastrophic potential, severity of consequences, risk for future 
generations, involuntariness and personal exposure to risk. This factor, called “dread”, is 
independent from the first, the “unknown risk” factor. Among hazards scoring high on 
the" dread” factor without scoring high on the “unknown” risk scale are: crime, shortage 
of food, nuclear weapons, alcohol, narcotics and terrorism. The two factors combined 
produce a joint picture of “unknowingness” and “dreadness” of risk. Hazards that reflect 
both “dreadness” and “unknowingness” are: economic crisis, social tension, repressions, 
shortage of medicines and medical equipment, nuclear power, pesticides and herbicides. 
 In opposition to the first factor, the second one is not related directly to the 
uncertainty, because it encompasses hazards with both known and unknown risk (i.e. 
uncertainty). However, I believe that the instabilities in societal segments related to more 
“dreadful” consequences will provide a stronger desire for uncertainty reduction than the 
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instabilities related to lesser “dread” hazards (given the same degree of “unknowingness”, 
i.e. uncertainty itself). This assumption is based on the nonsystematic observations 
showing differences between perceptions of uncertainty, say, related to the introduction 
of socialized medicine and perception of uncertainty related to possibility of nuclear 
reactor explosion (though both could be characterized by the same degree of 
“unknowingness”). 
Hence, assumption two could be formulated: 
 People will be more motivated to reduce uncertainties 
related to societal instabilities that produce more “dread” consequences. 
The two factors described above were found to be accountable for some 75% of 
the total variance in the measures. The rest of the variance, according to that study, could 
be explained by two other factors. The first of these two other factors is the size of the 
country. The size of the country contributes to the perception of uncertainty in that: the 
bigger the country, the more its absolute number of accidents, crimes etc. are perceived 
as a threat even if the share of them in a given population is the same. This conclusion 
was illustrated by comparing differences in perceptions of the same hazards between 
populations of Poland, Hungary, Norway and U.S. (Goszczynska et al. 1991: 181). 
The second of these two other factors is the media information policy. The cited 
study explains some of the differentiation in uncertainty perception in the observed 
countries by levels of openness of mass media (Goszczynska et al. 1991: 181). First, 
there is a difference in the level of censorship between communist and noncommunist 
countries. As noted by the authors, the strict censorship on accidents, shortages and crime 
in the communist countries could lead to the perceptions of those hazards that differ from 
the ones in the non-communist countries without such strict censorship. That is, they 
appear lower in communist countries. 
 Second, there are different levels of censorship across communist countries. For 
instance, people in Poland have relatively more information about such hazards as 
catastrophes, accidents and crime than people in the other former communist country, 
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Hungary, due to the existence of an independent Catholic press and numerous uncensored 
underground newspapers in Poland. This premise could also be applied nowadays to the 
“industrial democracies” because of different levels of informational availability in 
different parts of the countries. 
 The second finding allows postulating two additional assumptions about the 
perception of societal instabilities based on the discussed study: 
 The instabilities of the same levels of "unknowingness" and 
"dreadness" will be perceived differently at various historical periods. The 
periods characterized with greater access to information will be typified by a 
greater perception of uncertainty. 
 
 The instabilities of the same levels of "unknowingness» and 
"dreadness" will be perceived differently in various regions of a given 
country. In the regions with greater access to information and less strict 
censorship the perception of uncertainty will be greater than the ones in the 
regions with lesser access to information and more strict censorship. 
 
These assumptions have implications for the macro-micro link – between societal 
instabilities and the individual’s and family’s perception of it as uncertainty. Only a part of this 
last set of assumptions (the ones formulated by Goszczynska et. al) was incorporated in 
postulating hypotheses and, correspondingly, many of them were not tested. The major 
reason for it is this research did not imply empirical testing of the individual perceptions 
of instabilities as well as the testing of the differences in this perception across the 
regions of the country. Also, some of the assumptions are not applicable to the researched 
period or applicable to just one event. For instance, assumption related to the “dreadness 
of the event” could be related to such event during the period of research interest as 
Chernobyl nuclear plant explosion. 
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At this point I am turning to the second part of the diagram -- micro-micro link. 
According to the uncertainty reduction theory outlined in previous section, increased uncertainty is 
a predictor for increased parenthood. The theory emphasizes moving from being a non-parent to 
the decision-making on having a child. However, it is possible to extend the theory also to 
certain kinds of other types of fertility increase like increasing numbers of second, third and 
forth orders of birth. First, given the "gendered" nature of social world, having a boy and a 
girl would further reduce uncertainty, because boys will constrain parents in some ways 
while girls will do so in other ways, which boys cannot do.  So having two boys and two 
girls will not further reduce uncertainty, but having a girl and a boy would. It could 
provide an incentive for having a second, third or fourth child for having the one of an 
opposite sex.  
Second, the increased amount of children could be viewed as increasing marital 
solidarity (the latter is also viewed as the means to reduce uncertainty). Friedman et.al 
cites Tseng (1992, 616): “The physical presence of children in the household serves as an 
obstacle to their parents’ marital breakdown.” Third, of even greater importance, the birth 
of an “additional” child of any parity is often given in the new marriages in order to 
enhance marital solidarity (in cases where there are children from previous marriages of 
any or both of the spouses). Children from previous marriages won’t do the job of 
enhancing marital solidarity but the ones from the current marriage will. Increased 
number of divorces and (in some countries like Russia) widowhood contribute to the 
increase of these types of births. Friedman et. al have acknowledged the measure of 
moving from non-parenthood to a one child to be an ideal one but they still used 
empirical studies measuring the actual number of children in a family for supporting or 
disproving their hypotheses.  
Thus, the assumption linking uncertainty perception with fertility decision-
making (micro-micro link) could be formulated in a following way: 
 The greater the perception of uncertainty, the greater the 
fertility outcome for an individual and/or a couple (resulting either from 
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moving toward decision to have one child or, by increasing the number of 
children or, spacing the intervals between births differently). 
In addition to that, I make an assumption about how a combination of 
sociopolitical instabilities and economic instabilities affect fertility. In this special case, I 
believe economic instability and crisis will affect fertility adversely, eliminating the 
possible positive impact of sociopolitical instability on this demographic process. So, the 
next assumption could be formulated in a following way:  
 At periods characterized by both profound economic and 
sociopolitical instability, fertility rates will decrease, mainly as a result of 
the former. 
This assumption is based on both theoretical assessments and certain empirical 
evidence. To get to the core of the problem, one has to define and divorce the concepts of 
economic and sociopolitical instabilities. As mentioned before, the former includes large 
falls in statistically measured output, high rates of inflation (Rostowsky, 1988, 1), falling 
income level, unemployment rate, uncertainty of finding a new job and unpaid wages 
(Koehler and Koehler 2002, 234). The examples of the latter, as was also mentioned 
before, are coups d’état, demonstrations, civil wars (Chauvet, 2002, 234), elite conflicts, 
changes in the executive, social conflicts, including strikes, riots, political assassinations, 
guerilla warfare, and civic wars (Alesina and Perotti 1993)).  
 Economic and sociopolitical instabilities are assumed to have opposite effects on 
fertility, the former negative and the latter positive. While sociopolitical instability is 
perceived as uncertainty (and therefore, according to the uncertainty reduction theory, 
increases birth rates), economic instability typically leaves one a possibility to assess 
risks and therefore is not perceived as uncertainty. Indeed, most sociopolitical 
instabilities such as coups d’état are hard to predict or assign odds to. At the same time, it 
is possible to estimate odds of losing one’s job at the time of recession on the basis of 
existing trends and learning experience. 
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 Indeed, persistent rises of unemployment or job insecurity, as stressed by Koehler 
and Koehler (2002, 243-244), could directly affect one’s expectations about future 
earnings and wages. As they write: 
“The individual’s expectations about such persistent changes in unemployment 
or job insecurity are likely to be strongly influenced by current changes in 
unemployment and labor-market conditions: the worst recent conditions 
constitute the relevant experience that can be extrapolated into the future by 
individuals, and this ‘learning on the basis of recent experience’ is likely to be 
particularly relevant to the transition countries where individuals are faced with 
new institutional contexts that share few commonalities with the pre-1990 
situation…” (Ibid.)   
 Therefore, fertility behavior during the periods of economic instability is better 
explained by the microeconomic theory of fertility predicting decreasing birth rates under 
the conditions of rising inflation or falling income. The assumption about the prevalent 
influence of economic instability on fertility when it coincides with sociopolitical 
instability is based on the fact that people always prefer situations with known risk to 
uncertainty (Friedman et. al, 1994, 133) and the relevant empirical evidence (on which I 
elaborate later below). 
 The work of Koehler et. al (2002) provides a strong evidence of not only 
economic instability and crisis adversely affecting fertility but also of various types of 
economic instabilities having different impact on this demographic process depending on 
the ability to assess their odds (in other words, on whether they are perceived as 
uncertainties or not).  On one hand, the scholars provide strong evidence of economic 
instability and crisis impact on declining fertility in Russia in the late 1980s and the first 
half of the 1990s using macro-level data. These include a strong association between the 
decline in fertility per capita GNP, with the most pronounced relationship between the 
fall of the latter and the rates of second and third births (Koehler et. al, 2002, 238) 
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 However, micro-level data obtained in the course of the conducted Russian 
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) has provided mixed and what seemed to look 
like contradictory and counter-intuitive results. In the course of this survey the impact of 
fertility on various types of economic instability (such as short-term actual 
unemployment, delays or no-payment at the primary job, job insecurity) in the 
corresponding groups was studied and compared. It was found that, contrary to intuition, 
some groups facing labor market uncertainties reflected in unemployment and unpaid 
wages did not demonstrate decline in fertility, and sometimes even increased it. To 
explain this phenomena, Koehler et. al turn to the premises of uncertainty reduction 
theory attributing the decreased fertility to the desire to reduce the uncertainty related to 
the economic conditions. By introducing subjective measures of economic instabilities, 
Koehler et. al have obtained a support for this conclusion - these types of economic 
instabilities were indeed largely perceived as uncertainties.  
 At the same time, other types of economic instabilities don’t fit this category. The 
groups experiencing them demonstrate decline of their birth rates. Among these other 
types of economic instabilities the ones associated with concerns about obtaining daily 
necessities like long-term unemployment (whereas actual unemployment in a sampling 
cluster could be of short-term and “only moderately related to no payment” (Koeler et. al. 
2002, 245)). These types of economic instabilities where odds could be to a certain 
degree assessed and that are mostly associated with obtaining daily necessities cause the 
decline of fertility on behalf of corresponding groups, in accordance with the premises of 
microeconomic theory of fertility. Since these latter types of economic instabilities are 
prevalent, and the groups experiencing them constituted a majority in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s Russia, the overall impact of economic instability on fertility was adverse. 
 There are also many empirical examples of the negative association between 
economic instability and fertility. For instance, in the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) and Eastern European countries that underwent market reforms in the 1990s, 
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there was a deterioration of living standards that were followed by the decline of fertility. 
This decline was the most steep, pronounced and durable in the countries where reforms 
were the most painful for the population material-wise such as Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, 
Bulgaria, Slovakia and Romania. On the contrary, in the countries where reforms went 
relatively smoothly like Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovenia, decline of 
fertility was less steep and lasting. It is also of interest that, according to Sobotka (2003), 
in the first group the countries what was affected the most was the quantum of fertility, 
whereas in the second group the greatest effect of economic hardships concerned tempo 
of fertility. In other words, in the countries with milder manifestation of economic 
instability and crisis decline in fertility was largely attributable to the changing calendar 
of births while in the countries with huge degree of economic instability there was more 
substantial impact resulting in the diminished actual number of births for the whole 
childbearing period of women. 
 It is worth mentioning that in some countries economic instability have coincided 
with the sociopolitical ones. E.g. in Russia there was an armed stalemate between the 
executive and legislative branches of power that resulted in a bloodshed and arrest of 
Duma’s (Russian parliament) leaders; in Ukraine there was the first “Maidan” in 2004, 
with demonstrations aimed for recounting of votes at the presidential elections, as well as 
the second “Maidan” in 2013 resulted in escape of the elected President and holding new 
presidential elections in advance. In neither case these sociopolitical instabilities were 
capable of changing the negative impact of persistent economic instability and crisis on 
fertility. 
Finally, third link – the micro-to-macro one – does not require advancement and 
thus stays the same as formulated in the previous section:  
 Any increase in fertility of an individual or a family level 
will inevitably result in greater fertility rates at the societal level. 
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This elaborated model that allows for translation of different types and scopes of 
instability into corresponding levels of uncertainties that affect fertility behavior and rates 
could be represented in the following way (see Figure 3.2): 
In the given research this very last group of assumptions was included in the 
formulated hypotheses only in part. The major reason for it is that this research operates 
only on the macro-level – it compares macro-level fertility rates in various periods of 
instability. The micro-level of an individual perception of instability as uncertainty is 
assumed in the model but not specifically studied here. Also, some assumptions include 
various perceptions of instability in dependence of the country size and remoteness of the 
regions. In this research only one country, USSR/Russia, has been the unit of analysis, 
and the regional variations in both fertility and individual perceptions of uncertainty were 
not researched.  
However, some of assumptions proposed by Goszczynska et. al, were taken into 
account in formulating hypotheses. For instance, “the dreadness of the event” has added 
up to the cumulative index of instability at the period of explosion at the Chernobyl 
nuclear plant in 1986. Also, proclaimed policy of “perestroika” (“reconstruction)” by 
Gorbachev in the second half of the 1980s was taken into account as “the unknown 
event”; it added up to the overall level of instability at this period due to its magnitude, 
type (“erosion of a “social contract”) and intensity. The loosening up censorship on mass 
media at the very end of the 1980s as a factor of instability’s perception was also taken 
into account in my assumptions. 
It seems that using this set of assumptions in a proposed model have a great 
potential for the future research. In particular, the dramatic increase of using Internet in 
Russia (from some 18 to 40 percent over the decade) could be viewed as a factor 
impacting perceptions of instability in various regions, different time periods and social 
strata, according to the assumption of Goszczynska et. al in testing the impact on fertility. 
Based on the discussed above elaborations, I propose the following model of 
sociopolitical instability’s impact on fertility: 
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Figure 3.2. Model of Sociopolitical Instability’s Impact on Fertility 
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The model allows for linking these two phenomena – societal instability and 
short-term fluctuations of fertility – in the empirical research. It also allows for 
distinguishing between macro-societal instability and its perception as uncertainty on a 
micro-level of an individual or a family. This distinction was typically ignored in the 
theoretical and methodological literature on the subject. The result of it was the confusion 
of two levels of analysis – macro- and micro ones. This confusion has distorted the 
phased process of formulating the predictions of fertility rates for a given period. The 
proposed model resolves this problem by divorcing these two levels of analysis, thus 
allowing for better empirical tests of the hypotheses about the impact of societal 
instabilities on short-term fluctuations of fertility and, correspondingly, for the more 
accurate predictions of the latter.  
The model is opened to practically any theory of instability as far as it allows for 
ranking their types in scope and intensity, thus allowing for translation into the 
individual’s or family’s perceptions of them as uncertainties. It incorporates premises of 
the extended uncertainty reduction theory but is not limited to them. The model also has 
an inclusion of connections between instability and its perception as uncertainty at the 
individual level – the ones that are not explicated by the uncertainty reduction theory. It 
proposes ranking uncertainty in regards to corresponding intensities of instability with the 
help of scaling “unknowingness” and “dreadness” levels.   
The model could be tested directly, if the information about individual’s or 
family’s perceptions of uncertainty is available. In that case the test includes data on 
uncertainty perceptions and fertility decision-making. If this information is not available 
(which is the case of current research), the model could be tested indirectly by comparing 
different types of societal instabilities with fertility rates at any given period provided the 
availability of the reliable measures for both instability levels and fertility rates. 
Combination of two theories’ classification of instability provided in Chapter Two 
(the “reciprocal accountability” and “social contract” theories) had allowed rank ordering 
of the periods along the lines of scope and intensity of these instabilities, from the most 
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stable periods of collective leadership to the period of breakdown of social contract 
exemplified with the strongest instability (see Figure 3). The next step of the research is 
to provide macro-micro links, that is, to make assumptions about how societal 
instabilities were translated into individual’s and family’s perception of them as 
uncertainties. An important part of this work is linking these assumptions with the exact 
periods of research interest that are characterized with various kinds, intensities and 
magnitude of instabilities.      
 Here are these assumptions based on previous discussion that are the basis for 
moving to the formulation of the exact hypotheses: 
1) Periods with similar types of instability vary in regards to 
degree of uncertainty they generate. The greater the institutionalization 
of “reciprocal accountability”, the less there is an oscillation between 
directive and collective leadership and, hence, the less is the 
contestation of policy.  Thus Brezhnev’s contested directorship at 1982 
had created less uncertainty than the one of Khrushchev at 1960-1964. 
By the same token, Brezhnev’s breakout at 1965-1969 generated less 
uncertainty than the similar breakout of Khrushchev at 1954-1957. 
2) Among two types of unstable periods, the one typified with 
the breakout of a leader and the other by contested leadership, the latter 
is perceived as the one generating greater uncertainty. Thus, 
Khrushchev’s directorship at 1960-1964 had generated greater 
uncertainty than either Khrushchev’s or Brezhnev’s breakouts 
correspondingly at 1954-1957 and at 1965-1969. 
3) The greatest uncertainty is generated at the periods of the 
deterioration and erosion of “social contract”. These periods also score 
the highest on the scales of “unknowingness” and “dreadness”. It is not 
accidental that such hazardous, dread and unknown risks containing 
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event as explosion at the nuclear plant in Chernobyl had happened 
exactly at that period. 
4) At periods characterized by both profound economic and 
sociopolitical instability, fertility rates will decrease, mainly as a result 
of the former. Hence, the period of 1989-1997 marked with both 
profound sociopolitical instabilities and severe economic downturn and 
instability, should be characterized with the decline of fertility. 
 
  3.4. Hypotheses and Their Operationalization 
Based on the previous discussion as well as on formulated assumptions, I will 
present the following hypotheses for further empirical testing. In addition to previously 
formulated assumptions, these hypotheses include references for the exact periods, 
marked with corresponding types of instabilities that enable testing. The 
operationalization of each hypothesis is based on linking them with the exact period 
specified according to type, intensity, and magnitude of the instability (discussed in 
Chapter 2, pp. 13-46). Correspondingly, the following presents the operationalized 
hypotheses: 
H1. Periods of sociopolitical instability not coupled with economic crisis are 
characterized by increasing fertility. This stems from the major premise of the uncertainty 
reduction theory and defines linkages between instability and its perception as 
uncertainty. 
Hence, fertility rates in each period of instability are increasing. Consequently, by 
the end of each such period, i.e. 1965-1969, 1954-1957, 1982, 1960-1964, and 1978-
19881, fertility rates should be higher than at the beginning; even more so, than in years 
preceding each of these periods. 
                                                          
1 In fact, the erosion of the social contract continued until 1991, the year of the breakdown of the USSR. 
However, severe economic crisis struck the USSR in 1989; thus, for the purposes of testing the impact of 
sociopolitical instability, I limited this period to the year 1988. 
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H2. The greater the extent of sociopolitical instability at the societal level (if not 
accompanied by severe economic crisis and instability), the greater the fertility rate for a 
given period should be. 
Accordingly, each period marked with higher instability levels should be 
characterized by higher fertility rates. Hence, a hierarchy of fertility rates should appear 
across instability periods in the following way (arranged from lowest to highest 
instability): 
1) 1965 – 1969: the Brezhnev’s breakout 
2) 1954 – 1957: the Khrushchev’s breakout 
3) 1982: Brezhnev’s contested directorship1 
4) 1960 – 1964: Khrushchev’s contested directorship 
5) 1978 (esp. 1981) – 19882 
 
H3. Stable periods are characterized by lower fertility rates than periods with 
sociopolitical instabilities. This originates from the premise of the uncertainty reduction 
theory to expect an increase of fertility during periods of uncertainty, caused by 
sociopolitical instability. 
Hence, the stable periods of 1953-1954, 1965, 1957-1959, and 1970-1977 should 
be characterized by lower fertility rates than the periods of 1965-1969, 1954-1957, 1960-
1964, 1978-1985, and 1986-1988 that, albeit being marked with sociopolitical 
instabilities, escaped severe economic crises. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
1 The short period of instability related to Brezhnev’s contested directorship overlapped with the broader 
period of the deterioration and erosion of the social contract. 
 
2 Here, the period of 1970-1981, which has been defined as stable according to the “reciprocal 
accountability’ theory, was shortened since in 1978, the deterioration of the social contract began to 
manifest. For the same reason, a further period that has been defined as stable by the “reciprocal 
accountability” theory (1982-1986) has not been included here. 
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H4. Stable periods are characterized by greater homogeneity of fertility than 
periods marked with an increasing level of instability. Since fertility increases during 
unstable periods, fertility rates vary to a greater extent within these periods. 
Hence, the stable periods of 1953-1954, 1965, 1957-1959, and 1970-1977 should 
be characterized by greater homogeneity of fertility than unstable periods such as 1965-
1969, 1954-1957, 1960-1964, 1978-1985, and 1986-1988. 
H5. During periods characterized by both profound economic and sociopolitical 
instability, fertility rates will decrease, mainly as a result of the former. Hence, the period 
of 1989-1997, which was marked by both profound sociopolitical instabilities and severe 
economic downturn and instability, should be characterized by a decline of fertility. 
These hypotheses have been formulated for testing later in the dissertation. They 
include hypotheses about sociopolitical and economic instabilities. To split them as 
required, criteria have to be applied to refer each of the exact instabilities of any given 
period to the corresponding type. 
Although sociopolitical and economic instabilities are often interconnected and 
sometimes overlap, the conceptualization of each is still quite distinctive. Using these 
conceptualizations, it is possible to assign a predominant type (either sociopolitical or 
economic) to a given instability to test a hypothesis for its prospective impact on fertility. 
Chapter 2 provides some of the conceptualizations of sociopolitical instabilities. 
In summary, it is worth citing seminal work on the issue that “the notion of sociopolitical 
instability covers many heterogeneous events with different origins, intensities and 
actors, as, for example, coup d’état, demonstrations and civil wars” (Chauvet, 2002, 36). 
This paper also cited several other studies, assigning the following causes to 
sociopolitical instabilities: executive or elite instability, including legal or illegal, violent 
or non-violent, or changes in the executive power; social conflicts, including strikes, 
demonstrations, and riots; violent or armed instability, which is composed of political 
assassinations, guerilla warfare, and civil wars. 
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A very similar approach to the conceptualization of political instability has been 
expressed in a different seminal work (Horwitz, 1973, 449-463). The presence of political 
instability in society could be detected if any of the following criteria of stability are not 
met: a) the absence of violence; b) governmental longevity/duration; c) the existence of a 
legitimate constitutional regime; d) the absence of structural change; and e) a 
multifaceted societal attribute. 
However, according to Rostowsky, economic instability manifests itself “… in the 
form of both large falls in statistically measured output and in very high rates of 
inflation” (Rostowsky, 1988, 1). Kohler and Kohler (2002, 234) cite proponents for the 
“economic crisis argument”, providing an explanation of the decline in fertility in Russia 
and Eastern European countries, suggesting “falling income level, and rise in economic 
labour market uncertainty, and the disruption of traditional public transfer systems” as 
causes. With regard to the components of economic instability that Russia faced during 
the late 1980s to the early 1990s, these scholars also mentioned the unemployment rate, 
the prevalent uncertainty for finding a new job, and unpaid wages (the latter was very 
typical for Russia during the early 1990s, since employees were actually not paid for 
months). 
In accordance with the discussion and expert evaluation provided in Chapter 2, 
none of the periods of sociopolitical instability that have been studied for this 
dissertation, were coupled with pronounced economic crisis and instability, except for the 
period from 1989 to 1997 when, along with sociopolitical instabilities, a severe economic 
crisis struck. As mentioned above, the hypothesis of the prevailing adverse impact of 
economic crisis on fertility was tested for this very period. 
To test hypotheses on the impact of instabilities on fertility formulated in a given 
research, corresponding methods have to be employed and appropriate data has to be 
used. In the next Chapter, I will turn to discussing these issues, to accomplish a further 
empirical test of the proposed model.  
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    Chapter Four 
 
    Data Analysis and Results 
         4.1. Methods and Performance of Data Analysis. 
         4.1.1. Dataset 
The data on fertility used in this research are published by the Roskomstat (State 
Committee for Statistics), a Russian official body that is a major source of statistical 
information on economics, demography, social policy and other areas of social life. Data 
on demographic processes including fertility are obtained in the course of population 
census. The Roskomstat complements the census data with surveys taken at different 
times between censuses. The survey data are used to adjust demographic data for the 
inter-census years and to supplement the household data.  
An important step to take before I start working with the obtained data is to 
estimate its validity. There is a huge amount of literature analyzing the Roskomstat data. 
These data combine the results of the Soviet-era censuses taken by the Roskomstat’s 
predecessor, TsSU (Central Statistical Bureau) and the data from post-Soviet censuses of 
the Russian Federation. There have been many publications criticizing the Soviet practice 
of census-taking, including the problems of determining ethnic identity (because ethnicity 
and language were linked to territorial rights) and consequent distortions of the Soviet 
ethnic composition, violating privacy rights, undercounting migrants, especially those 
living without registration; counting the total population based on the official registration 
rather than on actual residence; the actual disappearance of social classes in order to 
justify political claims of the developing of a “classless society”; and excluding the whole 
groups of population such as prisoners, military personnel and inhabitants of hidden 
settlements (secret towns) (Arel 2002, pp. 801-828; Blum  1996, pp. 81-95; Tolts, 2001). 
 In addition to the listed lines of critique, Tolts (2001) also admits manipulating 
data on mortality at a certain point of time. When Soviet leader Brezhnev made a claim in 
1972 that life expectancy in Russia had reached 70 years, statistical data on mortality and 
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life expectance were slightly biased in rounding to justify the claim. Herrera (2004) states 
that in the later times of the USSR existence, the cooperation and direct contacts between 
Goskomstat and international and foreign institutions such as US Bureau of Census, 
World Bank, IMF and UN increased significantly. Such developments arguably led to the 
better census conducting and employing Western methods in, as Herrera puts it, 
“marketing  the Census” (2004, 4). He also stresses that “on some issues such as under-
counting, they [censuses] seem to have developed better methods” (2004, 5). 
Censuses conducted by Goskomstat in Russia had improved, but inherited the 
flaws mostly related to biases in counting migrants and regional residents. Buckley, for 
instance, considers data on oblast (region) level very questionable, but stating that “…the 
Russian census might be in the ballpark with regards to its aggregate numbers, 
considering the over-and under-counts across the nation” (Joseph 2002, p. 3).  
Regardless of the Soviet/Russian statistics flows, Goskomstat data on fertility 
were used and referred to in numerous publications and demographic studies conducted 
by Russian, Israeli, European and American scholars, e.g. Coale & Anderson (1979) and 
Tolts (2001) & Zakharov (2008). I’m therefore confident that using Goskomstat 
statistical data in my research is valid. Here are the major reasons for this confidence: 
Goskomstat material is based on the combination of census data and the data obtained in 
intermediate surveys; covers a period the most part of which was typified by improved 
methods of obtaining data or with data which were corrected later; covers fertility 
processes which were arguably the least impacted by data collection flaw; and is on the 
aggregate level, without division at the regional units (which are most prone to heavy 
bias). 
 
4.1.2. Method 
In order to test hypothesis formulated in the previous Chapter, one must first 
compare fertility levels at different periods marked with various scopes and levels of 
societal instability; and, second, compare fertility rates at the unstable and stable periods. 
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Still, while comparing fertility at different periods, age and cohort effects should be 
controlled for in order to single out the period effect. This control is essential for the 
purposes of my research since level and scope of societal instability vary across time 
periods. As noted by scholars (e.g. Mason et al., 1973), age, period and cohort effects are 
typically confounded in macro-level fertility analysis that uses annual rates. At the same 
time, the effects of age, period and cohort on a dependent variable can be causally 
distinctive.  
The cited scholars provide an example that illustrates the point. This is one that 
involves the attempt to explain men’s earnings in the United States over time. As noted 
by researchers, age per se could have an independent effect on earnings because of 
occupational experience. On the other hand, period that corresponds with age could also 
affect earnings independently because of wage-prices structure changes over time. 
Finally, membership in a cohort of a particular size also may affect job opportunities and, 
therefore, earnings. Yet, because age, period and cohort are linearly related to each other, 
and also are related to the independent variable, a three-way analysis would not provide 
an adequate result. Eliminating any of these parameters could lead to spurious 
relationships (Mason et. al, 1973, 246). 
Social scientists have attempted to separate cohort, age and period effects for 
quite some time. For this purpose the class of age-period-cohort (APC) models has been 
developed. Each parameter’s unique impact is estimated with the help of APC models. 
The latter are defined as a “class of models for demographic rates 
(mortality/morbidity/fertility/…) observed for a broad age range over a reasonably long 
time period, and classified by age and date of follow-up and date of birth” (Statistical 
Analysis of the Lexis Diagram: Age-Period-Cohort Models, 2016). There are quite a 
number of statistical papers discussing and actually applying APC models, particularly to 
vital events including diseases of various etiology (for example, Holford,  1983; 311-324; 
Clayton & Schifflers, 1987,  449-481; Carstensen, 2007, 3018-3045) and  Rychtarikova 
(2008).  
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The major problem that APC models face is of identification; this problem arises 
from the exact linear dependence between the three variables, age, cohort and period. In 
order to overcome identification problem, various techniques have been developed and 
correspondingly utilized in different variants of APC models. There are three such major 
variants: first, the conventional Constrained Generalized Linear Model (CGLM) (Mason. 
et. al 1975); second, the Intrinsic Estimator (IE) (Fu 2000; Yang et. al 2004, 2008); and, 
third, Hierarchical Models including Cross-Classified Fixed Effects Models (CCFEM) 
and Cross-Classified Random Effects Models (CCREM) (Yang and Land 2006, 2008). 
The first variant, the CGLM, is a coefficient-constrained approach. It implies 
placing at least one identifying restriction on the parameter vector. APC model becomes 
just-identified after the effects of two age, period or cohort groups are constrained to be 
equal. This constraint is placed based on prior theoretical knowledge. The latter, 
however, often times don’t exist; also, different choices of identifying constraint lead to 
various estimates for age, period and cohort effects. Such a sensitivity of CGLM 
estimates to the choices of constraints has led to the development of the new APC model 
variants. 
The group of scholars that has developed the second variant of APC, the IE 
(Yang, Fu and Land 2004, 75-110), claimed that it has clear advantages over CGLM. 
Among them the scholars mentioned IE being more direct and not requiring prior 
information for selection of the appropriate model identifying constraints. However, the 
claims of IE being less sensitive to the choice of constraints and thus having its estimates 
closer to the true parameters than the ones of CGLM, were recently disproved by several 
scholars (e.g. Kupper et. al 1985, Luo 2013). Luo (2013, 9) justifies her conclusion that 
“IE does impose constraints that are as consequential as those imposed by CGLM”. She 
also cites Upper et. al (1985, 822) stating that “the choice of constraint is the crucial 
determinant of the accuracy in the estimated age, period and cohort effects”. Therefore, in 
Luo’s opinion, IE is no better that GGLM in respect to the possible flaws due to choosing 
the equality constraints in order to solve the identification problem” (2013, 15).  
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Finally, third variant of APC models designed to address the identification 
problem, are the hierarchical Models, correspondingly CCFEM and CCREM. The claim 
of these models solving identification problems, however, becomes highly disputable. 
Luo (2012), for instance, states that these variants of APC model don’t automatically 
solve the identification problem; moreover, it implicitly imposes multiple constraints on 
the age, period, and cohort effects. In Luo’s view, CCFEM and CCREM estimates thus 
“…can be highly biased and substantive conclusions can be misleading when any of the 
multiple constraints is not satisfied by the true age, period and cohort effects” (2012, 2). 
Luo further demonstrates that CCFEM’s and CCREM’s assumed multiple constraints on 
the age, period and cohort effects not only depend on the widths of these parameters’ 
intervals but are also next to impossible to verify. Luo actually suggests certain 
advantages of CGLM over Hierarchical models in regard to resolving identification 
problem: “This feature [difficulties in verification] of CCFEM and CCREM is no 
different from the constraint assumed in CGLM except that the CGLM is explicit and 
usually imposes just one constraint” (2012, 19). 
Based on the provided arguments, I use the CGLM variant of APC model in order 
to single out the period effect on fertility. In order to enhance the validity of parameter 
estimates, I use several pairs of equality constraints. CGLM uses a regression equation 
with dummy variables as a first step. This equation has the form of 
Y ij =μ+β i +γ j +δk +εij where Y is the dependent variable, the effect of the i-th age group 
is given by β i , the effect of the j-th period by γ j , the effect of the k-th cohort by δk ; μ  
is the grand mean of the dependent variable and ε  is the random disturbance. 
The next step to estimate the separate effects of these variables is to make an 
assumption of equality of any two parameters in any single dimension (i.e. age, cohort or 
period). The decision as to which particular parameters the equality constraints are 
imposed on is made based on either prior theoretical assumptions or posterior empirical 
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observation. The estimates are then obtained by performing ordinary least squares, the 
cells of the underlying cohort table being the units of observation. 
This model implies making the minimal number of the so-called equality 
constraints: only two coefficients in one of the three dimensions (age, cohort and period) 
are assumed to be equal. The implementation of that model shows, however, that results 
vary depending on which of the three dimensions the equality constraint is imposed on, 
as well as on which categories within the chosen dimension constrained. There is no way 
for choosing the best fitting model because coefficients of determination are identical for 
various models that are just-identified. Interpretative difficulties in such models could 
also stem from the absence of strong a priori conceptions on the part of the researcher. 
To overcome that problem, Mason et al. (1973) suggest another version of the 
model that assumes employing more restrictions than just the minimal one needed for 
estimability. The scholars suggest equalizing two pairs of the coefficients (in two 
different dimensions) while excluding a single category in the third dimension. The 
equality constraints should be varied resulting in several models. The model with the 
largest R2 is the one that gives the best estimate. It is worth mentioning that Mason et al. 
(1973) suggest increasing number of dimensions for enhancing equality constraints as a 
good policy. However, they leave room for other ways of estimating the model. 
This variant of the model that one may term a model of enhanced equality 
constraints requires a priori knowledge of which categories in each dimension (age, 
period and cohort) are likely to have equal effects. In the absence of this knowledge, the 
following strategy is recommended. A step-wise procedure in which the whole 
dimensions are added or excluded from any given model could provide additional 
information about the ability of the dimensions to account for the variance in the 
dependent variable. The results then could be compared across a number of more-than-
minimally restricted models. In particular, one compares the total R-square with the R-
square’s for the equations excluding single dimensions. 
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These methods were employed in my research for the purpose of singling out the 
period effect on fertility, which is my dependent variable. I will turn to the detailed 
description of the statistical procedures after describing the data used in my dissertation 
research.  
 
4.1.3. Application of APC models 
The data obtained from Roskomstat and used in this study contain age-specific 
fertility rates for five year interval groups for women ages 15 to 49.  These data are 
available for the years of interest to this research, namely from 1952 to 1998. The 
technique of fertility ratio calculation for every given year is the following: numerator is 
the sum of births for the two consecutive years, and the denominator is the number of 
corresponding groups at the middle of the period. Thus the fertility rate is the average for 
the two year period.  
The obtained data on age-specific fertility for the period of interest is represented 
in the Table 4.1. 
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TABLE 4.1. Age-Specific Birth Rates per 1000 Women: Russian Federation, 1959-1998 
TOTAL 
Age 
group 
Years 
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
15-19 28.4 27.5 26.7 27.2 21.3 21 22.7 24.7 25.6 26 27.3 28.3 29.7 30.9 
20-24 157.9 157.7 157.5 156.7 156.3 156.2 150.8 150.3 147.8 143.1 142.9 146.9 152.6 156.1 
25-29 156.4 154.5 152.7 142.8 137.3 130.3 122.8 120.1 114.9 110.9 109 107.4 109.5 116.3 
30-34 101.9 100.2 99.5 91.8 86 80.5 77.3 77.7 77 74 72.4 69.3 68 65.6 
35-39 57.7 56.5 54.3 47.3 44.5 41.4 39.2 38.1 36.1 33.5 32 32.2 32.5 33 
40-44 19.9 17.3 16 15.7 14.9 14.1 13.4 12.6 11.6 10.8 10 9 8.3 7.9 
45-49 3 2.5 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 0.8 0.7 
15-49 82.9 83 81.8 78.4 73.4 67.6 62 59 56.4 53.6 52.9 53.4 54.4 55.2 
CONTR 2.626 2.581 2.543 2.416 2.31 2.225 2.139 2.125 2.072 1.998 1.974 1.971 2.007 2.053 
TFR 2.626 2.58 2.54 2.417 2.311 2.227 2.139 2.125 2.072 1.998 1.975 1.972 2.007 2.053 
               
Age 
group 
Years 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
15-19 31.5 32.8 33.9 34.5 35.6 37 40.8 42.7 43.3 43.8 45.3 46.3 47.4 47.4 
20-24 154.7 155.5 158.8 158.8 158.6 156.2 155 157.1 157.2 161.5 167.3 165.8 167.5 167.5 
25-29 114.4 112.8 110.5 108 107.8 106.5 103.1 101.2 103.5 107.9 118 112.9 119.7 119.7 
30-34 63.3 60 58.6 58.2 60 59.2 55.6 52.6 53.5 56.6 63 59.9 65.1 65.1 
35-39 32.5 30.9 28.9 26.5 23.7 21.6 19.6 18.4 19.1 22.9 24.2 23.6 25.8 25.8 
40-44 7.5 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.1 6.7 5.9 5.1 4.5 4.3 3.9 3.6 5 5 
45-49 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
15-49 54.9 55.3 56.6 57.1 57.7 58.1 59 59.6 61.1 63.7 67.7 65.6 66.9 66.9 
CONTR 2.023 2 1.993 1.969 1.967 1.938 1.902 1.888 1.908 1.987 2.11 2.062 2.154 2.154 
TFR 2.023 2 1.993 1.969 1.967 1.938 1.902 1.888         2.007 2.007 
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Age 
group 
Years   
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998   
15-19 48.5 49.6 52.5 55.6 54.9 51.36 47.9 49.9 45.59 39.74 36.2 34   
20-24 170.6 167.9 163.9 156.75 146.6 133.95 120.4 120.3 113.46 106.38 99 99   
25-29 122.6 114.1 103.1 93.19 83 72.7 65 67.2 67.16 66.53 66.2 68   
30-34 67.8 61.8 54.6 48.18 41.6 34.98 29.6 29.6 29.72 30.33 31.5 33.4   
35-39 27.8 25.6 22 19.37 16.5 13.94 11.4 10.6 10.65 10.83 10.8 11.5   
40-44 6.1 5.6 5 4.16 3.7 3.19 2.6 2.3 2.19 2.27 2.2 2.3   
45-49 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.15 0.2 0.19 0.2 0.1 0.12 0.11 0.1 0.1   
15-49 68.2 64.5 59.8 55.27 49.9 43.89 38.4 38 36.03 34.11 32.8 33.1   
CONTR 2.218 2.124 2.007 1.887 1.733 1.552 1.386 1.4 1.344 1.281 1.23 1.242   
TFR 1.887 1.732       1.552 1.385 1.4 1.344 1.281 1.23 1.242   
 
 
Source:  
Roskomstat of the Russian Federation (State Committee on Statistics of the Russian Federation) 
 
  
132 
 
 As seen from the Table 4.1, the rows and columns are not fully compatible in 
format: while fertility rates are given for every year for the period of interest, in regard to 
ages these rates are provided for five-year groups. This poses a problem for applying the 
age-period-cohort (APC) model proposed by Mason et al (1973). We need compatible 
intervals for years and women ages to apply a model. One way to make rows and column 
fully compatible is to arrange fertility data by five-year intervals for the period 
dimension. However, that could make the analysis of period effects poorer and less 
informative. Therefore, before I turn to APC modeling and single out the period effect on 
fertility, I have performed an interpolation of fertility data by five-year age intervals. 
The method used for that purpose is called the spline interpolation. It is a method 
that has been used in demography, and other disciplines, since the mid-20th century and is 
described in a large number of publications. The most explicit and direct explanation of 
splines application is presented by McNeil, Trussel and Turner (1977, 245-252). The 
scholars propose two variants of interpolation, the spline proper and the polynomial 
(called “smoother”). The first variant interpolates data points and satisfies boundary 
conditions by solving a linear equation.  
The second variant assumes imputed values of zero at the extremes of the 
fertility-by-age distribution (these are 15 and 50 years of age). Imputed values smoothly 
reach zero at the extremes and turn to negative values beyond them. I have performed 
both variants of data interpolation, and performed further analysis with both types of 
interpolated data. This method has allowed for obtaining the approximate data for every 
year within each woman’s age interval to make it compatible with the same interval of 
the period (a year) and, therefore, apply Mason et. al model. The transformed 
(interpolated) data were later used in the APC regression analysis using the approach 
proposed by Mason et al. (1973).  The results of this analysis are further used in the 
estimation of period fertility parameters. 
 In accordance with the Mason et al. approach, I set up equality constraints for 
two different dimensions, one at a time: for birth cohorts of 1942 and 1943, and the other 
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- for the years from 1972 through 1977. Such constraints are necessary to decrease the 
number of degrees of freedom taken by the model and make the model identifiable. The 
choice of particular parameters to constrain was based in part on empirical observations 
but also on literature discussed in Chapter 2. The rationale for choosing these parameters 
is the following: cohorts of 1942 and 1943 are the ones that appeared in the hardest times 
of the Second World War, which implies their similarity. The period from 1972 to 1977, 
according to the typology provided in Chapter 2, is considered to be a stable one, 
resulting in minimal differences of period effects within the time frame.  
Initially, many coefficients appeared to be not statistically significant. That was 
even to some extent the case with applying the constraints of the years from 1971 through 
1978 in the smoother version (see Table A1.1). The probable reason may be the fact that 
the model was still overspecified, with too many free parameters. For this reason, I have 
used the number of equality constraints in several dimensions simultaneously and 
performed ANOVA with all of these constraints in the spline variant. This approach 
resulted in coefficients with good significance (see Table A1.2). These coefficients were 
actually very close in all of the runs. Therefore, the data from Table A1.2 was used for 
interpreting results. 
 I present the results of APC analysis for the spline with enhanced equality 
constraints (fertility parameters are assumed to be equal, most importantly, in the 
following dimensions: at age 45=46; age 47=48; in the year 1970=1971) in Table A1.2. 
As seen from this table, the coefficients are significant for most of the important years in 
this application of APC model. The t-statistics are above the critical level of 1.96.  
The results are presented graphically in the following Figures for the spline with 
enhanced equality constraints: 
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Figure4.1 presents pure age effects on fertility in the observed period as modeled 
by the APC regression. Although age effects are not the focus of this research, it is 
worthwhile to consider this result. One can see on this figure that fertility rises rapidly 
from a near-zero level until it peaks at about 23 years and thereafter it falls down 
smoothly back to a near-zero level at this side of forties. This is precisely what one would 
expect to see, which confirms the validity of the Mason et al. method employed here.   
The units in which beta-coefficients are measured are the units of my dependent 
variable that is the number of births per 1000 childbearing aged women. The greatest 
beta-coefficient for the age category 23 means that this age group’s contribution to 
fertility, disentangled from the period and cohort effects, is about 170 births per 1000 
childbearing aged women. 
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Figure 4.2 shows pure cohort effects on fertility from the APC model. All effects 
are negative because it follows from the basic equation: 
 Age=Period – Cohort 
that age, period, and cohort are linearly related. Therefore age and period effects are all 
going to have positive effects in the model whereas cohort effects will be negative. The 
pattern of relative differences of the cohort effects against each other is the point here. As 
in the case with the age effects, beta-coefficients indicate the contribution of one cohort 
group to fertility cleansed from age and period effects. The difference between betas for 
the cohorts of 1931 and the 1971 years of births, 20.39, means that there were 20.30 less 
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births for 1000 childbearing aged women, controlling for period and age effects, for the 
latter cohort. 
Whereas the pattern of age effects shown in this Figure is relatively universal, the 
pattern of cohort effects is more complex and relates to the Russian history. However, the 
same pattern was found by Zakharov (2006, 2008), which again corroborates the validity 
of Mason et al. method. As I focus our study on period effects rather than cohort effects, 
we are not going to discuss this issue further.  
 
 
 
Period effect of ferility is the major focus of the dissertation research. It is 
determined with the help of applying an APC model-based analysis and could also be 
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represented in relation to the reviewed types, intensity and magnitude of instabilities for 
the corresponding periods (see Figure 4.3b): 
 
 
 
  extreme instability 
   
  strong instability 
   
  moderate instability 
   
  mild instability 
  
  stability 
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At Figures 4.3a and 4.3b pure period effects cleansed of age and cohort effects are 
presented. These are the central finding of the dissertation research and are discussed 
further below.  
 
            4.2. Results 
This section presents the results of hypotheses testing. As previously mentioned, I 
used the method recommended by Mason et al. for producing and comparing betas. In 
comparison to other methods, such as the standard deviation, the main advantage of 
Mason’s method is the ability to provide accurate information for a small number of 
observation points. 
 
H1. Periods of sociopolitical instability not coupled with economic crisis are 
characterized by increased fertility. 
This hypothesis assumes that fertility rates of each period of sociopolitical 
instability should be increasing. Consequently, by the end of each such period (i.e., 1965-
1969, 1954-1957, 1982, 1960-1964, and 1978-1988), fertility rates should be higher than 
at the beginning; even more so, than in years preceding these periods. 
As shown by Figures 3a and 3b, fertility has in fact declined during the period of 
1965-1969. Data was not available for 1954-1957 and thus, H1 could not be tested for 
this duration. The year 1982 was part of a broader period of increased instability (1978-
1986) and thus, could not be tested separately. Fertility has indeed increased during the 
period of 1978-1986, which is associated with both deterioration and erosion of the social 
contract. The difference in betas between these extreme years is quite substantial, 
comprising 10.69; furthermore, the difference between betas for 1978 and 1987, the years 
of peak fertility for this period, was even higher, equaling 13.08. 
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This supports the hypothesis for the period of 1978-1988, as the a period with the 
steepest increase of sociopolitical instability due to the deterioration and erosion of the 
“social contract”, during some years coupled with instability related to “reciprocal 
accountability” (see Figure 4.3b). 
 
H2. Increased sociopolitical instability at the societal level (if not 
accompanied by severe economic instability and crisis) will lead to higher fertility 
rate for a given period. 
Accordingly, each period marked with a higher instability level should be 
characterized by increased fertility rates. Hence, a hierarchy of fertility rates should 
appear across instability periods according to the following order (arranged from lowest 
to highest instability): 1965-1969: Brezhnev’s breakout; 1954-1957: Khrushchev’s 
breakout; 1982: Brezhnev’s contested directorship1; 1960-1964: Khrushchev’s contested 
directorship; 1978-1988 (particularly 1981)2; 
             To test this hypothesis, the average betas of the sociopolitical instability periods 
were compared. The following lists their values for the corresponding periods: 
 For 1965-1969, the average beta equaled 20.43; for 1954-1957, data was not 
available. Brezhnev’s contested directorship during 1982 overlapped with a stronger type 
of instability, related to the deterioration and erosion of the social contract (1978-1988)3; 
                                                          
1 The short period of instability related to Brezhnev’s contested directorship overlapped with the extended 
period of the deterioration and erosion of the social contract. 
2 The period of 1970-1981 was defined as stable according to the “reciprocal accountability” theory. This 
period was shortened because the deterioration of the social contract began to manifest itself in 1978. For 
the same reason, a further period, which was defined as stable by the “reciprocal accountability” theory, 
was not included here (1982-1986). 
3 Although the erosion of the social contract has lasted up to the very breakdown of the USSR in 1991, the 
part of this period from 1989 to 1991 was marked with the propagation of a severe economic crisis, 
followed by instability and thus, was tested as a separate hypothesis. 
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the average beta for 1960-1964 equaled 29.85, and for the period of 1978-1988 the 
average beta was 24.56. 
Since the trend of fertility increase lasted until 1987, it is worth investigating the 
average beta for this very period (up to 1987). It equals 24.08. Evident from a comparison 
between these average betas, the hypothesis could not be confirmed. 
 
H3. Stable periods are characterized by lower fertility rates than periods 
with sociopolitical instabilities. Therefore and in accordance to the earlier 
assumption, the level of uncertainty increased during periods of instability, leading 
to an increase of fertility. 
The stable periods of 1953-1954, 1965, 1957-1959, and 1970-1977 should 
therefore be characterized by lower fertility rates than the periods of 1965-1969, 1954-
1957, 1960-1964, and 1978-19883 that were marked with sociopolitical instabilities 
without simultaneous severe economic instability and crisis. 
To test this hypothesis, the average betas of stable periods were compared with 
those of periods marked with sociopolitical instabilities. They can be ordered according 
to the following for stable periods: for 1953-1954 no data was available; for 1965, the 
average beta equaled 23.38; for 1957-1959: data was merely available for 1958-1959 and 
for these years, the average beta equaled 38.77; for 1970-1977 the average beta was 
19.92. 
        For unstable periods, average betas had the following values: for 1965-1969: 20.43; 
for 1954-1957: no data available; for 1960-1964: 29.85; for 1978-1988: 24.5; and for 
1978-1987: 24.08. 
This hypothesis was partially confirmed: the betas for unstable periods were 
indeed higher than for stable periods, with the exception of one stable (1957-1959) and 
one unstable (1965-1969) period. An in-depth exploration, further confirming the partial 
substantiation of this hypothesis, is provided in the “Discussion” section. 
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H4. Stable periods are characterized by increased homogeneity of fertility 
compared to periods characterized by an increasing level of instability. Since 
fertility increases during unstable periods, fertility rates vary to a larger extent 
during unstable periods. 
The stable periods of 1953-1954, 1965, 1957-1959, and 1970-1977 were 
characterized by an increased homogeneity of fertility compared to unstable periods such 
as 1965-1969, 1954-1957, 1960-1964, 1978-1985, and 1986-1988. Typically, the 
standard variation is a good measure of homogeneity, and consequently, this has been 
widely used. However, for small observational data sets (the case of some of the periods 
for which the homogeneity was tested for the research of this dissertation), the result 
could be strongly biased. Therefore, it is not quite accurate to compare the levels of 
homogeneity between various periods (i.e. comparing periods with small and large 
numbers of observations). Various scholars in the field (e.g. Eisenberg, 2015) have 
elaborated the downside of using absolute and relative standard deviation. Therefore, I 
used beta coefficients, given that Friedman et. al (1994) recommend them in particular 
for a variety of interpretations related to divorcing age, period, and cohort effects. 
Homogeneity of the periods was measured and compared via the difference between 
highest and lowest betas within each period. These differences are provided below for 
selected periods. First, I calculated these differences for the stable periods for which I had 
the necessary data. I could not calculate the difference for the stable period of 1965 
because this was only one stable year that was framed by unstable periods. For the stable 
period of 1957-1959, data was only available for 1958-1959. The difference of betas for 
these years comprised 1.62. The next stable period was 1970-1977 and data was available 
for the whole period. The corresponding difference for a given period equaled 0.42 betas. 
At this point, I proceed to unstable periods. The differences of betas for these 
periods were the following: for 1965-1969: 4.66 betas; for 1957: no data available; for 
1960-1964: 12.53 betas; and for the period of 1978-1988: two important results were 
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found. The difference between the betas for the years 1985 and 1978 equaled 7.65, while 
the difference between 1986 and 1988 comprised 0.26. 
          Hypothesis 4 could be fully confirmed for all periods for which data was available, 
and an incomplete data set was only available for one period. 
 
H5. During periods characterized by both profound economic and 
sociopolitical instability, fertility rates will decrease, mainly due to economic 
instability. Hence, the period of 1989-1997, which was characterized by a 
combination of sociopolitical instabilities, and severe economic instability was also 
characterized by a decline of fertility. 
To test the hypothesis, betas were compared between the year when economic 
downturn started (1989) and the preceding year. Furthermore, the year when the 
economic downturn leveled off was compared with the first following year and the 
preceding year. 
           The period of economic recession lasted from 1989 to 1997. The differences 
between the betas for the corresponding years were: 25.88 betas between 1989 and 1997, 
and 29.08 betas between 1989 and 1997. These differences were the most pronounced 
among all revealed during testing of all formulated hypotheses. 
          Consequently, this confirmed the hypothesis, despite the fact that the actual decline 
of fertility started one year earlier (during 1988). I will suggest possible causes of this 
discrepancy in the Discussion section. 
 
 Chapter Five 
  Discussion and Directions for Future Research 
5.1. Discussion 
The application of the APC model allowed singling out the period effect of 
fertility. However, the period effect was not necessarily equal to the impact of social and 
political instability. Period effects are affected by first and second demographic 
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transitions, population policy, changes in housing policies, and specific governmental 
policies (e.g. campaigns against alcohol), which could also account for fertility swings. 
Thus, the major emphasis of this discussion was to provide a thorough analysis with the 
goal of defining whether the findings are attributable to the impact of sociopolitical and 
economic instabilities, or if other period effects also accounted for changes in fertility 
rates. Furthermore, I will discuss how the obtained results resonate with the hypotheses 
and with the existing theory they are based upon (which extends the uncertainty reduction 
theory). 
 
Hypothesis 1 
 
First and foremost, it is important to determine whether demographic transitions 
overlap with any of the periods for which specific hypotheses have been formulated and 
for which findings have been provided. The reason for this is that demographic 
transitions imply long-term radical shifts in fertility that overshadows any prospective 
short-term fluctuations, including those due the impact of societal instabilities. This also 
applies to Hypothesis 1, since its testing involved periods that coincide with the 
uncompleted First Demographic Transition. 
As noted by previous studies, the demographic transition, which has manifested 
as a steady decline of fertility in Russia, began at the very end of the 19th century and 
continued throughout the first half of the 20th century (Zakharov, 2008; Shcherbov & Van 
Vianen, 2001). Scholars also noted that the forced and brutal modernization of the USSR 
contributed to the pace of demographic transition, which started later than in most 
European countries. 
Furthermore noted by many scholars (e.g. Zakharov, 2003; 2008), the first 
demographic transition in Russia was completed in the 1960s. Zakharov (2008, 911) 
provided a major criterion for the completion of the demographic transition in Russia, i.e. 
the convergence of total fertility in the cohorts of “mothers” and their “daughters,” with 
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the former born between 1920 and 1930. Along with other criteria, such as cohort 
convergence and total period fertility levels, while also narrowing the spatial fertility 
variation, convergence of total fertility levels in the cohorts of “mothers” and “daughters” 
testified to the completeness of the transition to a new type of fertility by the end of the 
1960s. This conclusion about both timing and completion of the demographic transition 
of Russia will be applied to the interpretation of each of the five major hypotheses of the 
current study. The following describes how this impacts the findings of Hypothesis 1 
testing: 
In contrast to the hypothesis about increased fertility during periods of 
sociopolitical instability, two of the periods with mild instability (1960-1964 and 1965-
1969), were characterized by a decline of birth rates. Since these periods coincided with 
the completion of the demographic transition, fertility decline was attributable to this 
very phenomenon. Since long-term demographic transition, typified by a decrease of 
fertility to a level close to population replacement (TFR = 2.1), is more powerful than a 
short-term influence of instability, the possible impact of social instability on fertility 
could be nullified. Thus, both periods of 1960-1964 and 1965-1969 that coincide with the 
completion of a demographic transition, are not ideal for hypothesis testing. This 
enhances the plausibility of Hypothesis 1, since the remaining instability period (1978-
1986)1 largely demonstrated a steady and statistically significant increase of fertility. For 
further confirmation of the positive impact of instability on the fertility hypothesis, other 
possible period effects of processes during that period should either be ruled out or 
singled out. 
Many demographers attributed the observed fertility increase of 1981 to the 
implementation of a pronatalist population policy. The pronatalist set of measures 
                                                          
1 The impacted instability period of 1954-1957 remained outside of the available data coverage, 
while Brezhnev’s contested directorship of 1982 lies within the period of deterioration and erosion of the 
social contract (1978-1986). 
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included partially paid maternity leave, tax deductions for families with two and more 
children, allowances and deductions for housing and for the placing of children in 
kindergartens for the same category, extension of the possibility for working part-time, 
and sliding shifts for young mothers, which were all introduced starting November 1st 
1981. These measures were implemented in three stages: the first stage started on 
November 1st 1981, in the most demographically challenging areas (those with lowest 
fertility) such as the far East, Siberia, Karelia, and the Komi autonomous republics, as 
well as the cities of Arkhangelsk, Murmansk, Vologda, Novgorod, and Pskov; the second 
stage started in November 1982 and included the rest of Russia; the third stage started in 
November 1983 and included the other republics of the USSR.  
However, several reasons exist for considering factors other than population 
policy that have contributed to the pronounced fertility increase during the early 1980s. 
First, the increase of fertility during 1981 reflected both in TFR of official statistics and 
the period effect singled out in the current study (see Figure 3a), which is hard to attribute 
to just the population policy effect. The reason for this is that only two months had 
passed since the introduction of the policy measures and only a small part of the country 
was encompassed by them at that time (Siberia and the Far East have a very small 
population: Arkhangelsk, Murmansk, Vologda, Novgorod, and Pskov have a total of 
about three million people, while Karelia and Komi are autonomous republics with tiny, 
but also very aged populations). 
Some demographers pointed out that the mere announcement of the pronatalist 
policies formed a possible reason for the immediate increase of fertility. I.e. 
Arkhangelskyi (2006, p. 8) reported that the mere publication of the resolution on 
population policy implementation during the first quarter of 1981 could have had an 
impact since it did not contain information about the time frame for policy introduction 
across the country; consequently, the population could have had the illusion that these 
measures were being introduced straight away and countrywide. Zakharov (2006, p. 401) 
however, doubted that citizens were so naive. 
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Most importantly, this points towards the possibility of some other factor (besides 
population policy) accounting for the increase in fertility across country shortly before 
the announcement and implementation of the population policy. Many demographers 
(Kuzmin, 1993; Arkhangelskyi, 1994; Borisov & Sinelnikov, 1996) noted that such a 
fertility increase in many regions of Russia had already started by 1980, which is close to 
the timing of both announcement and implementation of the population policy. This 
further implies other reasons for the increase in fertility beyond the pronatalist policy. 
Population policy, according to this point of view, merely enhanced a developing trend. 
In an attempt to explain this pre-policy implementation demographic trend, 
demographers suggested an increasing shift toward younger ages. Indeed, this timing 
effect could result in an increase of TFR that confounds to period, cohort, and age effects. 
Ideally, to confirm any period effect (including the impact of instability), one has to be 
guided by the results of an APC model. Data obtained via this model in a current research 
did not indicate a fertility increase in pre-1981 years, thus enabling the fertility shift to 
younger ages (i.e. a cohort effect) as the most plausible explanation for the observed 
fertility increase at this very time. 
However, when analyzing the period effect of fertility increase in 1981 as 
evidenced by the results of implementing an APC model in the current study (see Figure 
3b), the impact of the fertility shift to younger ages could be ruled out. Two types of 
period effects, one regarding population policy and one regarding the impact of 
instability, were the only contenders to provide a plausible cause for the fertility increase 
during that period. Due to the reservations provided for the singular impact of the 
population policy, the instability impact hypothesis gained credibility. 
 The period effect of fertility at that time (see Figure 3b) revealed a steady 
increase from 1981 to 1987, with just one interruption, as fertility rates leveled off in 
1984 and 1985. This coincides with the finding of a statistical analysis that used the TFR. 
While some demographers attributed the increase in fertility from 1981 to 1987 to 
pronatalist population policies, the vast majority of scholars credit the population policy 
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implementation for enhancing fertility in 1981-1983, arguing that other factors could 
account for the more steeply increasing TFRs in 1985-1987. Reasons for this prevailing 
opinion include: first, the experience of population policy implementation in Eastern 
European countries, where fertility increases lasted three to five years subsequent to 
policy implementation; second: never throughout the history of population policy 
introduction, was an interruption of a trend observed (such as the case in 1984 and 1985 
in the USSR). For the latter phenomenon, it is worth mentioning that not even a slightly 
plausible explanation has ever been provided (within the premise of the impact of the 
population policy on fertility for the whole period between 1981 and 1987). 
Therefore, the majority of scholars who do not relate the fertility increases in 
1986 and 1987 to population policy measures usually attribute the phenomenon to one of 
the following reasons: first, to expectations related to Mikhail Gorbachev’s “perestroika” 
(“reconstruction”); second, to the anti-alcohol campaign launched by Gorbachev during 
the second half of the eighties (Klupt, 2008; Rimashevskaya & Milovidov, 1988), as 
discussed below. 
The first listed reason for the increased fertility during this period can be regarded 
as a variant of the uncertainty reduction theory. Indeed, there were no odds of success 
connected to hopes related to the proclaimed “perestroika” (reconstruction) politics, 
which aimed to bring a human face to socialism, loosen censorship in the mass media 
(“glasnost”), and to hopefully, unleash the hidden potential of socialism. Thus, 
expectations of people during this period most likely fit the definition of a perception of 
uncertainty. However, such expectations contained mostly optimistic components for the 
majority of the population, making corresponding demographic reactions a special case. 
Little theoretical framework exists that explained the impact of such expectations on 
fertility; however, such a positive causation cannot be entirely ruled out. The question 
remains of why the fertility in the USSR already entered a steep decline in 1988, when 
hopes (or illusions) for the success of perestroika had not yet evaporated, and economic 
hardship had not fully unfolded. 
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The following provides an analysis of the validity of the second explanation. In 
1985, an anti-alcohol campaign was introduced by Gorbachev (after which the General 
Secretary of the Communist Party Gorbachev was nicknamed “Mineral Secretary”). The 
reason for launching this anti-alcohol campaign had its origins in severe and increasing 
problems of alcoholism in the USSR. Reitan provided a full account of measures 
encompassed by the anti-alcohol campaign (2001, p.244). These measures included 
reductions in state production and sale of alcoholic beverages, considerable price 
increases, increasing of the minimum purchasing age to 21, restricting the hours of sale 
and the number of outlets and serving places, closing of breweries and some banning of 
drinking at the workplace, as well as toughening penalties for the latter and for public 
drunkenness, drinking at the workplace, drunk driving, and production and sale of 
samogon (home-brew). 
To determine the validity of the claim for an anti-alcohol campaign as the reason 
for a fertility increase in 1986 and 1987, it is important to look at the duration of this 
campaign. The resolution on the war on alcoholism was adopted in May 1985 and 
enforced from June 1st of the same year. Reitan (2001, p. 245) has distinguished narrow 
and wider definitions of the campaign period. The narrow definition was given to the 
active period of policy intervention (from 1985 to 1987/1988) while the wider definition 
referred to a period well into the 1990s. Reitan (2001, p. 245) furthermore cited various 
views on the actual impact of the campaign that range from a few months to all the way 
to 1990. 
To better understand both the duration of the anti-alcohol campaign and the 
temporal scope of its impact, it is worth reviewing the main stages involved in 
terminating this campaign. According to an account cited by Reitan (2001, p. 245-246), 
the stages included the cancellation of the criminal liability for personal samogon use in 
July 1987, followed by an increase in state sales of alcoholic beverages in January 1988, 
and the adoption of a resolution in October 1988 for the redundancy of anti-alcohol 
pressure after which, the campaign ceased to be enforced. 
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In the vast amount of literature on the results of the anti-alcohol campaign, major 
emphasis has been put on its impact on mortality. Some publications analyzed the 
campaign’s impact on revenues, financial instability, and as a result, on social upheaval. 
Finally, a certain amount of studies focused on the influence of the campaign on various 
aspects of social life such as crime rates, work, and family. However, absolutely no 
thorough research exists on the impact of this anti-alcohol campaign on fertility. 
In one of the rare studies that touch upon this connection (Rimashevskaya & 
Milovidov, 1988), the impact of the anti-alcohol campaign on fertility increase has been 
acknowledged; however, no mechanism or scope of such an impact was introduced. 
Klupt (2008, 317) briefly mentioned the possibility for an impact of the campaign on the 
increase in fertility, linking the “hope of women for correcting husbands’ drinking”. 
It is quite possible to imply the prospective impact on fertility of the mentioned 
social changes that were introduced by the anti-alcohol campaign. Improvement of 
relations in family life, reduction of crimes, and diminishing suicide rates could definitely 
have impacted fertility to a certain extent. Although the magnitude of this impact has not 
yet been studied, there is reason to believe it could hardly lead to such a significant 
increase in fertility as the one observed in 1986 and 1987. I.e., one of the possible social 
reasons for a specific fertility increase could have been the reduction in female suicide 
after the implementation of the anti-alcohol campaign. However, this most likely had 
very limited impact on fertility since, according to an account of Wasserman, Varnik, and 
Eklund (1998), the attributable fraction of alcohol for female suicides (and also female 
violent deaths) were a mere 27%, which was about half of those of males. Furthermore, 
not all of these suicides were committed by childbearing aged women. 
Further doubt for the explanation of a huge increase in fertility during 1986 and 
1987 by one single factor (an anti-alcohol campaign) is the abrupt reversal of this 
demographic trend in 1988, while the anti-alcohol campaign had gradually slowed and 
eventually reversed in the second half of 1987 and 1988. In summary, existing 
explanations fail to account for the three issues of the observed phenomenon of fertility 
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increase from 1981 to 1987.  
First, the question remains of why such a substantial fertility increase happened in 
1981, while an announcement on the perspective introduction of population policy 
measures was only introduced this very year, the regions where these measures were 
going to be introduced had not been specified and, eventually, they were implemented 
this very year in just few regions with only a small fraction of the population. Second, it 
remains unclear why fertility, initially increasing for three to five years after policy’s 
implementation in all countries, started decreasing after that, while in the USSR, instead 
of decreasing, birth rates leveled off for at least one year. Finally, the third question 
implies a sound and justifiable explanation of a further increase of fertility at 1986 and 
1987. 
An explanation that encompasses uncertainty reduction premises fills this gap and 
contributes to a coherent interpretation of fertility dynamics during this period. According 
to this explanation, 1981 was the year when the erosion of the “social contract” became 
especially evident and, consequently, fertility increased to compensate for the related 
uncertainty. This increase was enhanced by the introduction of a pronatalist population 
policy and by the shifting of births to younger ages of mothers. After three years of 
increasing fertility rates, these should have decreased again as was the case in all 
countries where pronatalist population policies were implemented. However, the impact 
of instability related to the erosion of the “social contract” did not allow fertility to 
“bend”; it had not yet declined as in other countries, but instead just leveled off. Then, 
during the next couple of years, fertility continued its upward trend as a result of further 
erosion of the “social contract”, possibly also enhanced by the anti-alcohol campaign. 
 
Hypothesis 2 
The notion of demographic transition during the 1960s clarifies why Hypothesis 2 
has not been confirmed. During the pre-completion of the transition period, fertility was 
obviously higher; therefore, the basis for comparison of two instability periods at that 
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decade is biased. Unfortunately, there is no way to test this hypothesis, comparing 
fertility during periods controlled for the stage of demographic transition or during 
periods after its completion. 
 
Hypothesis 3 
Similarly, the coinciding of the ongoing demographic transition with many of the 
periods marked with either stability or instability undermines the value of the results of 
Hypothesis 3. However, comparing adjacent periods of stability and instability (e.g. the 
stable period of 1957-1959 with the unstable one of 1960-1964) that are close to each 
other in regard to the advance of the demographic transition could enhance the validity of 
a partial confirmation of the hypothesis. Indeed, most of the unstable periods, both during 
and after the completion of demographic transition, demonstrated larger betas than those 
for most of the stable periods. The fact that the hypothesis has been partially confirmed 
despite the existing fertility differences was assumed to be due to the different stages of 
demographic transition between various periods, thus enhancing the strength of its 
confirmation. 
 
Hypothesis 4 
Taking fertility dynamics during demographic transition into account enhances 
the strength and value of the confirmation of Hypothesis 4. Indeed, it is reasonable to 
imply heterogeneity during periods within the completion of demographic transition 
(since fertility steadily decreased during these periods). However, according to the 
obtained results, fertility was still more homogenous during stable periods at times of 
demographic transition, than during unstable periods that overlapped with the completion 
of demographic transitions. 
 
Hypothesis 5 
Finally, Hypothesis 5 about the decisive adverse effect of economic instability 
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and the deterioration on fertility even when coupled with tremendous sociopolitical 
instability has been strongly confirmed, albeit with an amendment (see previous 
sections). As clearly evidenced by Figures 3a and 3b, fertility entered a steep decline in 
1988 and remained that way until the very end of the 1990s. Several major alternative 
explanations exist that can explain this phenomenon. One explanation relates the steep 
decline in fertility rates in Russia during the 1990s with the postponed impact of the 
implementation of the population policy during the 1980s. A second explanation links the 
fertility dynamics in Russia at this period to the effects of reforms that had been started 
by Gorbachev and that eventually resulted in the economic turmoil and hardship for the 
population. A third explanation blames the start of the Second Demographic Transition in 
Russia. A detailed analysis of all three possible explanations is provided in Appendix 1 to 
this Chapter (see p. 145). I provide arguments in favor for the second explanation, 
placing the highest weight on the steep decline of fertility in Russia at that time on both 
economic instability and crisis. 
In the context of this discussion, it is worth mentioning that the formulated 
hypothesis of a joint impact of economic and sociopolitical instability has obtained the 
most unambiguous support. Differences in betas were most pronounced for periods of 
economic instability. The plausibility for the conclusion of the dominant and adverse 
effect of economic instability on fertility has been supported by the fact that it was 
coupled with the strongest possible sociopolitical instability related (among other 
things) to the deterioration and eventual breakdown of the social contract, which 
coincided with the disintegration of the USSR itself. Other numerous severe types of 
sociopolitical instabilities existed as well. For instance, the shooting of the opposition-
dominated parliament upon the order of President B. Yeltsin in 1993, or the elections of 
1996 when Communists were about to come to power, that could have  potentially 
reversed economic and political reforms, to name but a few. However, none of these 
sociopolitical instabilities that were not always directly related to economics reversed 
the decline of fertility or even slowed its steepness. This clearly emphasized the 
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prevalence of economic factors when these are associated with the severe deterioration 
of living standards over any type of symbolic effect of (sociopolitical) uncertainties 
when it comes to affecting fertility dynamics. 
             The following provides a brief summary on how the overall results resonate with 
the formulated hypotheses as well as with the uncertainty reduction theory. Four of the 
five formulated hypotheses (1 to 4) were related to assumptions about various types and 
intensities of sociopolitical instabilities, affecting the individual perception of 
uncertainty, thus leading to increased fertility. The results for testing each of these 
hypotheses were investigating the confirmation from various angles (increased fertility 
during unstable periods, hierarchy of fertility levels during periods characterized with 
various types and degrees of instability, homogeneity of fertility rates in stable vs. 
unstable periods, and differences in fertility rates during stable and unstable periods). As 
mentioned above, some of these hypotheses were largely or partially confirmed, while 
others were dismissed. For the latter, it was hard to tell whether these hypotheses were 
dismissed because they were not correct, or because of incomplete data and/or the 
inability to control for other factors (with the stage of demographic transition as the major 
factor). 
          Arguably, the strongest confirmation was obtained for the hypothesis that fertility 
was impacted by the strongest type of sociopolitical instability, typified by the erosion 
and deterioration of the social contract, which happened in the Soviet Union for most of 
the 1980s (up to the start of the massive economic instability crisis during 1988). This is 
in line with the premises of the uncertainty reduction theory, linking a strong desire to 
reduce uncertainty (and therefore, to increase fertility as the means of achieving this) with 
the extent of objective uncertainty (Friedman et. al, 384). However, it is hard to 
determine whether this theory works for minor types and intensities of sociopolitical 
instabilities (e.g. related to the oscillation of “reciprocal accountability” at the upper tier 
of the elite) since, for the above-mentioned reasons, confirmation of the related 
hypotheses were either not obtained, or were more ambiguous, or  less pronounced. 
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         The fifth hypothesis linked economic instability with fertility, postulating an 
adverse effect of the former on the latter. This relates to the uncertainty reduction theory 
in the sense that the adverse relationship was assumed to hold even while coupled with 
sociopolitical instability. This hypothesis was strongly confirmed, with rates of fertility 
declining during the corresponding period from the advance of economic instability and 
crisis in the USSR from 1988 to the 1990s as the most pronounced period. This implies 
the necessity of a certain amendment to the uncertainty reduction theory by specifying 
the scope condition under which its central premise is not working (sociopolitical 
instability when coupled with economic instability is not leading to increased fertility as 
the means to reduce uncertainty). 
  
  
5.2. Directions for Future Research 
The conclusions of this research have led to realizing a need for further 
development of the topic, including both refinement of the concepts and methodology 
and also an extension of the scope and units of analysis. Here are possible avenues for the 
future research and advance of methodologies. 
  1. Hypotheses in this research were tested indirectly, by comparing macro-level 
data. However, it seems beneficial to test hypotheses along the macro-micro and micro-
micro links outlined in a model as well. This implies getting data on subjective 
perceptions of instabilities. However strong the association of objectively (conceptually) 
defined types and intensities of instability at various periods with their subjective 
perception as the ones creating uncertainty, are, there still could be discrepancies between 
them. Thus it could be relevant to follow the Weberian idea of getting into people’s heads 
by testing their subjective perceptions of different types of instabilities as of uncertainties 
and the latter’s impact on fertility decision-making. For that purpose one has to interview 
women and spouses with both fresh and distant memories of their fertility decision-
making and childbearing. It is worth performing both longitudinal and wave studies to 
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view the dynamics of changes in both actual and conditional (synthetic) cohorts. 
 2. My unit of analysis in this research was the entire country - that’s what the 
demographic data was available for. It will be, however, beneficial to test the hypotheses 
on instability’s impact on fertility across different regions of the country as well. There 
are several rationales for doing that. First, the perception of instability can vary across 
regions. According the above cited Godszynska et al., (1991, p. 181), the latter can vary 
depending on the size of the country and the level of political censorship that could also 
vary in the country’s center and the periphery.  
At the times of the USSR existence there was indeed a huge difference between 
access to the independent and semi-independent sources of information between large 
cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg and remote parts of the country. These days this 
gap is narrowing, partially due to the advance of the Internet. However, the difference in 
access to the information between various areas and types of residence in the country still 
remains, in part due to the different levels of the Internet availability. Thus, differences in 
uncertainty perception across regions of the country are worth exploring in order to test 
specific impacts on the local fertility decision-making. 
A second reason for studying regional variations in instability’s impact on fertility 
is the heterogeneity of the population in regard to the stages of the demographic 
development across the country. While in some parts demographic transition was 
completed by the 1960s of the 20th century, in other parts of Russia the process is still on 
the way. That implies different reactions to the impact of social-political instabilities that 
are mudded if fertility dynamics is studied in the country as a whole. 
Finally, the marked heterogeneity of fertility behavior in the Russian Federation 
regions significantly overlaps (though does not full coincide) with ethnic and religious 
diversity of population. For example, several autonomous republics like Tatarstan, 
Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetiya and Kabardino-Balkaria are predominantly populated 
by ethnic groups confessing Islam. This also could have a distinct impact on the 
perception of societal instability as well as latter’s influence on fertility given specific 
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national traditions and faith. Also, various regions of Russia differ extremely in regard to 
the level of modernization. Along with highly developed regions that include huge 
economic and cultural centers like Moscow and St. Petersburg and the ones rich with oil, 
gas and diamonds (e.g. Yamalo-Nentskii disctrict or Tumenskaya region), there are also 
many depressed areas like Valdai or Pskov. Most likely, the perception of societal 
instabilities and, hence, its impact on fertility would vary across these regions. 
 Fertility data used in this research does not differentiate across groups having 
various social economic statuses. It will be beneficial to compare levels of individual 
perceptions of uncertainty across social groups with different fertility decision-making 
and outcome. It is worth saying that fertility behavior of various social, professional and 
educational groups in Russia demonstrate unique patterns of demographic behavior. For 
instance, Perelli-Harris and Gerber’s (2009) study on the spread of the second 
demographic transition in Russia has showed that postponement of the first births of a 
child is more typical for women with a middle level of education than for educated and 
disadvantaged groups. So, it is equally plausible that perception of societal instabilities of 
different types and corresponding fertility decision-making also significantly and 
unexpectedly differ across these groups. 
 In this research the hypotheses of societal instabilities’ impact on fertility are 
tested for the fertile aged women as a whole, without singling out marital and non-marital 
births. This distinction, however, could be quite relevant to the topic. The thing is that 
instability could have distinct impact on the dynamics of each. Moreover, as noted by 
Perelli-Harris and Gerber (2010, pp. 2-5), nonmarital childbearing could be the product 
of two very distinctive social patterns: either lack of human and financial resources that is 
associated with disadvantage and poverty, or the rejection of traditional institutions, a 
process outlined by the second demographic transition (In regard to Russia, authors also 
found, in addition, some unique patterns as well). 
As the example of the first category, Perelli-Harris and Gerber (2010) bring the 
case of nonmarital childbearing in the US that is “associated with the inability to maintain 
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healthy marriages and a descent into poverty”. The second pattern, according to these 
authors, is exemplified by Northern European countries. The importance of further 
research of this category’s demographic behavior for exploring instability’s impact on 
fertility is evident since the authors claim that “given the instability of the economic 
situation following the transition to capitalism the rise in nonmarital childbearing could 
be associated with economic hardship and general life instability” (Perelli-Harris and 
Gerber, 2010). 
Because the share of nonmarital childbearing is steadily growing in the developed 
countries and its growth could be attributed to various reasons across the countries, with 
some of them being related to crisis and instabilities, and some to the advance of the 
Second Demographic Transition, it is worth studying instability’s impact on marital and 
nonmarital fertility separately. Moreover, since the reasons for non-martial fertility 
dynamics could vary, it is worth studying demographic trends for several internal clusters 
of this category. 
5. This research mostly explores the impact of different types of societal 
instability on fertility outcomes at the period ending up at early 1990s. One of the reasons 
that the time frame of the research has not been extended so far is that there are no well 
developed theories of instability types for the period after the breakdown of the USSR. In 
the dissertation research I have employed two well developed and all-encompassing 
theories, “reciprocal accountability” and “social contract”. They allowed for the detailed 
specification and ranking of the instabilities’ periods in the country that made it possible 
to perform the empirical test of the hypotheses. However, both theories (at least in their 
original form) are not applicable to the post-Soviet period.  
 That brings the broader issue of further development of conceptualizations and 
theories of societal instabilities of different types and scopes; the ones that encompass 
major traits of instabilities, classify and rank them in type, scope and intensity. Finding 
commonalities in the types of these new instabilities allows for not only testing the 
uncertainty reduction theory in new scopes but also for making larger generalizations and 
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conclusions. 
 6.  Agenda for a future research of the more recent periods (1990s, 2000s and 
2010s) also implies having a strategy for divorcing the social and political instabilities 
(that translates into a perception of them as symbolic uncertainties) and economic 
instabilities. These two are often times intertwined making it harder to draw definite 
conclusions. In a present research there were, however, several periods when social and 
political instabilities were largely not accompanied by severe economic crisis. It is worth 
exploring the paths of the two phenomena, economic and sociopolitical instabilities 
separately, in order to make definite conclusions on the impact of each. 
It is worth mentioning in that regard that most of the 1990s in Russia were 
marked with economic hardships however accompanied by social and political 
uncertainties. The latter include such political developments as the shooting of the 
Parliament dominated by opposition by President B.Yeltsin in 1993 and uncertainty 
related to the presidential elections of 1996 that contained a real possibility of the 
Communists coming to power again. The most severe economic downturn was arguably 
the default of 1998 that has, most likely, resulted in the nadir of Russian post-war fertility 
level – with Total Fertility Rate equaling 1.17 the next year. 
 Most of the next decade, the 2000s, was generally perceived as political and 
socially stable. It was also typified with gradual increase of standard of living due to 
monetary policy, liberal reforms and the high prices of oil. Not only sustainable 
economic growth and increasing salaries but also the increased number of goods on the 
shelves and newly available loans coupled with popularity of the country’s President 
contributed to what many respondents perceived as an overall stability. However, by the 
end of the decade things started to change some. Again, two types of instability, 
economic and sociopolitical one started to manifest themselves at the same time. The first 
one was associated with the advance of the world economic crisis of the 2008 that has 
impacted Russia the most of all other countries. Also, at that time there were many events 
pointing out for the systemic flaws of the current model of society and, thus, the need and 
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possibility of its correction or change. This attitude on behalf of population was reflected 
in the surveys of the VTSIOM, the major sociological agency of Moscow. 
 Future research that would continue investigating this very aspect’s impact on 
fertility in the 1990s, 2000s and periods to come should not only employ theories 
defining types, scopes and scales of the specific instabilities that have surfaced at these 
very periods but also a strategy for singling out the contribution of each type of various 
instabilities and, possibly, the combined effect of all. 
 Specifying types of instabilities in regard to their perspective impact on 
fertility decision-making and behavior, as well as working out a technique for divorcing 
their specific effects on that demographic process, are also needed for the other future 
research, the one on a global scale. I believe at least some part of the findings on 
instabilities’ impact on fertility outcomes in the USSR/Russia can be generalized for the 
other countries and global players as well. There is a lot of discussion about current and 
perspective instabilities and related uncertainties that the world faces. They are both of 
economic and symbolic types. Dramatic rise of fertility after the terrorist attack on the 
Twin Towers Some of these instabilities types overlap with each other and, what is very 
important for future hypotheses testing, coincide with the unfolding economic crisis. As 
mentioned in the previous discussion on the topic, the latter has started to show up in the 
mid-1980s and has rapidly accelerated in the late 1980s.  
Uncertainties related to such perspective economic and sociopolitical instabilities, 
the ones that the world arguably faces, also merit exploring them from the standpoint of 
their impact on fertility decision-making and behavior. Among such possible events one 
can mention the perspective changing of the political configuration of the world global 
players with possible creation of the non-polar (not a multi-polar!) world; change in 
consumerist consciousness and behavior; conversion (according to E. Wallerstein)  of 
capitalism to an unknown system in the next 20 to 30 years; climate change related to 
global warming that could cause dramatic changes in the very existence of the world 
economy, communications and the very cities and countries; the expediting speed of the 
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lava rise to the surface in Yellowstone Park that could replicate the Iceland volcano on a 
much greater scale; and the other unforeseen political, social and economic events. 
 
Conclusion 
In the course of this research the impact of certain types of societal instabilities on 
fertility was demonstrated. This is true in regard to such a strong type of instability as 
erosion and deterioration of such a basic institutional provision as “social contract”. It is 
very plausible that such a strong type of instability was the major reason for the increase 
of fertility that is conducive with uncertainty reduction theory. The impact of other types 
of sociopolitical instabilities on fertility dynamics was not unambiguously confirmed, and 
in some cases such an impact was ruled out. There is also a significant evidence of stable 
periods being more homogeneous in regard to fertility dynamics than unstable ones. It 
was also clearly demonstrated that economic downturn that results in severe deterioration 
of living standards and conditions and related economic instability has a decisive impact 
on the steep decline of birth rates regardless of the simultaneous presence of profound 
sociopolitical instabilities. 
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APPENDIX 1 to CHAPTER 4: 
 
TABLE A1.1 
PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF AGE, PERIOD, AND COHORT EFFECTS ON 
AGE-SPECIFIC FERTILITY per 1000 WOMEN (SMOOTHER) 
  
Coefficients(a) 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Std.Error 
Standardized 
Coefficients T Sig. 
INTERCEPT   -0.69 7.54 -0.09 0.93 
AGES      
age 16 7.09 2.42 0.02 2.93 0.00 
age 17 21.24 2.54 0.06 8.36 0  
age 18 43.36 2.72 0.13 15.97 0.00 
age 19 71.15 2.94 0.22 24.19 0.00 
age 20 100.63 3.21 0.31 31.37 0.00 
age 21 127.09 3.50 0.39 36.26 0.00 
age 22 146.23 3.83 0.45 38.22 0.00 
age 23 155.33 4.16 0.47 37.30 0.00 
age 24 153.89 4.52 0.47 34.06 0.00 
age 25 143.62 4.88 0.44 29.41 0.00 
age 26 127.83 5.26 0.39 24.32 0.00 
age 27 110.29 5.64 0.34 19.57 0.00 
age 28 94.06 6.02 0.29 15.62 0.00 
age 29 80.83 6.41 0.25 12.60 0.00 
age 30 70.89 6.81 0.22 10.41 0.00 
age 31 63.40 7.21 0.19 8.80 0.00 
age 32 57.05 7.61 0.17 7.50 0.00 
age 33 50.70 8.01 0.15 6.33 0.00 
age 34 43.74 8.41 0.13 5.20 0.00 
age 35 36.12 8.81 0.11 4.10 0.00 
age 36 28.25 9.22 0.09 3.06 0.00 
age 37 20.70 9.63 0.06 2.15 0.03 
age 38 13.98 10.04 0.04 1.39 0.16 
  
174 
 
age 39 8.38 10.45 0.03 0.80 0.42 
age 40 3.94 10.86 0.01 0.36 0.72 
age 41 0.50 11.27 0.00 0.04 0.97 
age 42 -2.19 11.68 -0.01 -0.19 0.85 
age 43 -4.37 12.10 -0.01 -0.36 0.72 
age 44 -6.16 12.51 -0.02 -0.49 0.62 
age 45 -7.62 12.93 -0.02 -0.59 0.56 
age 46 -8.71 13.35 -0.03 -0.65 0.51 
age 47 -9.41 13.77 -0.03 -0.68 0.49 
age 48 -9.72 14.18 -0.03 -0.69 0.49 
age 49 -9.74 14.60 -0.03 -0.67 0.51 
age 50 -9.56 15.02 -0.03 -0.64 0.53 
YEARS      
year 1958 16.68 7.27 0.05 2.29 0.02 
year 1959 15.25 6.86 0.04 2.22 0.03 
year 1960 14.01 6.45 0.04 2.17 0.03 
year 1961 10.31 6.05 0.03 1.70 0.09 
year 1962 7.17 5.64 0.02 1.27 0.20 
year 1963 4.69 5.25 0.01 0.89 0.37 
year 1964 2.20 4.85 0.01 0.45 0.65 
year 1965 1.77 4.47 0.01 0.40 0.69 
year 1966 0.30 4.09 0.00 0.07 0.94 
year 1967 -1.70 3.72 0.00 -0.46 0.65 
year 1968 -2.23 3.36 -0.01 -0.66 0.51 
year 1969 -2.14 3.03 -0.01 -0.71 0.48 
year 1970 -0.91 2.71 0.00 -0.34 0.74 
year 1971 0.64 2.43 0.00 0.26 0.79 
year 1978 -0.52 2.43 0.00 -0.21 0.83 
year 1979 -0.33 2.71 0.00 -0.12 0.90 
year 1980 0.23 3.03 0.00 0.08 0.94 
year 1981 1.52 3.36 0.00 0.45 0.65 
year 1982 4.43 3.72 0.01 1.19 0.23 
year 1983 8.55 4.09 0.02 2.09 0.04 
year 1984 7.92 4.47 0.02 1.77 0.08 
year 1985 8.30 4.85 0.02 1.71 0.09 
  
175 
 
year 1986 11.74 5.24 0.03 2.24 0.03 
year 1987 14.02 5.64 0.04 2.49 0.01 
year 1988 11.79 6.04 0.03 1.95 0.05 
year 1989 8.76 6.44 0.03 1.36 0.17 
year 1990 5.51 6.85 0.02 0.80 0.42 
year 1991 1.11 7.26 0.00 0.15 0.88 
year 1992 -4.20 7.67 -0.01 -0.55 0.58 
year 1993 -9.22 8.08 -0.03 -1.14 0.25 
year 1994 -9.29 8.49 -0.03 -1.09 0.27 
year 1995 -11.37 8.91 -0.03 -1.28 0.20 
year 1996 -13.69 9.33 -0.04 -1.47 0.14 
year 1997 -15.65 9.74 -0.04 -1.61 0.11 
year 1998 -15.84 10.16 -0.05 -1.56 0.12 
COHORTS      
cohort 08 -6.10 18.36 0.00 -0.33 0.74 
cohort 09 -5.02 16.25 0.00 -0.31 0.76 
cohort 10 -3.96 15.23 0.00 -0.26 0.80 
cohort 11 -2.27 14.50 0.00 -0.16 0.88 
cohort 12 -0.48 13.89 0.00 -0.03 0.97 
cohort 13 1.27 13.34 0.00 0.10 0.92 
cohort 14 3.08 12.83 0.00 0.24 0.81 
cohort 15 4.77 12.34 0.01 0.39 0.70 
cohort 16 6.61 11.87 0.01 0.56 0.58 
cohort 17 8.64 11.41 0.01 0.76 0.45 
cohort 18 10.67 10.96 0.02 0.97 0.33 
cohort 19 12.55 10.52 0.02 1.19 0.23 
cohort 20 14.11 10.08 0.02 1.40 0.16 
cohort 21 15.27 9.64 0.03 1.58 0.11 
cohort 22 16.18 9.15 0.03 1.77 0.08 
cohort 23 16.79 8.69 0.03 1.93 0.05 
cohort 24 17.19 8.26 0.03 2.08 0.04 
cohort 25 17.47 7.86 0.04 2.22 0.03 
cohort 26 17.72 7.48 0.04 2.37 0.02 
cohort 27 18.02 7.11 0.04 2.53 0.01 
cohort 28 18.41 6.70 0.04 2.75 0.01 
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cohort 29 18.81 6.30 0.04 2.99 0.00 
cohort 30 19.10 5.90 0.04 3.24 0.00 
cohort 31 19.12 5.50 0.04 3.48 0.00 
cohort 32 18.67 5.11 0.04 3.65 0.00 
cohort 33 17.60 4.73 0.04 3.73 0.00 
cohort 34 16.09 4.35 0.04 3.70 0.00 
cohort 35 14.11 3.99 0.04 3.54 0.00 
cohort 36 11.67 3.64 0.03 3.21 0.00 
cohort 37 8.97 3.31 0.02 2.71 0.01 
cohort 38 6.34 3.00 0.02 2.11 0.04 
cohort 39 3.99 2.73 0.01 1.46 0.14 
cohort 40 2.09 2.50 0.01 0.84 0.40 
cohort 41 0.77 2.33 0.00 0.33 0.74 
cohort 42 0.48 2.29 0.00 0.21 0.83 
cohort 43 1.32 2.44 0.00 0.54 0.59 
cohort 44 2.36 2.65 0.01 0.89 0.37 
cohort 45 3.42 2.91 0.01 1.18 0.24 
cohort 46 4.39 3.20 0.01 1.37 0.17 
cohort 47 4.63 3.54 0.01 1.31 0.19 
cohort 48 4.72 3.89 0.01 1.21 0.23 
cohort 49 4.76 4.25 0.01 1.12 0.26 
cohort 50 4.72 4.63 0.01 1.02 0.31 
cohort 51 4.61 5.02 0.01 0.92 0.36 
cohort 52 4.44 5.41 0.01 0.82 0.41 
cohort 53 4.23 5.80 0.01 0.73 0.47 
cohort 54 3.99 6.20 0.01 0.64 0.52 
cohort 55 3.72 6.61 0.01 0.56 0.57 
cohort 56 3.29 6.98 0.01 0.47 0.64 
cohort 57 2.69 7.36 0.01 0.37 0.72 
cohort 58 1.88 7.76 0.00 0.24 0.81 
cohort 59 0.88 8.18 0.00 0.11 0.91 
cohort 60 -0.27 8.62 0.00 -0.03 0.98 
cohort 61 -1.47 9.09 0.00 -0.16 0.87 
cohort 62 -2.68 9.51 -0.01 -0.28 0.78 
cohort 63 -3.83 9.93 -0.01 -0.39 0.70 
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cohort 64 -4.93 10.36 -0.01 -0.48 0.63 
cohort 65 -5.95 10.78 -0.01 -0.55 0.58 
cohort 66 -6.81 11.21 -0.01 -0.61 0.54 
cohort 67 -7.33 11.64 -0.01 -0.63 0.53 
cohort 68 -7.68 12.08 -0.01 -0.64 0.53 
cohort 69 -7.60 12.51 -0.01 -0.61 0.54 
cohort 70 -6.65 12.95 -0.01 -0.51 0.61 
cohort 71 -4.63 13.40 -0.01 -0.35 0.73 
cohort 72 -1.74 13.85 0.00 -0.13 0.90 
cohort 73 1.96 14.31 0.00 0.14 0.89 
cohort 74 6.25 14.78 0.01 0.42 0.67 
cohort 75 10.63 15.26 0.01 0.70 0.49 
cohort 76 14.48 15.76 0.02 0.92 0.36 
cohort 77 17.26 16.29 0.02 1.06 0.29 
cohort 78 19.48 16.88 0.02 1.15 0.25 
cohort 79 20.92 17.57 0.02 1.19 0.23 
cohort 80 21.66 18.52 0.01 1.17 0.24 
cohort 81 21.60 20.45 0.01 1.06 0.29 
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APPENDIX 2 to CHAPTER 4 
 TABLE A.1.2 
   
 PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF AGE, PERIOD, AND COHORT EFFECTS 
ON AGE-SPECIFIC FERTILITY per 1000 WOMEN (SPLINE) 
Parameter 
B 
Std.Error T Sig. 
Intercept 0.82 14.70 0.06 0.96 
YEARS 
year 1958 39.58 10.75 3.68 0.00 
year 1959 37.96 10.50 3.62 0.00 
year 1960 36.54 10.24 3.57 0.00 
year 1961 32.65 9.99 3.27 0.00 
year 1962 29.35 9.75 3.01 0.00 
year 1963 26.68 9.50 2.81 0.01 
year 1964 24.01 9.25 2.60 0.01 
year 1965 23.38 8.97 2.61 0.01 
year 1966 21.72 8.71 2.50 0.01 
year 1967 19.53 8.45 2.31 0.02 
year 1968 18.81 8.20 2.30 0.02 
year 1969 18.72 7.95 2.35 0.02 
year 1970 19.78 7.72 2.56 0.01 
year 1972 20.80 7.26 2.86 0.00 
year 1973 20.00 7.06 2.83 0.00 
year 1974 20.03 6.82 2.94 0.00 
year 1975 19.62 6.59 2.98 0.00 
year 1976 19.83 6.35 3.12 0.00 
year 1977 19.36 6.12 3.16 0.00 
year 1978 18.73 5.89 3.18 0.00 
year 1979 18.74 5.66 3.31 0.00 
year 1980 19.13 5.43 3.52 0.00 
year 1981 20.25 5.21 3.89 0.00 
year 1982 22.99 4.99 4.61 4.40 
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year 1983 26.95 4.77 5.65 1.96 
year 1984 26.16 4.56 5.74 1.18 
year 1985 26.38 4.35 6.06 1.73 
year 1986 29.67 4.15 7.15 1.44 
year 1987 31.80 3.96 8.04 1.99 
year 1988 29.41 3.77 7.80 1.22 
year 1989 26.21 3.59 7.30 5.01 
year 1990 22.78 3.42 6.65 4.20 
year 1991 18.19 3.27 5.56 3.18 
year 1992 12.69 3.13 4.06 5.22 
year 1993 7.48 3.00 2.49 0.01 
year 1994 7.21 2.89 2.49 0.01 
year 1995 4.94 2.80 1.76 0.08 
year 1996 2.45 2.73 0.90 0.37 
year 1997 0.33 2.68 0.12 0.90 
year 1998 0.00 . . . 
AGES 
age 15 -0.82 9.45 -0.09 0.93 
age 16 4.50 9.20 0.49 0.62 
age 17 19.48 8.95 2.18 0.03 
age 18 43.43 8.69 5.00 6.64 
age 19 73.93 8.44 8.75 6.07 
age 20 106.85 8.20 13.04 1.19 
age 21 136.51 7.95 17.17 6.91 
age 22 157.63 7.70 20.47 3.44 
age 23 167.22 7.46 22.42 8.65 
age 24 164.78 7.21 22.85 8.83 
age 25 152.27 6.97 21.85 1.02 
age 26 133.98 6.73 19.91 1.82 
age 27 114.61 6.49 17.67 6.28 
age 28 97.49 6.25 15.60 1.57 
age 29 84.34 6.01 14.03 8.48 
age 30 75.28 5.78 13.03 1.29 
age 31 68.96 5.55 12.43 1.14 
age 32 63.55 5.32 11.95 2.31 
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age 33 57.78 5.09 11.35 1.42 
age 34 50.99 4.87 10.48 9.56 
age 35 43.22 4.65 9.30 5.49 
age 36 35.07 4.43 7.91 5.17 
age 37 27.36 4.22 6.48 1.28 
age 38 20.64 4.02 5.14 3.16 
age 39 15.22 3.82 3.99 7.09 
age 40 11.09 3.63 3.06 0.00 
age 41 8.02 3.46 2.32 0.02 
age 42 5.66 3.30 1.71 0.09 
age 43 3.76 3.15 1.19 0.23 
age 44 2.17 3.00 0.72 0.47 
age 45 0.86 2.87 0.30 0.76 
age 47 -0.47 2.22 -0.21 0.83 
age 49 -0.44 2.52 -0.17 0.86 
age 50 0.00 . . . 
COHORTS 
cohort 
1908 
-40.46 25.46 -1.59 0.11 
cohort 
1909 
-39.19 23.90 -1.64 0.10 
cohort 
1910 
-37.88 23.13 -1.64 0.10 
cohort 
1911 
-35.89 22.69 -1.58 0.11 
cohort 
1912 
-33.79 22.38 -1.51 0.13 
cohort 
1913 
-31.91 22.06 -1.45 0.15 
cohort 
1914 
-30.01 21.77 -1.38 0.17 
cohort 
1915 
-28.20 21.50 -1.31 0.19 
cohort 
1916 
-26.19 21.23 -1.23 0.22 
cohort 
1917 
-23.93 20.98 -1.14 0.25 
cohort -21.64 20.74 -1.04 0.30 
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1918 
cohort 
1919 
-19.47 20.51 -0.95 0.34 
cohort 
1920 
-17.64 20.28 -0.87 0.38 
cohort 
1921 
-16.21 20.04 -0.81 0.42 
cohort 
1922 
-15.13 19.83 -0.76 0.45 
cohort 
1923 
-14.35 19.61 -0.73 0.46 
cohort 
1924 
-13.83 19.40 -0.71 0.48 
cohort 
1925 
-13.43 19.19 -0.70 0.48 
cohort 
1926 
-13.06 18.97 -0.69 0.49 
cohort 
1927 
-12.59 18.77 -0.67 0.50 
cohort 
1928 
-12.00 18.56 -0.65 0.52 
cohort 
1929 
-11.35 18.35 -0.62 0.54 
cohort 
1930 
-10.77 18.15 -0.59 0.55 
cohort 
1931 
-10.47 17.95 -0.58 0.56 
cohort 
1932 
-10.65 17.75 -0.60 0.55 
cohort 
1933 
-11.48 17.55 -0.65 0.51 
cohort 
1934 
-12.82 17.36 -0.74 0.46 
cohort 
1935 
-14.67 17.16 -0.85 0.39 
cohort 
1936 
-17.03 16.97 -1.00 0.32 
cohort 
1937 
-19.68 16.78 -1.17 0.24 
cohort -22.26 16.59 -1.34 0.18 
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1938 
cohort 
1939 
-24.56 16.41 -1.50 0.13 
cohort 
1940 
-26.38 16.22 -1.63 0.10 
cohort 
1941 
-27.57 16.04 -1.72 0.09 
cohort 
1942 
-28.07 15.86 -1.77 0.08 
cohort 
1943 
-27.98 15.68 -1.78 0.07 
cohort 
1944 
-27.22 15.51 -1.76 0.08 
cohort 
1945 
-26.15 15.34 -1.71 0.09 
cohort 
1946 
-24.84 15.17 -1.64 0.10 
cohort 
1947 
-23.51 15.01 -1.57 0.12 
cohort 
1948 
-22.35 14.84 -1.51 0.13 
cohort 
1949 
-21.96 14.68 -1.50 0.14 
cohort 
1954 
-21.45 13.87 -1.55 0.12 
cohort 
1959 
-22.10 13.35 -1.66 0.10 
cohort 
1960 
-22.74 13.23 -1.72 0.09 
cohort 
1961 
-23.64 13.13 -1.80 0.07 
cohort 
1962 
-24.70 13.02 -1.90 0.06 
cohort 
1963 
-25.82 12.92 -2.00 0.05 
cohort 
1964 
-26.88 12.83 -2.09 0.04 
cohort 
1965 
-27.83 12.75 -2.18 0.03 
cohort -28.71 12.66 -2.27 0.02 
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1966 
cohort 
1967 
-29.57 12.59 -2.35 0.02 
cohort 
1968 
-30.30 12.52 -2.42 0.02 
cohort 
1969 
-30.75 12.46 -2.47 0.01 
cohort 
1970 
-31.02 12.41 -2.50 0.01 
cohort 
1971 
-30.86 12.37 -2.50 0.01 
cohort 
1972 
-29.80 12.33 -2.42 0.02 
cohort 
1973 
-27.66 12.31 -2.25 0.02 
cohort 
1974 
-24.57 12.30 -2.00 0.05 
cohort 
1975 
-20.48 12.31 -1.66 0.10 
cohort 
1976 
-15.61 12.33 -1.27 0.21 
cohort 
1977 
-10.65 12.38 -0.86 0.39 
cohort 
1978 
-6.44 12.46 -0.52 0.61 
cohort 
1979 
-3.53 12.60 -0.28 0.78 
cohort 
1980 
-1.22 12.81 -0.09 0.92 
cohort 
1981 
0.04 13.18 0.00 1.00 
cohort 
1982 
0.30 13.91 0.02 0.98 
cohort 
1983 
0.00 . . . 
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APPENDIX 1 to CHAPTER 5. Reasons for Fertility Decline in Russia  
                                                    in the late 1980s- 1990s 
 
As clearly seen from the Figure 3b, fertility went into a steep decline in 1988 and 
remained that way into the very end of the 1990s. There are several alternative 
explanations to this phenomenon. 
 
Distant Consequences of Population Policy 
Let’s start with the first of them. The bulk of this explanation is that policy has 
affected timing of births by enhancing procreation at earlier ages and narrowing 
intergenetic (birth) intervals, thus causing a drop in fertility later on, at the time when 
these births would have “normally” occur. 
For the purposes of assessing a hypothesis on population policy’s distant 
consequences having an impact on fertility decline at the early 1990s and later periods, 
two points are of primary interest. First, to what extent was the increase in fertility 
caused by policy measures? And, second, to what extent could enhanced fertility be 
attributable to a tempo effect (giving births at earlier ages and narrowing birth 
intervals), and to what degree this increase was related to change of quantum of births? 
Indeed, for assessing the plausibility of hypothesis on a compensatory drop in fertility at 
the years following the decade of policy implementation, one has to be positive, in first 
place, on the attribution of the most of demographic change to introduced policy 
measures’ impact and, secondly, on the prevalence of a timing of birth change effect. 
First assumption was addressed earlier in Chapter 5 (see pp. 136-138). The main 
premise of this notion was that though the increase of fertility in early 1980s was widely 
hailed as the evidence of population policy impact, there is reason to believe the trend 
was already on the way. The implication of this part of analysis for the assessment of a 
compensatory post-policy fertility decline explanation is the following one: with having 
reasonable support for partial fertility increase being attributable to not just a policy 
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effect, the scope of this explanation diminishes. 
As for estimating the influence of population policy in regards to affecting 
quantum and tempo of fertility, there is largely a consensus among demographers about 
the latter having been impacted the most. Avdeev and Monnier (1995, 26-28) have 
estimated population policy’s quantum effect at the level of 2 to 15% (for various 
cohorts) of the overall completed fertility. Arkhangelsky (2006, 35) assesses the 
“surplus” of births due to policy’s measures in the amount of 0.1- 0.2 children for the 
cohort of women born in 1953-1957, the one with most affected quantum of fertility. 
Zakharov (2006, 45) provides an estimate of actual additional births (not related to just 
change in timing) as of 3.6% of the total number of newborns. 
Of great importance for assessing the hypothesis on the compensatory drop in 
fertility in the years following its initial rise after introducing pronatalistic population 
policy, is the analysis performed by Zakharov (2006). Comparison of actual and 
synthetic (conditional) cohorts allowed for not only discriminating tempo and quantum 
effects of population policy but also helped to estimate latter’s impact on order of births 
and other changes in demographic behavior among different cohorts. 
Among major findings of this analysis are the following ones. Changing of the 
timing of births, that is the main impact of population policy, has included further shift 
of the first birth toward younger ages and narrowing of the intergenetic (birth) intervals. 
Policy had little if any effect on reducing the percentage of childless families, with their 
share in the total number of families staying at some eight percent. The probability of 
the second order births had significantly increased, especially at the early reproductive 
ages. Three was also some increase of the probability of third order births (two to three 
percent), especially at the ages over 30 (cohorts of 1945-1954 years of birth) and among 
those reaching this age before the year of 1990. There is no statistically significant 
increase in the births of fourth and next orders. 
So, one of the major policy’s impacts were enhancing number of families with 
two children, the trend that was already on the way. As mentioned before, most of this 
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“surplus” was reflected in the rise of Total Fertility Rates, and is attributable to 
changing of tempo of births. The differences in fertility behavior between cohorts have 
also manifested themselves, as demonstrated by the analysis. Cohorts of women born in 
the first half of the 1950s, the ones facing the decision to give births “now” or “never” 
at the time of population policy implementation, had the highest fertility increases. 
Generations that belong to second half of the 1950s years of birth and the ones born at 
the beginning of the 1960s (they were in their 20s at the time of policy measures 
introduction) had mostly changed their calendar of births. Finally, generations of the 
youngest women born in mid-1960s and later, are typified with having a very early start 
of procreation activity and a deep drop in fertility at the middle reproductive ages. 
Zakharov, assessing these findings, does not deny the possibility of social and 
economic crisis affecting fertility drop in the 1990s. However, he equally emphasizes 
the impact of changing fertility tempo consequences (2006, 48-49). As one of the 
arguments in favor of this point of view he brings the following evidence: steep fall of 
fertility among women belonging to cohorts of 1960-1965 years of birth that started at 
1989; slowdown of family formation for the cohorts born at the first half of the 1950s at 
mid-1980s and for the cohorts of 1959-1960 years of birth – at 1988. Zakharov also 
stresses that these slowdowns and steep declines in fertility happened before the 
beginning of systemic crisis at the early 1990s and views them as an evidence of 
changing timing of births being a major cause of the drop in TFR. 
In assessing these conclusions one has to agree there are definitely several 
factors affecting fertility decline in Russia, consequences of changing tempo of births 
being one of them. As demographers stress, there is no way to discriminate these effects 
by providing exact statistical estimation of each factor’s contribution. Acknowledging 
the definite role of fertility tempo changes effect on decline of birth rates, I would like 
to provide a qualitative assessment of the magnitude of alternative factors’ impact (in 
the context of this very part of discussion, it is mostly the role of social and economic 
crisis). 
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First, the scope of changing tempo of births impact on further decline of fertility 
is limited by the fact that some of additional births are not attributable to the 
implementation of population policy. With its amount not exactly defined, this chunk of 
additional births that is not attributable to policy’s impact could not be encompassed by 
an explanation related to consequences of changing timing of fertility. Indeed, tempo-
related explanations work only for those affected by population policy. 
Second, the core assumption of tempo-related explanations is that births 
occurred earlier due to implementation of population policy, would have otherwise 
taken place later, according to a “normal” pace of fertility. But it is equally plausible to 
assume that, being delayed in the absence of policy measures, these births would have 
never occurred anyway because of the start of systemic crisis in Russia in the 1990s. If 
this very scenario had been unfolded, fertility decline would not possibly demonstrate 
the same steepness but the total fertility rates would be still similarly low. 
Finally, one of the arguments in favor of a tempo-related explanation of the drop 
of fertility is the one based on data on actual cohorts’ birth rates. As mentioned before, 
these data demonstrate that fertility decline at different cohorts happened at the second 
half of the 1980s, before the start of transformational crisis in the USSR/Russia. Indeed, 
collapse of the state, breakdown of social and economic system, collapse of such 
institutions as social security and medical insurance and inflation in four digits numbers 
have happened in the early 1990s. However, signs of severe social and economic crisis 
have already manifested themselves in the late 1970s but have significantly accelerated 
in the late half of the 1980s. 
 From 1986 through 1988 Gorbachev initiated or pronounced intent to institute 
policies that threatened to undercut the basic provisions of a social contract in all major 
policy areas: employment security, wage equality, price stability and socialized services. 
Changes in industrial policy began to erode employment security and stability, 
heightening demands for productivity and the prospect of displacement. A wage reform, 
which increased differentials among skill grades, was also introduced. In addition, 
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legitimization of a limited cooperative sector began to weaken state control over 
consumer prices and challenged the monopolistic position of state enterprises in the 
consumer sector. Proposed price reforms threatened state subsidies and other necessities. 
In the context of this discussion it is important to look at the wage dynamics at 
this period. The idea of wage reform was to diminish egalitarian distribution of income 
and to tie wages with quality and productivity. In many enterprises the reform produced 
labor productivity gains and cuts in the labor force. This did not necessarily lead to 
unemployment because of the creation of new jobs and possibility to enter them. 
Through 1987 overall increases in industrial productivity exceeded wage increases. The 
greater differentiation in wages and their higher correlation with productivity were 
introduced by the reform. 
In 1988, however, the impact of reform policies on wages markedly weakened, 
as the workers used new political freedoms to strike against lowering their wages. 
Though the strikes weren't massive, the government mostly stuck to the social contract 
and forced managers to comply with workers' demands. Also, by late 1988 industrial 
managers were also motivated to increase wages because of inflation in the consumer 
economy. Thus the drop of wages in 1987 was followed by their increase. 
The broader instability related to the deterioration of a social contract could be 
found in the emergence of the threat in possibility of linking wages and employment 
with productivity. This possibility was later reversed. Reform policy did result, 
however, in some erosion of labor's social contract guarantees: some workers were 
released from their jobs; other experienced loss of wages, and many experienced 
unaccustomed economic insecurity. But by early 1989 new decisions or concessions 
had limited the painful effects for workers: factories were allowed to reabsorb released 
workers, bankrupt enterprises were bailed out, wage discipline was relaxed, 
privatization was severely limited, and retail price reform was indefinitely delayed. 
A  similar  retreat  from  the  initial  reforms  threatening  other  provisions  of  a  
social contract had happened in 1988-89. According to the new law, subsidies should be 
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slashed to unprofitable state enterprises, with the goal of reducing subsidies to the loss-
making plants by 30 percent in 1989. However, this hard decision was delayed several 
times and, in fact, industrial subsidies in 1989 and 1990 actually increased. Other 
important decision was related to the restructuring of the health sector including 
privatization of some medical services and creation of medical cooperatives. According 
to the plan, the paid services would have affected only about two percent of medical 
services over the next fifteen years. The legalization of cooperatives was formalized by 
the adoption of Law on Cooperatives on May 1988 and by the Fall, 1988 medical 
cooperatives were rapidly developing. The results of the cooperatives' establishment 
were mixed and included public complaints about abuses and corruption in that sector. 
Overall, it is evident that inconsistencies with the provision of social contract 
elements that have accelerated in the 1980s, especially in the second half of the decade, 
have mostly affected the symbolic aspect of the population’s everyday life. Introduction 
and shutting down the cooperatives, reversal of some crucial elements of a contract such 
as healthcare subsidies and linking wages with the increased productivity has affected 
mostly the stability of the existing system without bringing a substantial decline in the 
standard of living measured by GDP per person or the consumer basket. This trend 
related to the “social contract” deterioration not accompanied by a manifest economic 
crisis, lasted to some 1988. 
Severe economic crisis, however, had exploded in the USSR in 1989 and 
culminated in 1990. This crisis had progressed and by 1990 it looked like the economy 
would disintegrate altogether. The reason for this crisis were reforms themselves that 
led to growing monetary imbalances, aggravated fiscal imbalances, an administrative 
stalemate, calamities in foreign trade, a decline in price stability (severe inflation) and 
shortages of the most basic goods. 
So, it cannot be ruled out that to a certain extent fertility drop in the actual 
cohorts were caused by these very signs of social and economic instability and crisis 
that, according to the provided analysis, have started to aggravate before the 
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transformational crisis of the 1990s, at the second half of the 1970s and, to a much 
greater extent, at the late 1980s. Total fertility rates have showed some increase in the 
1980s largely due to changing of birth calendar as a result of population policy 
implementation, but relatively steady decline in fertility among actual cohorts could be 
a more of a long-term reaction to the accelerated social and economic crisis. 
Based on provided three arguments, it is possible to conclude that, along with a 
definite impact of the timing of births on fertility decline, there are also many reasons to 
believe in the presence of other factors, economic instability and crisis being one of 
them, that made a significant impact on fertility dynamics. Next section of this 
Appendix explores the role of these alternative factors brought up for the remaining 
explanations of lowest low fertility in Russia. 
 
             Is It Transformational Crisis or a Second Demographic Transition? 
As mentioned earlier, the decline of fertility in Russia started most recently in 
1988 has dramatically accelerated since 1990. Coincidence with the start of a 
transformational crisis provided grounds for establishing causation between two 
phenomena. 
The transformational crisis in Russia was multifaceted. It was manifested, first 
of all, in the overwhelming economic disaster. The national economy went into a 
tailspin, with gross domestic product starting to decline at a rate of 17 percent in 1991, 
and at even higher rate since. In 1995 poverty rate was estimated at the level of 26 
percent of the total population. Inflation reached the record rate of over 2,000 (!) 
percent in 1992. Most of amassed monetary savings of people was thus inflated away. 
Non-payments of wages became common practice even at profitable Russian 
enterprises. Also, in some cities in the early 1990s food coupons were introduced 
because of scarcity of even most basic foods. 
Radical structural transformation also took place at that time. Lots of 
manufacturing facilities were closed and many new businesses dealing with trade, 
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investment and finances emerged instead. That  gave  a  reason  to  sociologist  Michael  
Burawoy  for  defining  the developing mode of production a “merchandise capitalism”. 
Massive privatization of state owned property was exercised at that time. Staged 
collateralized auctioning allowed for allocation of huge assets in the hands of a tiny 
circle of new oligarchs, cronies of political elite members. Along with emerging of new 
classes like businessmen, racketeers and private security services, traditional well-to-do 
strata like physicians, teachers, research fellows and qualified workers increasingly 
found themselves not being in demand (and, thus, moving below the poverty line). 
The transformational crisis has also carried a political dimension. In 1991 the 
USSR was dissolved, and that led to quite a few global implications including types of 
relationships with newly formed independent states, formerly USSR republics. Among 
problems related to this development were the ones with Russian-speaking populations 
in these states and the painful dissolution of “imperial consciousness”. New forms of 
political activity including participation in civil movements and newly formed 
alternative parties emerged as well. 
Many ideational changes were also associated with this ongoing transformation. 
It was a radical break with what had been referred to as “socialist greenhouse” ideology 
(Sobotka, 2002, 41-46). There were no longer such things as guaranteed employment 
and free access to medical care. This break was even more pronounced given that 
leading reformers of the 1990s, E. Gaidar and A. Chubais, were guided by experience of 
liberal economic policies conducted by M. Thatcher and R. Reagan, with their emphasis 
on laissez-faire, minimal level of state support and reliance on individual. 
Implementation of these practices in Russia was accompanied by corrupted 
privatization and generated strong ideological resistance on the part of broad segments 
of the population. Society was marked with a huge polarization between those accepting 
new values (that still differed significantly from their Western counterparts) and those 
who did not. 
Ideational changes that took place during transformation in Russia have also 
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included the ones directly related to demographic behavior. Those are the values 
reflecting permissiveness on sexual norms and behaviors including non-marital births 
and living in consensual unions. Acquiring these values was a sharp breakaway with 
Puritanism professed by official Soviet propaganda. 
It is important to mention that the period of interest (from 1990 to nowadays) 
was not homogeneous in regard to described changes. In mid-1990s first signs of 
moderate economic growth showed up. The financial crisis and default of 1998 
interrupted this trend for some time. However, by the turn of decade (and millennium) 
the trend was reversed and economic growth significantly accelerated on the wings of 
skyrocketing oil prices and implemented market reforms. Not only shortages of basic 
goods were over in most of the large cities of Russia but also new opportunities 
emerged as well. One of them, long-term consumer loans and mortgages that were 
introduced in early 2000s, became available for many citizens. New employment 
opportunities, especially in big cities, resulted in the creation of a tiny but steadily 
growing middle class. 
The question that divides demographers in regard to providing an explanation of 
the emerged lowest low fertility in Russia is whether the major reason for the 
phenomena was the period effect of the transformational crisis, or it was rather long-
term trends of changing fertility behavior due to the spread of new values conducive to 
Second Demographic Transition. With general consensus that both factors matter, the 
question is which of them prevails in impacting Russian fertility phenomena. Also, to 
what extent this factor prevails. 
Let us start with analysis of the extent to which Second Demographic Transition 
theory is applicable to post-communist Russia. I will break this analysis into two parts. 
In first one, I will speculate on the applicability of the general premises of this theory 
including ideational changes in their relation to structural changes in society. In the 
second part I will examine interpretations of fertility behavior in Russia in regard to 
major manifestations of this behavior described by the Second Demographic Transition 
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theory. 
The major premise of this theory, as well known, is that changes in demographic 
behavior are explained by huge shifts in the prevailing societal values. Van de Kaa 
(1996, 425) emphasizes these new values of “postmodern epoch”. Among them he 
mentions “…the overwhelming preoccupation with self-fulfillment, personal freedom of 
choice, personal development and lifestyle, and emancipation”. European Value Survey 
conducted in the Northern, Eastern and Southern parts of the continent have provided 
evidence of a connection between new models of demographic behavior conducive to the 
Second Demographic Transition theory’s values: individual autonomy, weaker civil 
morality, world orientation, and tolerance toward minorities, self-fulfillment and other 
postmaterialist values (Surkyn and Lesthaeghe, 2004, 54). 
Van de Kaa stresses relationship of these values’ emergence with social, 
economic and structural conditions of societies: “Rising incomes and the economic and 
political security which democratic welfare states offer their populations has helped 
trigger a ‘silent’ revolution”, a shift in a ‘Maslovian’ post-materialism  direction  where  
an  individual’s  sexual  preferences  are accepted for what they are, and decisions on 
cohabitation, divorce, abortion, sterilization and voluntarily  childlessness  are  largely  
left  to  the  discretion  of  the  individuals  and  couples involved” (1996, 425). 
To what extent Russian society matches the criteria of postmaterialism that is a 
prerequisite for the emergence of described value shifts? In first place, postindustrial 
societies are typified with the prevalence of service economy sector. This is definitely 
not the case with Russia even nowadays, with lion share of the state profits being 
generated from the sales of natural resources. Russia in the 1990s was not a welfare 
state offering economic security to its citizens, the one Van de Kaa was referring to in 
regard to Second Demographic Transition. Structurally, middle class is claimed to be 
the “modernized part of population”, thus, “type of its marital behavior shares European 
and American pattern” (Srednii Class, 2008, 39). According to results of the survey 
conducted by Independent Institute for Social Policy, the share of the middle  class  
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constituted  20  percent  of  country’s  active  population  in  2000.  Some estimates of 
the same category for 1998 is 9.4 percent and for 2006 – 22 percent. In rural areas of 
Russia the share of the middle class is estimated at the level of 13-15 percent (Srednii 
Class, 2008, 39). 
What is equally important of assessing the possibility of widespread transition to 
new demographic behavior in Russia is the level of polarization in society. According to 
data published by Roskomstat (Russian Committee for Statistics), in 2007 incomes of top 
10 percent of population have sixteen times exceeded the ones of bottom 10 percent. 
Overall, Russian social structure resembles the one Europe had forty-fifty years ago 
(Srednii Class, 2008, p. 39). At this very time, a period of 1955-1965, for the most 
European countries Second Demographic Transition had yet to come. 
This is not to be said that economic and structural conditions in Russia rule out 
the fact of Second Demographic Transition took a start in Russia. Rather, the point is 
that given these conditions, there is, most likely, a very tiny segment of population in 
nowadays Russia (and even more so in the 1990s) that fully acquired values conducive 
to the ones described by the Second Demographic Transition theory. This very segment 
is mostly concentrated in big cities, growing regional centers and oil rich cities. It is 
likely that with increase of cities’  development  and  overall  modernization  of  the  
country,  this  chunk  of population will increase. 
I would go beyond purely structural analysis given the fact that the values could 
to some degree trickle down to lower strata, outside of statistically defined boundaries 
of middle class. I’d like to speculate on the very values conducive to Second 
Demographic Transition: to what extent they are shared by the “demographically 
advanced” group, Russian middle class? As seen from the list of these values cited 
above, it is quite a heterogeneous group. The question of which of these values were 
internalized in Russia, and to what extent, merits special research. In the absence of 
that, I’ll try just speculating on the topic. 
Tolerance toward minorities is definitely not a value in great supply in Russia. 
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Killings of foreign students with different color or just from different ethnic groups by 
skinheads became a common practice in quite a few cities of Russia, St. Petersburg 
being first among them. Sobotka cites characterization for all the post-Soviet states that 
include existence of such traits as “…xenophobia and authoritative nationalism” (2002, 
p. 50). 
The idea of such values as self-fulfillment, freedom of choice, personal 
development and individualistic lifestyles being acquired in full by the broad segments 
of Russian population has been qualified by a prominent demographer as being “out of 
touch with reality” (Klupt, 2008, p. 323). Indeed, unfair allocation of the most attractive 
assets in the hands of elite’s inner circle, widespread corruption, authoritarian type of 
modernization undertaken by President B. Yeltsin, as well as domination of criminals in 
economic structures in the 1990s don’t contribute to self-actualization and enjoyment of 
freedom. However, there are certain shifts in the direction of spreading of those values. 
Plurality of the forms of ownership provided certain choices for individuals. Ability to 
earn more money created stimulus for hard work and education, those accumulated 
wealth started, in accordance to Maslow, thinking of higher forms of human existence, 
such as self- actualization. 
One value related to freedom and self-expression, however, has not only 
emerged but became dominant. That is consumerism. Actually, drive for consumerism 
has appeared before 
1990. In discussion, provided on that issue, Sobotka (2002, 57) cites a point of view 
linking collapse of the Communist regimes with their inability to satisfy consumer 
demands. With gradual rise of supply of goods in the second half of 1990s not only 
demand for them was matched but the whole culture of consumerism has emerged and 
expanded in Russia. 
Summarizing this part of discussion, one can conclude that not only economic 
and structural conditions of Russia have limited the advance and scope of Second 
Demographic Transition but the very uneven internalization of various values 
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conducive to the initiation of new demographic behavior, most likely, have made a 
mark on its advance. 
Let us turn to the analysis of Second Demographic Transition theory’s 
manifestations of demographic behavior in Russia. Following features of such behavior 
are defined: increase in the numbers of consensual unions; increase in proportions of 
non-marital childbearing with an accompanying increase in the mean age at 
childbearing outside marriage; decline of induced abortions and increase in use of 
modern contraception; change in the position and shape of distribution of birth by age 
including shift in the share of teenage fertility; increase of the mean age of legal 
marriage, mean age at giving first birth, and mean age of maternity. 
Let us start with analysis of the first two features. Russia in the 1990s has 
demonstrated relatively high and still growing rate of cohabitation. Higher prevalence 
of cohabitation of the women aged 20-24 and 25-29 in comparison with many other 
Eastern European countries, with tendency of increase, is presented by Sobotka (2002, 
p. 33). Also, a definite change towards increased non-marital childbearing  coupled  
with  higher  prevalence  of  cohabitation  is  clearly the trend  for  three countries, 
Russia being one of them. 
These  trends  could  well  speak  in  support  of  SDT  start  in  Russia.  
However, both spreading of cohabitation unions and increase in the share of non-marital 
births could equally reflect severe economic and social conditions. Klupt (2008, 320) 
emphasizes the movement of significant share of incomes into economic “shady” areas 
that, along with weakening of legal system, have led to diminishing of the role of 
marriage institution as the one securing provision of material support from the former 
husband for rearing a child. The author also stresses that despite commonalities in 
changes of sexual relationships between Russia and Western Europe, their impact on 
fertility differed. While in most Western European countries non-marital fertility is 
almost equaled to fertility in legal marriages (due to favorable economic conditions for 
rearing a child by a lone mother), the spread of cohabitation unions in Russia has 
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resulted in overall fertility decline. So, increase in number of couples living in 
cohabitation unions and the number of non-marital births, most likely, reflect the impact 
of two major factors: first, spreading of new sexual norms conducive to SDT and, 
second, devaluation of the institution of marriage due to transformational crisis. 
As for the third manifestation of Second Demographic Transition, there is strong 
evidence that Russia has definitely demonstrated a decline in induced abortions and 
relatively high rate of using modern contraception (mostly IUD). With TIAR level of 
2.08 in 1999, Russia still has the high rate of induced abortions, perhaps highest among 
countries  of  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  including  former  Soviet  republics  (with  
no  data available for Ukraine). But consistent trend of gradual decline in induced 
abortions since second half of the 1980s is evident: 3.66 percent in 1985, 3.31 percent in 
1989, 3.05 percent in 1990, 2.6 percent in1995, 2.40 percent in 1997, 2.2 percent in 
1998 and 2, 08 percent in 1999. 
Induced abortions decline is a more unambiguous indicator of Second 
Demographic Transition that increase of those living in consensual unions. The latter 
could point out for both the start of demographic transition and for the impact of 
transformational crisis as well, while decline in induced abortions and increase in the use 
of modern contraception clearly speaks of the signs of long-term processes like Second 
Demographic Transition expansion. 
Postponement of marriages and parenthood is viewed as the main feature of the 
Second Demographic Transition (Lesthaege and Moors, 2000, p. 124). The importance 
of timing change in fertility is emphasized, in particular, by Sobotka (2003). He notes 
that postponement of childbearing depresses the TFR to a lower level than the one it 
would have reached in the absence of timing changes. So, for the explanation of the 
extent to which TFR decline is attributable to postponement of births (the main feature 
of the Second Demographic Transition) is essential for a given discussion. 
Russia has demonstrated a trend of increasing of the ages of both marriage and 
parenthood, as for the first order births, as well the mean one. It was not as pronounced, 
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though, like in most countries of Central and Eastern Europe. And, as with the share of 
those living in cohabitation unions, this indicator could be interpreted both as a sign of 
the SDT advance, as well as a manifestation of economic crisis. Klupt, for instance, 
mentioned possibility of this postponement being partially attributable to the “behavior 
of young women from depressed regions that performed several abortions before the 
birth of a first child, and have postponed those latter due to lack of permanent job and 
reliable partners” (Klupt 2008, p. 322). 
However,  there  is  an  indicator  designed  to  split  “real”  reduction  in  fertility  
level (quantum) from the one caused by timing effects: it is adjusted total fertility rate 
introduced by Bongaarts-Feeney. According to it, there is a clear division in the major 
“contributors” to low TFR across Central and Eastern European countries. While in 
Hungary and Czech Republic the decline of TFR was mainly attributable to the timing 
effects (the tempo component) and  in  Baltic  States,  Poland  and Slovakia  the  impact  
of  calendar  of  births  was  also  quite substantial, in Bulgaria, Romania and Russia the 
tempo effect in TFR was very modest: correspondingly 30, 20 and 16 percent. So, for 
Russia quantum component of lowest low fertility was the prevalent one, and that speaks 
in favor of a limited effect of the Second Demographic Transition. 
What seems very insightful for assessing degree of Russian fertility trends’ 
universality is the “two layer model” proposed by Sobotka (2002, 2003). According to 
it, the split between Central and Eastern European countries in regard to described 
above differences in types of demographic behavior and patterns reflect the pace of 
implemented reforms. Countries that have underwent  smooth  transition  to  market  
economy  (Czech  Republic,  Slovenia,  Poland  and Hungary) demonstrate greater signs 
of acquiring fertility behavior conducive to Second Demographic Transition (which is 
reflected in prevailing influence of birth postponement on the decline of TFR). Second 
category experienced economic and societal near-collapse in the course of 
transformation and thus demonstrate emphasis on survival values. Thus major factor in 
TFR decline for these countries was the quantum effect that is the actual change in the 
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number of births throughout the women’ reproductive period, not related to timing 
effects of postponing births, that is the tempo effect. So, the impact of Second 
Demographic Transition (for which postponing births is one of the major indications) 
was not so pronounced for the countries of  second  category  that  includes  Bulgaria,  
Romania  and  most  post-Soviet  states,  including Russia. 
Summarizing this discussion, it could be concluded that there are clear 
indications of the 
SDT indeed started and generated an impact on fertility in Russia. However, at the 
period from 1990 to nowadays its impact seems to be relatively insignificant. Here are 
the major arguments in favor of this point of view based on provided discussion: 
First, level of country’s modernization and the corresponding social structure 
typified with tiny portion of “demographically advanced” middle class, assume 
significant limitations for fertility behavior conducive to Second Demographic 
Transition; 
Second, the societal values that generate Second Demographic Transition were 
not evenly acquired: some of these important values were shared only by very small 
segments of population; 
Finally, various manifestations of fertility behaviors conducive to the ones 
described by Second Demographic Transition theory, differed in degree of acceptance. 
While some of them (decline in the induced abortions,  increase  in  the  use  of  modern  
contraception)  demonstrated  significant  dynamics, others, like the most important 
one, delaying of first and other births, were not as pronounced. Most of TFR decline 
was attributable to quantum rather than tempo effect. 
There are several other factors that also favor the possibility of a strong impact 
of transformational crisis on lowest low fertility, also suggest this explanation. One of 
them being the fact that Second Demographic Transition that took place in most 
Western European countries had not caused such prolonged and steep decline of fertility 
(except for Germany, Italy and Spain for the special reasons related to correspondingly 
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denazification, traditions of familialism and a negative attitude toward living in 
consensual unions). However, for the countries that underwent transformational crisis, 
there are striking similarities in steepness and duration of fertility decline.  
Other indirect evidence of demographic behavior’s sensitivity to economic 
situation is the drop in fertility in Russia in 1999, right after financial default of 1998. 
Shortly after the start of financial and economic recovery TFR gradually started to 
climb. Also, evidence in  favor  of significance  of  economic  crisis  impact  on  fertility  
is  supported  by  the  data  of sociological survey conducted by VTsIOM (the Russian 
Center for Public Opinion Research). According to it, in the first half of the 1990s 
people cited the decline of living standards, unemployment and other factors that are 
directly tied to the economic crisis among major reasons limiting the desired number of 
children in a family (Kashperov, 2004, p.  61). 
The undertaken discussion allows for defining economic crisis and instability to 
be the primary reason for a steep fertility decline in the USSR/Russia starting late 
1980s.  
 
